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Introduction
Calls for greater empirical work in international law have been gaining
ground.' This article, building from years of empirical investigation of
1. See, e.g., Jeffrey Dunoff & Joel Trachtman, The Law and Economics of Humanita-
rian Law Violations in Internal Conflict, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 394 (1999) (writing from a law
and economics perspective that "[w]hile law and economics is rich in theory, it exalts
empiricism (in which it is surprisingly poor)"); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, Interna-
tional Law and State Socialization: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, 54
DUKE L.J. 983 (2005) (writing from a sociological "acculturation" perspective that
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international trade dispute settlement and its impact in Brazil, aims to
advance our understanding of three sets of interrelated questions: who
shapes international trade law through litigation and bargaining, how do
they do so, and what broader effects do international trade law and
judicialization have within a country?2 The article's point of entry is an
examination of what lies behind Brazil's use of the legal regime of the
World Trade Organization (WTO), including its use in litigation, negotia-
tions, and ad hoc bargaining. We assess how the WTO legal regime has
affected Brazil's national administration and Brazilian government-busi-
ness-civil society relations regarding international trade policy and dispute
settlement. In turn, we depict the strategies that Brazilian public and pri-
vate actors have adopted to deploy and shape this very international legal
process. We aim to show how these national and international processes
are reciprocally and dynamically interrelated. 3
Although earlier work has focused on the impact of the legalization
and judicialization of trade relations in the United States and the European
Union (EU), 4 this article assesses the responses and strategies of a major
"[flurther empirical research is required to illustrate more concretely how states are
accultured"); Gregory Shaffer, A New Legal Realism: Method in International Economic
Law Research, in INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE DISCIPLINE
29 (Colin B. Picker et al. eds., 2008) (writing from a new legal realist approach and
noting that although there has been a growth in quantitative empirical work on the use
of the WTO legal system, qualitative empirical studies based on extensive field work are
still lacking).
2. By using the term "legalized regime," we refer to the relative precision and bind-
ing nature of WTO rules. By the term "judicialized regime," we refer to the use of a third
party institution for dispute settlement-WTO panels whose decisions are subject to
appeal before the WTO Appellate Body. On the concept of legalization, compare Ken-
neth Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT'L ORG. 401, 401-03 (2000) (defin-
ing legalization in terms of a spectrum of three factors: (i) precision of rules, (ii)
authority or bindingness of rules, and (iii) delegation to a third party decision-maker),
with Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to "Legalization:" Richer Views
of Law and Politics, 55 INT'L ORG. 743, 743 (2001) (taking a more sociological perspec-
tive and critiquing Abbott et al.'s formal definition of legalization). On the concept of
judicialization, or third party dispute resolution, see Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization
and the Construction of Governance, 31 COMP. POL. STUD. 147, 147-84 (1999).
3. For a socio-legal account of the recursive, reciprocal relation of international
institutions and domestic contexts, see Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The
Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of
Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM.J. Soc. 1135 (2007). In political science, two-level
game theory examines the interrelationship of international negotiations (Level 1) and
domestic politics (Level 2), assessing the strategic role of national leaders in determin-
ing national positions and strategies at the international level in light of national politi-
cal contexts. In contrast, the literature referred to as "the second image reversed"
examines how international structures affect domestic political life. On two-level games,
see DOUBLE-EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC POLITICS (Peter
B. Evans et al. eds., 1993) and Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The
Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 INT'L ORG. 427 (1988). On the second image reversed, see
Peter Gourevitch, The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Polit-
ics, 32 INT'L ORG. 881 (1978).
4. See, e.g., GREGORY C. SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS: PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS
IN WTO LITIGATION (2003) [hereinafter SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS]; Gregory Shaffer,
What's New in EU Trade Dispute Settlement?: Judicialization, Public-Private Networks and
the WTO Legal Order, J. EUR. PUB. POL'Y 832, 837 (2006). In addition, there has been
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developing country, Brazil. The article investigates, in particular, how the
legalization and judicialization of international trade relations have
spurred institutional transformations within Brazilian government, busi-
ness, and civil society as well as in their interactions, giving rise to new
Brazilian public-private partnerships for trade policy formation and trade
dispute settlement. That is, we examine international law matters not in
terms of compliance with individual legal decisions or treaty provisions
(for which there is considerable literature) 5 but rather in terms of the more
systemic impact of WTO legalization and judicialization on Brazilian busi-
ness-government-civil society relations regarding the making and imple-
mentation of international trade law.6
By focusing on the interaction of domestic and international
processes, we view international trade litigation as part of a broader struc-
ture of international trade dispute settlement, negotiation, and practice. 7
Brazil has aspirations for regional and global leadership and the WTO pro-
considerable scholarship regarding the impact of the European Union within EU mem-
ber states. See, e.g., TRANSFORMING EUROPE: EUROPEANIZATION AND DOMESTIC STRUCTURAL
CHANGE (Maria Green Cowles et al. eds., 2001); Karen J. Alter, The European Union's
Legal System and Domestic Policy: Spillover or Backlash?, 54 INT'L ORG. 489 (2000).
Although there have been many studies of trade policy-making in Brazil, this article is, to
our knowledge, the first sustained empirical study of what lies behind Brazil's approach
to international trade dispute settlement and its impact within Brazil.
5. On international law generally, see ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA H. CHAYES, THE
NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995);
William C. Bradford, International Legal Compliance: An Annotated Bibliography, 30 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 379 (2004) (providing an excellent review of the literature);
Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV.
1823 (2002); Harold K. Jacobson, Conceptual, Methodological, and Substantive Issues
Entwined in Studying Compliance, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 569 (1998) (surveying major ILC
theories); Robert 0. Keohane, Compliance with International Commitments: Politics
Within a Framework of Law, 86 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 176 (1992); Kal Raustiala &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law, International Relations, and Compliance, in THE
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 28 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002). On
WTO and GATT law, see ROBERT HUDEC, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN GATT LEGAL SYSTEM (1993); Chad Bown, On the Economic
Success of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, 86 REV. ECON. & STAT. 811 (2004) (noting
that three years after the date of adoption of a WTO judicial decision in favor of a com-
plainant, imports of the complainant's affected goods have increased substantially into
the respondent); Marc Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
Early Settlement in GATT/WTO Disputes, 24 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 158, 162 (2000) (show-
ing that around two-thirds of complaints "ending prior to a ruling (whether before or
after the establishment of a panel), exhibited full or partial concessions by the
defendant").
6. This article does not examine, in a broad sense, societal change within Brazil,
but it provides material support for such an inquiry. Rather, the article focuses on this
subset of change.
7. As a diplomat from a mid-sized developed country mission confirmed within the
WTO context, it is a common error of trade law academics to view WTO judicial opin-
ions as the end of the process. Cases, rather, are resolved through diplomatic negotia-
tions and private party bargaining behind the scenes. The judicial decision simply
serves to help the parties resolve their dispute. In his words, "the end game ... ulti-
mately involves negotiation informed by dispute settlement." Interview by Gregory C.
Shaffer with Diplomat [name withheld], in Geneva, Switz. (June 24, 2002) (on file with
authors).
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vides a vehicle through which it can advance these aims. For Brazil to do
so, however, it needed to adapt internally to meet international trade law's
increasing institutional demands. In documenting these adaptations, the
article shows how Brazil's strategies for WTO litigation and negotiations
have enabled it to become a major player in the WTO system. The article,
therefore, situates WTO legal and Brazilian domestic developments within
a single frame.8 The interaction between the national and international
levels is our unit of analysis.
The article applies two complementary analytic frameworks to assess
how WTO legalization and judicialization have interacted with Brazilian
domestic factors. First, the article is part of a larger investigation of the
effect of changes at the international level on domestic institutions and
government-business-civil society relations around the world. 9 New gov-
ernance processes, whether they consist of transgovernmental public net-
works, 10 mixed public-private hybrid networks," or transnational private
fields of law-making, 1 2 have reflected and responded to the challenges
8. This article differs from socio-legal studies that focus solely on the impact of
international legal norms within developing countries. For excellent work in this vein,
see SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006); Bruce Carruthers & Terrence Halliday, Negotiat-
ing Globalization: Global Scripts and Intermediation in the Construction of Asian
Insolvency Regimes, 31 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 521 (2006).
9. See TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE STATE (Stephan Leibfried & Michael Zurn eds.,
2005); see also GREGORY SHAFFER & DAMIAN CHALMERS, TRANSNATIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS
OF THE STATE (2007), available at http://www.luc.edu/law/faculty/docs/shaffer/trans-
natltransfstate.pdf. For a fascinating study about changes in Latin America regarding
economic development and human rights policies, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G.
GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, ECONOMISTS, AND THE CON-
TEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002). For a structural perspective with a
realist international relations approach, see Richard H. Steinberg, The Transformation of
European Trading States, in THE STATE AFTER STATISM: NEW STATE ACTIVITIES IN THE AGE OF
LIBERALIZATION (Jonah D. Levy ed., 2006) and Richard H. Steinberg, The Formation,
Transformation, and Deformation of Trading States in Poor Countries (2008) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with authors).
10. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 62 (2004); Mark Pollack
& Gregory Shaffer, Who Governs?, in TRANSATLANTIC GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECON-
OMY 287 (Mark Pollack & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2001) (creating a framework that looks
at the relative roles of intergovernmental, transgovernental, and transnational networks,
including hybrid public-private networks).
11. See, e.g., JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS REGULATION 3
(2000); SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 109-16. On the increased impor-
tance of public-private networks in public interest lawyering domestically within the
United States, see Louise G. Trubek, Crossing Boundaries: Legal Education and the Chal-
lenge of the "New Public Interest Law," 2005 Wis. L. REV. 455, 461-62 (2005) (discussing
a new framework for public interest lawyering, involving new public-private collabora-
tions, more flexible tools, and greater international awareness and engagement).
12. On private transnational law-making, see KLAUS PETER BERGER, THE CREEPING
CODIFICATION OF LEX MERCATORIA (1999); A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL
AUTHORITY: TRANSNATIONAL MERCHANT LAW IN THE GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY (2003);
Daniela Caruso, Private Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 1 (2006); Ross Cranston, Theorizing Transnational Commercial Law, 42
TEX. INT'L LJ. 597 (2007); PEER ZUMBANSEN & GRALF-PETER CALLIESS, ROUGH CONSENSUS
AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (forthcoming 2008). On
private transnational law dispute settlement, see YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH,
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posed by economic globalization and the transnational institutions and
regimes that have arisen to govern it.13
Second, the article is part of a larger project on the challenges that the
WTO dispute settlement system poses for developing countries, and the
strategies that some of them are adopting, Brazil being a leading exam-
ple. 14 Although the WTO's more legalized and judicialized dispute settle-
ment system offers significant promise for developing countries, greater
judicialization comes with costs. Demands on human resources, legal
knowledge, and experience multiply when a WTO member wishes to
invoke its international trading rights, putting a primacy on legal capac-
ity.' 5 The legal procedures and substantive case law have become increas-
ingly complex and technically demanding.
Brazil is widely touted as one of the most successful users of the WTO
dispute settlement system among all countries, developing and devel-
oped. 16 Its relative success before the WTO dispute settlement system has
received national and international attention and has further motivated the
government and private sector to engage actively in the Doha Round of
WTO negotiations. As we will show, the political payoffs for Brazil have
DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1996). On the practice of transnational law, see THE PRAC-
TICE OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW (Klaus Peter Berger ed., 2001). On transnational contractual
networks, see COMMODITY CHANS AND GLOBAL CAPITALISM 2 (Gary Gereffi & Miguel
Korzeniewicz eds., 1994).
13. We refer to globalization as "a process of widening, deepening, and speeding up
of worldwide connectedness, in particular in the economic sphere." We adapt this defi-
nition from DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CUL-
TURE 2 (1999). Held et al. also gave a broader, more complex definition of globalization
that includes cultural as well as economic phenomena: "A process (or set of processes)
which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and
transactions - assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact - gen-
erating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction and
the exercise of power." Id. at 16.
14. See, e.g., Gregory Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work
for Developing Countries, in Towards a Development-Supportive Dispute Settlement System
in the WTO 1, 26, 51-52 (Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Resource Paper No. 5,
2003), available at http://www.ictsd.org/pubs/ictsd-series/resourcepapers/DSU_
2003.pdf [hereinafter Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute System Work]. The analysis
builds from socio-legal studies of domestic legal frameworks' operations where parties
have disparate financial resources and legal experience. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, Why
the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y
REV. 95, 96, 107 (1974).
15. See Marc L. Busch et al., Does Legal Capacity Matter?: Explaining Patterns of Pro-
tectionism in the Shadow of WTO Litigation 3 (2008) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://search.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1091435.
16. See, e.g., William J. Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: The First Ten
Years, 8J. INT'L ECON. L. 17, 24, 40-42 (2005) (noting that "in the last few years develop-
ing countries have become more frequent users of WTO dispute settlement, both in
absolute and relative terms .... Among developing countries, Brazil has made the most
extensive use of the WTO dispute settlement system."). A leading international trade
lawyer based in Washington, D.C. thus states, "Brazil puts the lie to the claim that devel-
oping countries can't use the WTO." Telephone Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with
Gary Horlick, Partner, Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, Hale & Dorr LLP (Feb. 27, 2008) (on
file with authors) [hereinafter Horlick Interview].
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been significant, helping it become a leader of developing countries in
trade negotiations (the so-called G-20) and a member of a new G-4 for
trade negotiations in the Doha Round, consisting of the United States, the
EU, Brazil, and India.' 7 As David Deese writes with respect to Brazilian
and Indian leadership in the Doha Round, "[Flor the first time there was
also a precedent set for shared structural leadership beyond the United
States and the EU at the very heart of the international trade negotiating
process." 18 For these reasons, Brazil is cited as a model for other develop-
ing countries, one with normative implications for our assessment of the
WTO legal order. 19 However, no one has analyzed what lies behind Bra-
zil's success.
This article examines for the first time how Brazil has mobilized legal
capacity both in response to the challenges that the WTO regime poses and
in light of domestic Brazilian factors. Changes at the international level
have helped unleash competition for new expertise to take advantage of the
opportunities offered by international trade law, involving law schools,
policy institutes, law firms, consultancies, think tanks, business associa-
tions, and different government ministries. Brazilian expertise on interna-
tional trade matters has diffused outside of the traditional foreign ministry
to include broader public-private networks with the aim of enhancing Bra-
zilian capacity to meet the challenges that the WTO legal system poses.
The participants in these networks have formed a community of trade pol-
icy specialists within Brazil, one that is transnationally linked to a broader
trade policy field. Although this field can be conceptualized in terms of an
"epistemic community," our study shows that there is also contestation
within the Brazilian trade law community, which is not a closed one, and is
pressed to respond to political and social developments. 20
17. See G-20 History, http://www.g-20.mre.gov.br/history.asp (last visited May 23,
2008); see also PEDRO DA MOTTA VEIGA, MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPA-
TION: CASE STUDY 7: BRAZIL AND THE G-20 GROUP OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res.e/bookspe/casestudiese/case7_e.htm (last visited
Mar. 14, 2008). On the G-4, see Robert Wolfe, Canada's Adventures in Clubland: Trade
Clubs and Political Influence, in CANADA AMONG NATIONS 2007: WHAT ROOM TO MANOEU-
VRE? 181, 192 (jean Daudelin & Daniel Schwanen eds., 2008). The leaders of the G-20
are Brazil, China, India, and South Africa, with Brazil being the entrepreneur of the
group. See G-20 History, supra. The group's first formal common proposal during the
Doha Round was on agriculture and was made at the WTO Ministerial Meeting in
Cancun, Mexico. Id.
18. DAVID DEESE, WORLD TRADE POLITICS: POWER, PRINCIPLES AND LEADERSHIP 153-55,
170, 177-78 (2007) (noting that in 2004, "the Brazilian and Indian ministers estab-
lished themselves as co-leaders in the most contentious issue area, agriculture, because
they were able to gradually press the U[.]S[.] and EC for substantial agricultural reforms
they would not offer on their own. In this way, once again the ground was prepared for
deeper agreements in a future round.").
19. We refer in particular to assessments of the fairness of the system.
20. See Peter M. Haas, Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy
Coordination, 46 INT'L. ORG. 1, 3 (1992). Policy networks of professionals that hold
particularly homogeneous cognitive orientations have been viewed as forming "episte-
mic communities" (or knowledge communities), which hold core sets of beliefs, princi-
ples, goals, and methods for validating claims that facilitate collaboration. Id. The term,
taken from the Greek word episteme, meaning "knowledge," refers to a network of pro-
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The result of these processes, in our view, has not been the weakening
of the state, as some scholars contend.2 1 Rather, we see the strengthening
of Brazil's capacity to play an active role at the international level through
public and private actors (with reciprocal but not identical interests)
responding to a new context: the more legalized and judicialized WTO sys-
tem. This article addresses, in particular, Brazil's use of mechanisms of
public-private coordination to gather information and define and advance
its interests in WTO negotiations and dispute settlement, adapting mecha-
nisms analogous to those that were first developed in the United States and
Europe for similar purposes. 2 2
The WTO, its dispute settlement system, and Brazil are particularly
important sites of inquiry for three reasons. First, because of its legalized
and judicialized nature, catalyzing domestic initiatives to shape interna-
tional law, the WTO affords significant opportunities to governments and
private constituencies, particularly business constituencies. 23 Big money
is at stake and lawyers with expertise are available for hire. The WTO, the
fessionals who share at least four attributes that facilitate collaborative problem-solving:
"(1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs...; (2) shared causal beliefs...; (3)
shared notions of validity ... ; and (4) a common policy enterprise . I..." Id. Haas
defines an epistemic community as a "network of professionals with recognized exper-
tise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy relevant
knowledge within that domain or issue-area." Id.; see also ETIENNE WENGER, COMMUNI-
TIES OF PRACTICE: LEARNING, MEANING, AND IDENTITY 45-49 (1998). This competition for
trade policy expertise can also be viewed in terms of the emergence of a "field" within
Brazil of international trade law and policy, one that is transnational in its dimensions,
being linked to lawyers and policy makers in Geneva, Switzerland (the WTO's organiza-
tional home), Washington, D.C. (with its international trade bar), and other locations
around the world, particularly national capitals. On the concept of social field, see
PIERRE BOURDIEU & Loic J.D. WACQUANT, AN INVITATION TO REFLEXIVE SOCIOLOGY 16
(1992) ("[A] field consists of a set of objective, historical relations between positions
anchored in certain forms of power (or capital) ...."). For an application to the world of
international arbitration, see generally DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 12.
21. See, e.g., KENICHI OHMAE, THE BORDERLESS WORLD: POWER AND STRATEGY IN THE
INTERLINKED ECONOMY 188-89 (rev. ed. 1999); SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE
STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 3 (1996).
22. See generally SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS, supra note 4.
23. For examples of how WTO law catalyzes efforts to create parallel international
regimes with offsetting norms that can constrain the WTO's reach, see Laurence R. Hel-
fer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPs Agreement and New Dynamics of Intellectual Property Law-
making, 29 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 1-10 (2004) (discussing how the substantive and
procedural tensions between TRIPs and other international regimes created incentives
for new forms of intellectual lawmaking in other issue areas); see also GREGORY SHAFFER
& MARK POLLACK, WHEN COOPERATION FAILS: THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS OF
GENETICALLY MODIFIED FOODS (forthcoming 2008) (assessing how severe conflicts
between the United States and the EU over agricultural biotechnology regulation have
led them to engage in "forum shopping" for the regime that will most likely produce
their preferred outcome, giving rise to overlapping and sometimes purposefully incon-
sistent regimes for trade, the environment, and food safety and finding that these incon-
sistencies and conflicts among regimes have influenced the natures of the regimes
themselves as "hard" and "soft" law regimes); Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The
Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources, 58 INT'L ORG. 277 (2004) (using the regime
complex for plant genetic resources to examine how clusters of international legal agree-
ments overlap in scope, subject, and time to create a "regime complex," or an array of
partially overlapping and nonhierarchical institutions governing a particular issue area).
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most legalized of multilateral regimes with a compulsory judicial system,
provides access to a dispute settlement forum that could help to offset
power asymmetries in international trade relations under the mantle of the
"rule of law" or in contrast, it could deepen them.
Second, WTO law can have a significant impact on national econo-
mies and regulatory practices. Who participates in WTO dispute settle-
ment affects WTO law's application and interpretation over time, which in
turn, can affect domestic regulation and economic decision-making
around the world. From an instrumentalist perspective, WTO law provides
tools to actors within domestic and international politics, while from a con-
structivist perspective, WTO law can shape perceptions of political
choices. 24 WTO law can directly affect national laws and regulations con-
cerning the importation of goods and services,2 5 investment,2 6 intellectual
property rights,2 7 telecommunications, 28 financial services, 2 9 government
procurement, 30 industrial policy,3 1 agriculture, 32 and customs regula-
tions.33 Moreover, WTO law indirectly affects almost all national regula-
24. See MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS, AND JUDICIALIZATION
14 (2002) (noting "how mutually constitutive instrumental rationality-for example, a
decision to expend resources to litigate and normativity-for example, the development
of legal argument-can be"). For a contrasting, but nonetheless complementary perspec-
tive, see Robert Wolfe, See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representation of the Trading Sys-
tem, 11 EUR. J. INT'L REL. 339, 340 (2005) (viewing WTO law as a "continuous process of
social interaction" in which the judicial process plays a relatively minor role). Our arti-
cle, although often focusing on the judicial process, takes a broad perspective in demon-
strating how Brazil has been able to enhance its ability to participate in WTO litigation,
bargaining, and monitoring.
25. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187
(1994) [hereinafter GATT 1994]; see also General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr.
15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B,
1869 U.N.T.S. 183 (1994) [hereinafter GATS]. For an assessment, see Judith Goldstein
et al., Institutions in International Relations: Understanding the Effects of the GATT and the
WTO on World Trade, 61 INT'L ORG. 37 (2007).
26. See Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868 U.N.T.S. 186.
27. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C,
1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreements].
28. See GATS, supra note 25, Annex on Telecommunications.
29. See id.
30. See Agreement on Government Procurement, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4B, Ar. III, 1915 U.N.T.S. 103
(1994).
31. See Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, Mar-
rakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex IA, 1867 U.N.T.S.
14 (1994).
32. See Agreement on Agriculture, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establish-
ing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 410.
33. See Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Selected Customs Matters,
WT/DS315/AB/R (Nov. 13, 2006); see also Appellate Body Report, European Communi-
ties- Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment, WT/DS62/AB/R (June 5,
1998).
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tory laws and regulatory practices, including environmental law,3 4
consumer protection law, 35 tax law,3 6 labor law,3 7 and so-called moral
laws, such as regulation of gambling. 3 8 Thus, understanding how coun-
tries and constituencies organize to respond to and make use of the WTO
legal system is important.
Third, Brazil has been the most successful developing country in its
use of WTO dispute settlement. This study, therefore, should be of great
interest to other developing countries. The article shows how a developing
country can mobilize legal resources to respond to and advance its interests
through the judicialized WTO regime, even against the most powerful
WTO members, the United States and the European Union.3 9 Brazil is a
large and relatively advanced developing country and this factor needs to
be taken into account.40 The challenges that other developing countries
face in international trade dispute settlement, nonetheless, are much closer
to those faced by Brazil than they are to those confronting the United States
and the European Union, the most active users of the WTO dispute settle-
ment and whose strategies in WTO dispute settlement are better known. 41
In methodological terms, this study is based on four years of empirical
investigation, drawing on a wealth of primary and secondary sources. Cru-
cially, we have cross-checked our findings from written sources against
interviews with a wide range of individuals. In particular, this article
builds on in-depth, semi-structured elite interviews and discussions with
Brazilian government officials in Brasilia, Geneva, and Washington, D.C.,
as well as U.S. private lawyers who have worked with the Brazilian govern-
ment, representatives of Brazilian companies and trade associations, mem-
bers of the Brazilian bar, Brazilian academics, leaders of Brazilian think
tanks and consultancies, representatives of non-governmental organiza-
tions, and members of the WTO Secretariat. We have attempted, wherever
possible, to corroborate information gleaned from interviews in other
34. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded
Tyres, WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter Appellate Body Report, Brazil-
Tyres]; Appellate Body Report, United States- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, 1I 155-59, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
35. See Appellate Body Report, Korea- Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled,
and Frozen Beef, WT/DS161/AB/R (Dec. 11, 2000).
36. See Appellate Body Report, Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, WT/DS1 1/AB/R
(Oct. 4, 1996); see also Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, United States- Equaliz-
ing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on Processed Orange and Grapefruit Products, WT/
DS250/3 (June 2, 2004).
37. See, e.g., Christopher McCrudden & Anne Davies, A Perspective on Trade and
Labor Rights, 3 J. INT'L ECON. L. 43, 52, 57 (2000).
38. See Panel Report, United States- Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007).
39. For juridical reasons relating to the treaty framework of the European Union, the
EU is officially referred to as the European Communities (EC) in the WTO, although the
term EU is most commonly used in the media, including in EU public communications.
See, e.g., Glossary: A Guide to 'WTO Speak,' http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/glos-
sary e/glossary e.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
40. Part V of this article addresses the limits of the Brazilian approach for smaller
developing countries.
41. See, e.g., SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS, supra note 4.
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sources, to minimize our own and the reader's reliance on non-replicable
data. Throughout the article, we have attempted to process-trace 4 2 our
hypotheses and claims at both the national and international levels, tri-
angulating on our subject using all available sources, whether primary or
secondary, written or interview-based. We have documented our sources
as fully as possible in the footnotes.
Parts I and II of this article provide key background information for
the core of our empirical study in Part III, which investigates the major
changes that WTO judicialization has catalyzed in the Brazilian govern-
ment, media, academia, law firms, business trade associations, think tanks,
consultancies, and civil society organizations. Part I also provides back-
ground on the export-oriented shift in trade policy in Brazil and other
Latin American countries during the 1990s, together with an overview of
Brazil's participation in and organization for dispute settlement under the
WTO's predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
It highlights two key preexisting attributes of Brazilian government and
business organization (our domestic level variables) that would facilitate
Brazil's engagement in WTO negotiations and successful use of WTO liti-
gation. Part II.A presents an overview of three particular challenges that
the WTO dispute settlement system poses for developing country participa-
tion in terms of legal expertise, financial cost, and extra-legal power. Part
II.B summarizes Brazil's experience in the WTO dispute settlement system,
both quantitatively and qualitatively, noting the catalyzing effect for Brazil
of early cases in which it was on the defensive. This leads us to Part III, the
empirical core of our study, which broadly investigates what lies behind
Brazil's success in WTO dispute settlement, the institutional changes and
mobilization strategies that public and private actors in Brazil have devel-
oped and that have catalyzed Brazil's capacity to make effective use of the
WTO legal and judicial system. Part IV then provides specific examples of
the strategies of public-private coordination that Brazil has used success-
fully as a complainant, respondent, and third party in WTO litigation,
involving companies, trade associations, civil society organizations, and
elite law firms, particularly, but not exclusively, leading U.S. law firms.
Part V follows by examining, in light of the challenges that an increasingly
demanding WTO dispute settlement system poses, the limitations of the
Brazilian approach for smaller developing countries, as well as for Brazil
itself, that to which, paradoxically, Brazil's successful use of leading
outside legal counsel has contributed.
We conclude by drawing out seven findings from our study. We
address, in particular, how international trade law and judicialization can
unleash a competition for expertise that transforms a government's rela-
tion with business and civil society over international trade policy. We
contend that the process of catalyzing change within a country is not auto-
matic but depends on key domestic factors as variables. We find that the
42. See ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVEL-
OPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 205-32 (2005).
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resulting dynamic can strengthen the state's ability to engage effectively at
the international level. We conclude by observing that the best interpreta-
tion of what lies behind Brazil's success is the rise of pluralist interaction
between the private sector, civil society, and the government on trade mat-
ters. This public-private exchange is spurred by the institutionalization of
a more legalized and judicialized system for international trade relations in
the broader context of Brazilian democratization and global economic inte-
gration. As WTO institutions have developed, individuals and groups in
Brazil have responded by investing in expertise to take advantage of the
opportunities offered and to defend against the challenges posed.43 The
resulting public-private partnerships have significantly enhanced Brazil's
ability to advance its interests in international trade negotiations and dis-
pute settlement and in the process, have an impact on the WTO regime.
1. Brazil's Change in Trade and Development Policy: The GATT Years
Before examining the changes catalyzed in Brazil by the WTO's
judicialization of trade relations, we must provide a baseline of what
existed before the WTO's creation in 1995.
A. Brazil's Change in Development Policy
During the 1990s, Latin American countries changed their trade and
development policies, to varying degrees, from the "import substitution
industrialization" policies of the 1960s and 1970s to more "export-ori-
ented," trade-liberalizing alternatives. 44 In broad terms, Brazilian develop-
ment policy shifted from a focus on insulating the economy from
international trade pressures to a focus on integrating into the global econ-
omy through enhanced trade, while retaining some ability to use industrial
policy to develop, in particular, its manufacturing sector. 4 5 These transfor-
mations occurred at a time when liberalized international trade relations
43. That is, this expertise can be used to defend import-competing groups and
domestic policies, as well as to advance the aims of export-oriented groups and those
wishing to change domestic policies.
44. KATHRYN SIKKINK, IDEAS AND INSTITUTIONS: DEVELOPMENTALISM IN BRAZIL AND
ARGENTINA 75-79 (1991). Import substitution industrialization refers to a development
policy advocating local production of higher value goods and services over importation.
Id. at 75. Such local production is facilitated through trade protection and government
subsidies. Id. In this way, proponents hope that a developing country can move from
merely supplying raw materials in trade to developed countries, to producing goods
with a higher added value, having positive spillover effects for the domestic economy.
Id. The Argentine economist Raul Prebisch, director of the UN Economic Commission
for Latin America, was a major proponent of such policies. Id. East Asian countries, in
contrast, focused more on production for global markets and less on production for
domestic and regional markets, which meant that their companies had to invest more in
technological developments to stay competitive. Id.; see also Albert 0. Hirschman, Ideol-
ogies of Economic Development in Latin America, in LATIN AMERICAN ISSUES: ESSAYS AND
COMMENTS 3, 3 n.1 (1961) (referring to "the ideologies of economic development" in
terms of sets of "distinctive beliefs, principles and attitudes").
45. See, e.g., Report of the Secretariat, Trade Policy Review- Brazil, 19, 37, WT/TPR/
S/140 (Nov. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Trade Policy Review-Brazil] (noting that export pro-
motion is "a key element of Brazil's trade policy").
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were further institutionalized at the international level through the creation
of the WTO and its judicialized system for dispute settlement in 1995.
The causal explanation for change is always difficult to specify. The
best explanation of Brazil's shift during the 1990s towards more outward-
looking, liberalized trade and development policies (as well as Latin
America's generally) appears to be a combination of internal and external
structural and ideological factors involving changed economic and geopo-
litical contexts and the proliferation of ideas in relation to the debt crises of
the 1980s. 4 6 At least as reflected in growth rates, Brazil's import substitu-
tion policies of the 1950s through the 1970s had been relatively successful.
In real per capita terms (taking into account both population growth and
inflation), Brazil grew at an average rate of 6.1% during the late 1950s, 4%
during the 1960s, and approximately 5.5% during the 1970s. 4 7 The oil
and interest rate crises of 1979 and the ensuing debt crises of the 1980s
and 1990s, however, caused economic stagnation, resulting in what has
been called the "lost decade" in Latin America. 48 Elites in Brazil, as well as
46. See generally GLOBAL CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE: THE NEw INTERNATIONAL CON-
TEXT OF DEVELOPMENT 6 (Barbara Stallings ed., 1995) ("exploring how international and
domestic politics affect policy choice"); JOHN WILLIAMSON, THE PROGRESS OF POLICY
REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA (1990); DANIEL YERGIN & JOSEPH STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING
HEIGHTS: THE BATTLE BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND THE MARKETPLACE THAT Is REMAKING THE
MODERN WORLD 233-38, 257-59 (1998); Augusto Varas, Latin America: Toward a New
Reliance on the Market, in GLOBAL CHANGE, supra, at 272. Simmons and Elkins test for
explanations for the liberalization of capital controls in terms of the impact of economic
competition (affecting the demand for liberalization) and social emulation, as through
transnational networks (affecting the supply of liberalization). See Beth A. Simmons &
Zachary Elkins, Globalization and Policy Diffusion: Explaining Three Decades of Liberaliza-
tion, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY: POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN TRANSITION 275,
275-99 (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003). They find evidence for both expla-
nations. Id. However, as Cason and White point out, Brazil did adopt export promotion
policies "as far back as the 1960s and early 1970s" in conjunction with import substitu-
tion industrialization, but they were unsuccessful. See Jeffrey Cason & Gregory White,
The State as Naive Entrepreneur: The Political Economy of Export Promotion in Brazil and
Tunisia, 26 POL'Y STUD. J. 46, 46 (1988). For an analysis of institutional changes in Latin
America, see Andrea C. Bandeira & Fernando Garcia, Reforms and Growth in Latin
America, 77 CEPAL REV. 79, 79-95 (2002).
47. See Alan Heston et al., Penn World Table Version 6.2 (Ctr. for Int'l Comparisons
of Prod., Income and Prices, Univ. of Pa., Sept. 2006), http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/
php-site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php (select "Brazil" and "Real Gross Domestic Product per
Capita"). Brazil GDP per capita figures are expressed in real terms in 2000 constant
prices. Id. From 1955 to 1961, Brazil's GDP grew at an average rate of 9.4% in real
terms. JORG MEYER-STAMER, TECHNOLOGY, COMPETITIVENESS, AND RADICAL POLICY CHANGE:
THE CASE OF BRAZIL 38 (1997). Its GDP continued to grow rapidly through the 1960s
and 1970s, increasing from $17.2 billion in 1961, to approximately $42.6 billion in
1970, and to $237.8 billion in 1980, making for an average (real) GDP growth rate of
6.2% during the 1960s and 8.8% during the 1970s. For aggregate GDP data, see Minis-
t~rio do Desenvolvimento, Indistria e Comtrcio Exterior, Evolucao do Com&cio Exte-
rior Brasileiro - 1950 a 2007, http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/arquivo/secex/
evocomextbrasil/evolucaocebrasileiro.xls (last visited May, 20, 2008). For Latin
America as a whole, per capita output increased cumulatively by "almost 40 percent
through the 1970s and about 30 percent through the 1960s." See WILLIAMSON, supra
note 46, at 1.
48. See, e.g., THOMAS E. SKIDMORE & PETER H. SMITH, MODERN LATIN AMERICA 443
(6th ed. 2005).
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in other Latin American countries, became disaffected with past inward-
looking policies. 4 9 The "development economics" used to justify import
substitution industrialization policies were in retreat. 5
0
Latin American policy makers noted the success of the more export-
oriented economies of East Asia, with which their countries had been favor-
ably compared only two decades before. As Augusto Varas notes, in the
1970s, Latin American and East Asian countries were often "linked as suc-
cessful 'newly industrialized countries (NICs),"' 5 1 as real per capita GDP
grew at relatively similar rates in the two regions during that decade.5 2 At
the end of the 1970s, it appeared that Brazil "would close the gap separat-
ing it from the OECD countries, much in the same way that South Korea
and Taiwan in fact did in the 1980s."'53 These countries' growth rates,
however, diverged dramatically in the 1980s, during which Brazil's real per
capita GDP grew by only about 1% annually, while the newly industrial-
ized East Asian countries real per capita GDP grew by around 6%
annually.5 4
In 1989, Fernando Collor de Mello won the Brazilian presidential elec-
tion and pushed for policies of monetary stability, fiscal restraint, trade
and capital liberalization, and privatization. Trade liberals hailed his talk
of "opening [Brazil] to the outside world and unshackling the economy"5 5
as he "emphasized deregulation and greater openness to world markets."5 6
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, a leading formulator of "dependency theory,"
which had provided an intellectual basis for import substitution industrial-
ization, became Minister of Finance in 1994 and then, in 1995, President
49. SIKKINK, supra note 44, at 7-10.
50. See, e.g., ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ESSAYS IN TRESPASSING: ECONOMICS TO POLITICS
AND BEYOND 1 (1981); DEEPAR LA, THE POVERTY OF 'DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS' 18 (2d ed.
1997); SIKKINK, supra note 44, at 7-10; WILLIAMSON, supra note 46, at 71-76 (examining
the concept of "Washington Consensus").
51. See Varas, supra note 46, at 273.
52. Real per capita GDP grew almost 6% annually in Brazil, approximately 7% annu-
ally in Korea and Hong Kong, and between 8% and 8.4% annually in Taiwan and Singa-
pore. See Heston et al., supra note 47 (computations based on real GDP per capita in
constant prices).
53. MEYER-STAMER, supra note 47, at 33 (also noting that "Brazil's industrialization
long appeared to be a pronounced case of success. A country that at the beginning of
the 1950s still had an agrarian character turned, in the course of 30 years, into one of
the world's major industrial states").
54. Korea's and Taiwan's real per capita GDP grew by between 6.3% and 6.6% annu-
ally, and Hong Kong's and Singapore's by between 5% and 5.75% annually during this
period. See Heston et al., supra note 47. Varas goes further, maintaining that World
Bank figures show that during the 1970s, real per capita GDP grew by approximately
6% annually in Brazil (and about 3.7% in Latin America) but during the 1980s, actually
fell by about 0.6% annually in Brazil (and about 0.8% in Latin America). See Varas,
supra note 46, at 296-97 tbl. 9.1.
55. A Survey of Brazil, ECONOMIST, Dec. 7, 1999, at 7 ("Since the election campaign,
the consequences of this political and ideological change for Brazilian trade policy were
not long in coming."). Williamson, however, notes that Brazil was among the last Latin
American countries to liberalize. See WILLIAMSON, supra note 46, at 26.
56. BRAZIL: A COUNTRY STUDY (Rex A. Hudson ed., 1997), available at http://coun-
trystudies.us/brazil/80.htm.
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of the Republic for two four-year terms. 5 7 Cardoso privatized more state
enterprises and further opened Brazil's economy to global competition, but
Brazil only gradually moved toward more liberal economic policies.
5 8
Cardoso's shift from being a leading theorist of "dependency theory" to
being a strong advocate of Brazilian integration in the global economy is
emblematic of the significant ideological changes among Brazilian gov-
erning elites.5 9 Although the political left won the election of 2002, the
government of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva has maintained Brazil's
economic policies of greater budgetary discipline and relatively liberalized
trade. 60
External factors complemented internal domestic explanations for Bra-
zil's change in trade and development policies. The World Bank, Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF), and the U.S. Treasury strongly advocated
Brazilian trade liberalization while Brazil negotiated new and restructured
loans. 6 1 These institutions' leverage increased on account of debt crises,
facilitating their demands for structural adjustment policies as loan condi-
tions.6 2 Moreover, as other Latin American countries liberalized their
economies, Brazil, competing with them for investment and foreign market
57. See Joao Resende-Santos, Fernando Henrique-Cardoso: Social and Institutional
Rebuilding in Brazil, in TECHNOPOLS: FREEING POLITICS AND MARKETS IN LATIN AMERICA IN
THE 1990s 145, 182 (Jorge I. Dominguez ed., 1997); Larry Rohter, Departing President
Leaves a Stable Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002, at A1O.
58. MONICA HIRST, THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL: A LONG ROAD OF UNMET EXPECTA-
TIONS 20 (2005); see also Andrew Hurrell, The United States and Brazil: Comparative
Reflections, in THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL 73-74 (noting Brazil "moved toward eco-
nomic liberalization; but the process of economic reform domestically remained more
complex and checkered than elsewhere").
59. As Winston Fritsch and Gustavo Franco write, Brazil's shift in policy reflected a
"slow move of the opinion of local elites toward deregulation - especially in the sphere
of trade and industrial policy," a shift that included not only government leaders but
also businessmen and academics. Winston Fritsch & Gustavo Franco, Brazil and the
World Economy in the 1990s, in LATIN AMERICA'S INTEGRATION INTO THE WORLD ECONOMY 9
(Winston Fritsch ed., 1991); see also Pedro da Motta Veiga, Trade Policy-Making in Brazil:
Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, in PROCESS MATTERS: SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT AND DOMESTIC TRADE TRANSPARENCY 143, 144 (Mark Halle & Robert Wolfe
eds., 2007) [hereinafter Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship] (refer-
ring to "the change of paradigm [that market liberalization] represented for economic
agents within Brazil").
60. See Trade Policy Review- Brazil, supra note 45, at 17. For example, in 2004, the
WTO's Trade Policy Review of Brazil reported that from 2000 to 2004, "Brazil has con-
tinued to enhance the transparency and reduce the complexity of its trade regime,
including by streamlining its import procedures and consolidating import regulations.
Import licensing no longer applies to all goods, although non-automatic requirements
still affect over a third of all tariff lines or parts of lines." Id. at 20-21 (also noting a
decline in the average applied tariff "from 13.7% in 2000 to 10.4% in 2004" for Brazil as
part of Mercosur's Common External Tariff).
61. See ROBERT GILPIN, GLOBAL POLITICAL ECONOMY: UNDERSTANDING THE INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 269-70 (2001).
62. Id. at 270 (noting that "in November [19981 the IMF offered Brazil a large assis-
tance package of over $40 billion and attached a precondition that the Brazilian econ-
omy be significantly revamped").
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access, followed suit.63
The United States not only offered carrots in the form of new loans
but also wielded sticks in the form of trade sanctions to press Brazil to
open its market. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the Office of the
United States Trade Representative (USTR) targeted Brazil's trade, indus-
trial, and intellectual property policies six times under Section 301 of the
1974 U.S. Trade Act and threatened trade sanctions. 64 In 1989, the USTR
brought what was known as a "Super 301" against Brazil, designating Bra-
zil's import licensing regime as a "priority practice," along with those of
India and Japan.6 5 The United States filed a GATT complaint, which it
settled when Brazil agreed to relax its import restrictions as part of a gen-
eral liberalization initiative under the Collor Government. 66 In May 1993,
the USTR again initiated a Section 301 investigation of Brazil's intellectual
property policies, which it terminated in February 1994 in light of the crea-
tion of the WTO and the new Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intel-
lectual Property Rights (TRIPs), as well as Brazilian assurances. 67
63. See Marcelo de Paiva Abreu, Trade Liberalization and the Political Economy of Pro-
tection in Brazil Since 1987, at 8 (Inst. for the Integration of Latin America & the Carib-
bean & Integration, Trade & Hemispheric Issues, Div. of the Integration & Regional
Programs, Dep't of the Inter-American Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. SITI-08B, 2004).
De Paiva Abreu gives special emphasis to Brazil's competition with Argentina, Chile, and
Mexico. Id.
64. See THOMAS 0. BAYARD & KIMBERLY ANN ELLIOTr, RECIPROCITY AND RETALIATION IN
U.S. TRADE POLICY 355-69 (1994). Under Section 301, the USTR would "investigate"
foreign practices to determine if they were in violation of an "international legal right" or
"unreasonable" as defined by the statute. Id. at 26-28, 31. If the practice met either of
these criteria, the United States could apply or threaten to apply a variety of trade sanc-
tions. See id. at 195. In 1982, for example, the U.S. footwear trade association and
unions filed a petition to the USTR challenging the import practices of a number of
countries, including Brazil's import licensing system. Id. at 410. In a settlement, Brazil
agreed to lift a number of restrictions on footwear, "at least temporarily." Id. at 411.
The USTR did not pursue the case against Brazil before the GATT because the USTR
found that Brazil had a "balance of payments defense" on account of the debt crisis. Id.
Nevertheless, Brazil lifted some restrictions. See id. Later, in 1985, the USTR self-initi-
ated a Section 301 proceeding to investigate Brazil's industrial policies in support of an
informatics industry, including Brazil's policy on software copyright protection. Id. at
421-24. For further information on Brazil's industrial policy toward developing an
informatics industry and the U.S. response, see Peter B. Evans, Declining Hegemony and
Assertive Industrialization: U.S.-Brazil Conflicts in the Computer Industry, 43 INT'L ORG.
207 (1989); Peter B. Evans, State, Capital, and the Transformation of Dependence: The
Brazilian Computer Case, 14 WORLD DEv. 791 (1986); John S. Odell, International
Threats and International Politics: Brazil, the European Community, and the United States,
1985-1987, in DOUBLE EDGED DIPLOMACY: INTERNATIONAL BARGAINING AND DOMESTIC
POLITICS 233 (Peter Evans et al. eds., 1993).
65. BAYARD & ELLIOTT, supra note 64, at 149. The Brazilian import licensing system
had been used to help allocate scarce foreign reserves. Id. at 156-60 (noting that the
U.S. action was, once again, criticized by many GATT members).
66. Id. at 162. The Collor government also agreed to renounce use of Article 18(B)
of the GATT, which provided special treatment for developing countries when imple-
menting trade restrictions on balance of payment grounds. Id. at 155.
67. The USTR also targeted other key developing countries, including Argentina,
India, South Korea, and Thailand, in its push for the TRIPs Agreement. BAYARD & ELLI-
OTT, supra note 64, at 189. It applied sanctions against Thailand in 1989, India in 1992,
and Argentina in 1997, withdrawing tariff benefits under its "General System of Prefer-
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In sum, there was a general shift in trade and development policy in
Brazil and throughout Latin America in the 1990s. Although some Latin
American countries, such as Venezuela and Bolivia, have changed course in
recent years, Brazil's government under President Lula largely has retained
its general international trade and macroeconomic orientations. Moreover,
the liberalization of international trade has now been institutionalized
through the WTO and its dispute settlement system, as well as through a
growing, complex web of bilateral and regional trade agreements. 68 For
Brazil, these include Mercosur, which was established pursuant to the
1991 Treaty of Asuncion and the 1994 Ouro Preto Protocol. 69 Brazil's poli-
cies can change, but they must now do so within changed international
and transnational institutional contexts.
B. Brazil's Organization for the GATT: Two Key Attributes for the
Future
Studies show that the amount a country trades is typically the most
important factor for explaining a country's use of international trade dis-
pute settlement, but it is not the only factor, as significant variation
remains among countries trading at similar levels.70 To understand a
country's use of international trade dispute settlement, one must also
examine domestic factors. In this section, we first assess how Brazil's
development policy affected its views on international trade law and dis-
pute settlement. We then note that Brazil entered the WTO with two key
attributes that facilitated its successful use of WTO dispute settlement
through public-private mechanisms of coordination: (1) a professional gov-
ernment bureaucracy for international trade and (2) a system of relatively
ences" program. Id. at 189, 195. On U.S. strategies, see PETER DRAHOS & JOHN
BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? 86 (2002);
MICHAEL P. RYAN, KNOWLEDGE DIPLOMACY: GLOBAL COMPETITION AND THE POLITICS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1998); SUSAN K. SELL, POWER AND IDEAS: NORTH-SOUTH POLITICS
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ANTITRUST (1998); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC
LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003).
68. See PETER SUTHERLAND ET AL., WORLD TRADE ORG., THE FUTURE OF THE WTO:
ADDRESSING INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 49-51 (2004), available
at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/lOanniv e/future-wto_e.pdf.
69. SKIDMORE & SMITH, supra note 48, at 430-31. Mercosur is the Mercado Comun
del Sur (Common Market of the South). Id. at 431. In 1991, Brazil signed the Asuncion
Treaty for the establishment of Mercosur and in 1994, Brazil signed the Ouro Preto
Protocol for the establishment of Mercosur's institutional structure, including the office
of a secretariat, and the parties' commitment to pursue a common market for Mercosur's
four members, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Id. In 2002, the Protocol of
Olivos reformed Mercosur's dispute settlement system, creating a Permanent Court of
Review. See Welber Barral, U.N. Econ. Comm'n for Latin America & the Caribbean, The
Brazilian Experience in Dispute Settlement, 21 U.N. Doc. LC/W.147 (Aug. 2007) [herein-
after, Barral, The Brazilian Experience]. Venezuela became a full member of Mercosur on
July 4, 2006. Profile: Mercosur- Common Market of the South, BBCNEws.coM, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/5195834.stm (last visited May 20, 2008). Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru have been granted associate member status. Id.
70. See Henrik Horn et al., Is the Use of the WTO Dispute Settlement System Biased?
(Ctr. for Econ. Pol'y Research, Discussion Paper No. 2340, 1999).
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well-funded trade associations and large private companies that help busi-
nesses overcome collective action problems.
Brazil's import substitution industrialization policies shaped the
structure of trade policy making within its state bureaucracy. These poli-
cies and the resulting governmental structure led to a relatively passive and
fragmented role for its private sector and civil society regarding interna-
tional trade negotiations and the enforcement of international trade law
under the GATT, which existed from 1948 to 1994.71 Before the shift in
Brazilian development policy in the early 1990s, Brazil's state bureaucracy
for trade-related matters was centralized within two entities. The Brazilian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (commonly known as Itamaraty after the Rio de
Janeiro palace in which it was located until 1970) represented Brazil inter-
nationally, including for trade negotiations. The Brazilian Department of
Foreign Trade (Carteira de Comercio Exterior do Brasil, CACEX), located
within the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Trade, implemented
Brazil's import substitution policies. Until CACEX was eliminated in 1991
as part of the Collor government's trade liberalization reforms, it handled
all trade aspects of Brazil's industrial policies. CACEX oversaw export pro-
motion through the provision of grants and tax and credit incentives, and
import protection through administrative requirements for import licenses
over which it operated with considerable discretion. 72 In reflection of Bra-
zil's import substitution paradigm, CACEX took a dirigiste, protectionist
orientation. 73
The relations between CACEX and the private sector under Brazil's
import substitution policies were organized on a sectoral basis. CACEX's
sectoral organization for implementing Brazil's import substitution policies
led the private sector to become both more fragmented and more passive
on trade matters negotiated at the international level, particularly interna-
tional legal matters. 74 Government-business relations were generally non-
71. Pedro da Motta Veiga, Trade-Policy Making in Brazil: Transition Paths, in THE
TRADE POLICY-MAKING PROCESS: LEVEL ONE OF THE Two LEVEL GAME: COUNTRY STUDIES IN
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 13, 14 (2002), available at http://www.sice.oas.org/ctyindex/
ARG/policymaking-e.pdf [hereinafter Veiga, Transition Paths].
72. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 153.
Veiga writes, "CACEX acted as a public agency performing regulation and operational
functions, providing financial resources to the private sector, managing tax and credit
incentives, promoting exports, directly trading export products and controlling imports
through a wide array of non-tariff barriers." Id.; see also BRAZIL: A COUNTRY STUDY, supra
note 56.
73. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 153;
BRAZ. COUNTRY MGMT. UNIT, POVERTY REDUCTION & ECON. MGMT. DEP'T, WORLD BANK,
BRAZIL - TRADE POLICIES TO IMPROVE EFFICIENCY, INCREASE GROWTH AND REDUCE POVERTY
135 (2004), available at http://wbln0018.worldbank.org/lac/lacinfoclient.nsf/8d6661f6
799ea8a48525673900537f95/ae5b 14d59f188f3085256e66007d06fe/$FILE/Brazil%20
Trade%20Policies-par t I.pdf.
74. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 153.
As a result, "the dialogue and consultations between public sector and private agents...
were almost entirely restricted to [a sectoral] articulation." Id. (also noting that "a
remarkable characteristic of this model is that both design and management of these
instruments were essentially sectoral"). Schneider likewise finds that Brazilian cross-
sectoral business associations, although relatively wealthy and well-staffed, were rela-
Vol. 41
2008 The Trials of Winning at the WTO
transparent, characteristic of "an authoritarian State, [whose] economic
policy instruments [were] under the control of a strong techno-bureau-
cracy." 75 Private businesses and trade associations relied on their infor-
mal connections with the government for export promotion and import
protection. 76 At times, specific industrial sectors responded to specific
sectoral negotiations which affected them, such as the textiles sector in the
Multi-Fiber Agreement negotiations or the steel sector in the negotiations
of U.S. "Voluntary Export Restraints."77 Overall, however, the private sec-
tor did not coordinate to lobby the government regarding trade positions in
the GATT. 78 Moreover, civil society representatives were largely shut out of
trade policy making, and neither the Brazilian legislature nor Brazilian
media paid much attention to it.
Brazil, nonetheless, had two key attributes that would later facilitate
its engaged participation in WTO dispute settlement. First, it had a profes-
sionalized Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a strong esprit de corps, where
selection and advancement of officials was largely based on merit. The
ministry is known for its relative advantage over other organs within the
Brazilian state in terms of its unified institutional structure, relative auton-
omy, professionalism, and ability to adjust to outside developments when
necessary. 79 The ministry has long had a strong interest in international
tively weak so that "economic and political elites regularly circumvented them." BEN
Ross SCHNEIDER, BUSINESS POLITICS AND THE STATE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY LATIN AMERICA
93-94 (2004) [hereinafter SCHNEIDER, BUSINESS POLITICS]. He concludes that, in con-
trast, "many narrow sectoral associations were so favored, which consequently
encouraged participation in those associations rather than in encompassing ones." Id.
at 97. This sectoral focus also characterized Brazil's approach to international trade
negotiations, a model that predominated until the end of the military dictatorship in
1989 and the election of the Collor government that year. See Veiga, Transition Paths,
supra note 71, at 13. Veiga notes the impact of the macro-economic crises in the late
1980s, which "led to a gradual deterioration of the sectoral mechanisms of consultation
and negotiation between State and business actors typical of industry and trade-focused
policy-making during the import-substitution (IS) period." Veiga, Changing Patterns in
State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 171.
75. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 153.
76. In terms of broader business-government relations, see SCHNEIDER, BUSINESS
POLITICS, supra note 74, at 108-09 ("Where bureaucratic rings (personalized networks)
predominated, firms had fewer incentives to invest in associations." As a result, "institu-
tionalized channels for participation by associations in policy making . . . became
increasingly rare in Brazil.").
77. Veiga, Transition Paths, supra note 71, at 14.
78. Id. Thus, Veiga finds that although "the agro-industrial sectors closely moni-
tored the progress of the Uruguay Round, [they] rarely participated in the definition of
Brazilian positions." Id. Similarly, Schneider writes, "In Brazil government officials
consulted occasionally with business about trade but never institutionalized concerta-
tion on an industry- or economy-wide basis." Ben Ross Schneider, Big Business and the
Politics of Economic Reform: Confidence and Concertation in Brazil and Mexico, in BUSINESS
AND THE STATE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 191, 207 (Sylvia Maxfield & Ben Ross Schnei-
der eds., 1997).
79. See Zairo B. Cheibub, A Carreira Diplomatica no Brasil: o Processo de Burocratiza-
fdo do Itamarati, 23 REvlSTA DE ADMINISTRACAO PUBLICA 97, 125 (1989). In 1961 and
1973, for example, the ministry adapted its internal structure in response to the intensi-
fication of multilateral trade negotiations. Id. at 125. These adaptations anticipated the
ministry's changes during the 1990s and 2000s in response to the Uruguay and Doha
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economic affairs and has developed corresponding expertise. As a result,
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been able to retain its central position in
determining Brazil's international trade and economic policy, but other
ministries have become increasingly involved as access to Brazilian trade
policy making has broadened, as we will discuss in Part III.A.8 0
Second, Brazil has relatively well-funded and well-staffed trade
associations, as well as some large individual companies, which facilitate
businesses' ability to overcome collective action problems. Brazilian busi-
nesses, thus, are better able than businesses in other developing countries
to fund outside lawyers and economic consultants to assist the government
with trade disputes and with the development of trade negotiation posi-
tions. For example, Brazilian legislation long included a compulsory tax,
the proceeds of which went to all business associations, which often used it
to hire economic expertise. 8 1 As Ben Schneider writes, "[O]ver time the
statutory provisions for financing compulsory associations bankrolled
some of the wealthiest business associations in Latin America," which were
able to accumulate "enormous resources." 8 2 Moreover, as elites circulated
between government and business, whether as employees or as consul-
tants, relatively close relations developed between the government, trade
associations, and companies.8 3 The Brazilian government could tap these
human and financial resources.
The combination of these factors is a key to successful, non-collusive
government-business coordination. Although government and business
representatives will have distinct interests, they can interact in ways that
enhance economic and regulatory performance subject to certain condi-
tions. To start, if businesses and government are not to collude to the detri-
ment of development objectives, a professional government bureaucracy
with some autonomy is needed as a bulwark against corruption. Comple-
mentarily, collaborative governance mechanisms benefit from enhanced
trade negotiations and the WTO's judicialized dispute settlement system. Pedro da
Motta Veiga & Roberto Magno Iglesias, A Institucionalidade da Politica Brasileira de
Comercio Exterior, in 0 DESAFIO DAS EXPORTACOES 51, 51-96 (Armando Castalier
Pinheiro eds., 2002).
80. See Cheibub, supra note 79, at 127; Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society
Relationship, supra note 59, at 176; see also infra Part III.A.
81. SCHNEIDER, BUSINESS POLITICS, supra note 74, at 101, 123.
82. Id. We thank Ben Schneider for emphasizing this point in his comments on our
paper at a workshop at Northwestern University. As Haggard, Maxfied, and Schneider
further write, "When we probe the question of why small businesses are able to over-
come collective action problems, we often find the visible hands of state actors and polit-
ical entrepreneurs." Stephan Haggard et al., Theories of Business and Business-State
Relations, in BUSINESS AND THE STATE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 36, 45 (Sylvia Maxfield &
Ben Ross Schneider eds., 1997). This point applies both to the financing of Brazilian
trade associations and as we will see, the role of entrepreneurs behind Brazil's com-
plaints in important WTO cases, such as the United States Subsidies on Upland-Cotton
and the EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar cases discussed in Part IV.A.
83. See SCHNEIDER, BUSINESS POLITICS, supra note 74, at 96 (noting "representatives of
business, especially industry in Sdo Paulo, regularly figured prominently in top posi-
tions in all sorts of governments").
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transparency to ensure public accountability. 84 Finally, it is important for
businesses to be able to pool their resources so as to be meaningful inter-
locutors with government officials on international economic matters, pro-
viding the government with needed information and expertise so that
government is better able to implement the state's goals. As Ben Schneider
and Sylvia Maxfield emphasize, "Institutionalist analyses of development
have often concluded that relations between business and government
account for a large part of the variation in economic performance. '8 5
Peter Evans developed the concept of "embedded autonomy" to high-
light the importance for bureaucrats both to retain autonomous, profes-
sional decision-making authority and to develop dense ties with the private
sector. 8 6 As Evans writes, successful developing countries are more likely
to have governments that approximate "Weberian bureaucracies" in which
"highly selective meritocratic recruitment and long-term career rewards cre-
ate commitment and a sense of corporate coherence. '8 7 These bureaucra-
cies, however, also need to have links with the private sector and civil
society, because a "state that was only autonomous would lack both
sources of intelligence and the ability to rely on decentralized private-
implementation. '88 Evans finds that a state with a professionalized
bureaucracy is more likely to develop the necessary "ties with the business
community" to facilitate "joint public-private partnerships in pursuit of
economic transformation," as opposed to "capture" and "collusion."8 9 In
the WTO context, businesses can help states compile information on the
trade barriers they face, evaluate options, and finance the costs of hiring
economic and legal expertise to prevail in a WTO complaint or in negotia-
tions. State bureaucracies must then manage and steer this relationship to
84. See infra Part III.C. Part III.C provides evidence of a Brazilian trend toward much
greater public accountability on trade policy relative to the past.
85. Ben Ross Schneider & Sylvia Maxfield, Business, the State, and Economic Perform-
ance in Developing Countries, in BUSINESS AND THE STATE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 6 (Syl-
via Maxfield & Ben Ross Schneider eds., 1997). Blanca Heredia and Ben Ross Schneider
typologize administrative reform in developing countries along three models that reflect
the points just made. See Blanca Heredia & Ben Ross Schneider, The Political Economy of
Administrative Reform in Developing Countries, in REINVENTING LEVIATHAN: THE POLITICS
OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 6-9 (Ben Ross Schneider &
Blanca Heredia eds., 2003). Reform programs can attempt to ensure: (i) a professional,
merit-based bureaucracy, (ii) a transparent, accountable bureaucracy, and (iii) an effi-
cient, managerial-oriented bureaucracy that is customer-oriented. See id. at 7-8. They
point out that reform programs often include combinations of these models but that the
pursuit of their respective goals involves tradeoffs. See id. at 6-9.
86. PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFORMATION 12
(1995) [hereinafter EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY].
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Peter Evans, State Structures, Government-Business Relations, and Economic Trans-
formation, in BUSINESS AND THE STATE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 63, 66 (Sylvia Maxfield
& Ben Ross Schneider eds., 1997). Evans contends that this is "the key to the develop-
mental state's effectiveness." Peter B. Evans, Predatory, Developmental, and Other Appa-
ratuses: A Comparative Political Economy Perspective on the Third World State, 4 Soc. F.
561, 574 (1989).
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advance national goals. 90
In sum, before the creation of the WTO and the start of negotiations to
establish a Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, foreign trade was not an
issue that mobilized Brazilian business or civil society. Rather, given Bra-
zil's import substitution industrialization policies, Brazilian industry did
not organize for foreign trade policy and dedicated little lobbying to it. Bra-
zilian industry primarily targeted the large internal Brazilian market, and
regarding foreign trade, industry's focus was on its relations with CACEX
for ad hoc support and import relief at the national level, for which the
GATT did not pose a significant risk. As Brazil's policies shifted to more
open-market and export-oriented alternatives, accompanied by greater
international legal commitments under a new WTO judicialized system,
Brazilian industry and government began to devote more attention to inter-
national trade law and practice. They explored strategies to increase
exports, retain protection for Brazil's internal market where desired, and
increase economic output overall. The combination of a professionalized
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and a relatively well-organized business sector
that included large, export-oriented companies boded well for Brazil's abil-
ity to make effective use of the WTO judicial system.
C. Brazil in GATT Dispute Settlement
Before we turn to Brazil's experience with WTO dispute settlement, we
make two points regarding its experience under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). First, Brazil participated in the less judicialized
system of GATT dispute settlement, and its participation increased signifi-
cantly during the GATT's final years when the system itself became more
judicialized and Brazil's development and trade policies became more lib-
eral and export-oriented. The experience provided a foretaste of the devel-
opments to come under the WTO. Second, these GATT disputes were
nonetheless of a low political profile and resulted in little regulatory
change. They thus did not generate Brazilian media coverage or catalyze
much Brazilian business or civil society engagement.
Brazil was one of the twenty-three original GATT contracting parties in
1948. 9 1 Although it was not a frequent user of GATT dispute settlement in
the early years, Brazil became more active as the GATT system became
more judicialized in the 1980s, particularly during the last years of the
Uruguay Round negotiations, which took place between 1986 and 1994.92
90. On government steering of public-private governance networks, see R.A.W.
Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 POL. STUD. 652
(1996).
91. Margaret S. Lyon, The Impact of Foreign Imports on the Florida Citrus Industry, 3
FLA. INT'L L.J. 443, 451 n.71 (1988). Brazil formally joined the GATT on July 30, 1948.
Id.
92. According to a Brazilian government source, Brazil always identified dispute set-
tlement as an important issue, although it focused greater attention on negotiations in
the early years. Interviews by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian officials, Brazilian Mis-
sion [names withheld], in Geneva, Switz. (Sept. 20-24, 2006) (on file with authors).
Seven rounds of trade negotiations were completed between 1949 and 1979. Id.
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Brazil filed sixteen complaints in total during the nearly forty-eight years
that it was a member of the GATT, twelve of them initiated during the Uru-
guay Round negotiations. It was a respondent in six cases during these
forty-eight years. 93 Overall, Brazil was the fifth most active user of the
GATT dispute settlement system.9 4 Annex I provides a descriptive, chrono-
logical overview of Brazil's experience with dispute settlement under the
GATT and contains a table that lists all GATT cases in which Brazil was a
party.
It is difficult to report on Brazil's organization for GATT dispute settle-
ment because few records exist and scholars have written relatively little
about it. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs controlled Brazil's approach to
GATT dispute settlement, and it generally received little proactive input
from the Brazilian private sector. The government did receive some sup-
port from U.S.- and EU-based lawyers in cases involving import relief mea-
sures, such as anti-dumping and countervailing duty determinations,
typically where the attorneys had already contested the agency decisions at
the national level. 9 5 The Brazilian private sector's general approach, how-
ever, was largely to defer to the ministry on such matters. It was not until
the creation of the WTO's more judicialized (and significantly more costly)
system that the government realized the extent of its need for the private
sector's assistance in funding outside attorneys and the private sector
became much more engaged, partly on account of the relatively greater
legal certainty that the WTO dispute settlement system provided. 96
Notwithstanding the gradual judicialization of GATT dispute settle-
ment, Brazil operated with less certainty under the GATT system because
defendants could still block a panel's formation or the adoption of a
93. See infra Annex I.
94. E-mail from Eric Reinhardt, Assoc. Professor of Political Sci., Emory University,
to Gregory C. Shaffer (Nov. 1, 2006) (on file with authors). The four most active mem-
bers during the GATT negotiations were, in order, the United States, the European Com-
munity, Canada, and Australia. Id.
95. Telephone Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Washington, D.C. Legal Coun-
sel [name withheld] (Feb. 19, 2008) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Washington
Counsel Interview]. These private attorneys were funded by either the U.S. importer or
the Brazilian exporter. Id. In Brazil's 1992 GATT case against U.S. countervailing duties
on rubber footwear, for example, the U.S. industry funded outside U.S. counsel to assist
Brazil. Id. In a 1992 case brought by the United States against Brazilian countervailing
duties on milk powder, U.S. counsel again assisted Brazil, but this time funded by the
Brazilian industry. Id.
96. Karen Alter provides an example of the differences between GATT and WTO
dispute settlement for Brazil in relation to Brazil's "long-running dispute with the EU
regarding [the EU'sl treatment of soluble coffee." Karen J. Alter, Resolving or Exacerbat-
ing Disputes?: The WTO's New Dispute Resolution System, 79 INT'L AFF. 783, 786 (2003)
(based on an interview with a Geneva-based diplomat). She writes, "Brazil had not pur-
sued a complaint under the old GATT system because it knew the complaint would be
blocked. Negotiations under the new system got nowhere until Brazil notified the EU
that it would request formal consultations at the next Dispute Settlement Body meet-
ing-the first step in initiating the dispute resolution process. Three days later, the EU
offered concessions it had previously said were impossible, and the dispute was
resolved." Id. In this case, the applicable substantive GATT rules had not changed, only
the dispute settlement rules had. Id.
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panel's findings. 97 Only a few of Brazil's complaints resulted in the forma-
tion of a panel and thus full litigation,9 8 and most of Brazil's complaints
did not result in any change in the targeted country's policies. 99 Because
these cases were of a low political profile, they received little public atten-
tion and involved little engagement of the private sector except for some
back-up support in import relief cases where a company had already hired
a lawyer for a challenged domestic proceeding. In contrast, WTO dispute
settlement has gained much greater attention from Brazilian government,
industry, the private bar, the media, and civil society.
II. The Challenges Posed By WTO Dispute Settlement: The Catalyzing
Effects of the Embraer Case for Brazil
A. The Challenges of WTO Dispute Settlement
The WTO expanded the scope of the 1948 General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT) to include nineteen agreements under a single
framework and a vastly expanded membership, consisting of 151 members
today. 10 0 Countries have significantly reduced tariff rates1 01 and the
97. See HUDEC, supra note 5, at 42. Since as far back as the 1960s during the GATT
period, Brazil supported a stronger international trade dispute settlement system, both
to help defend itself against U.S. unilateralism and to secure better access for its exports
generally. Id. In the 1960s and 1970s, Brazil supported "a more active, prosecutorial
role for the GATT Secretariat," as well as special, differential treatment procedures and
remedies for developing countries, but it was largely unsuccessful in these efforts. See
id.; Hhkan Nordstr6m & Gregory Shaffer, Access to Justice in the WTO: The Case for a
Small Claims Procedure?, 7 WORLD TRADE REV. (forthcoming 2008) (estimating the costs
of WTO litigation); Advisory Centre on WTO Law, http://www.acwl.ch/ (last visited
May. 10, 2008) (noting the limited use of the April 5, 1966 GATT Decision providing for
accelerated procedures for developing country complainants under Article XXIII (BISD
14S/18)). Brazil stressed that a system of remedies based on retaliation favors large,
developed countries exercising market power. HUDEC, supra note 5, at 42. In the negoti-
ations that led to the 1979 GATT reforms, for example, "[t]he Brazilian delegation tabled
proposals [for] . . . stronger remedies for developing country complaints, such as collec-
tive retaliation or money damages." Id. Brazil's delegation nonetheless recognized that
"the dispute settlement procedures are a very important and integral part of the GATT
and ... play a decisive role in securing reciprocity and a proper balance of rights and
obligations between contracting parties." Communication from Brazil, Uruguay Round
Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement, MTN.GNG/NG13/W/24 (Mar. 7, 1988), availa-
ble at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/history/urdsu/w24.pdf.
98. See GATT Panel Reports/Working Party Reports/Other Rulings, http://
www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/ (last visited May 24, 2008) (showing that
only a few panels were formed because of Brazilian complaints).
99. See infra Annex I; see also SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 51-57.
In fact, the final results of Brazil's complaints against the United States' strategic use of
Section 301 were significant changes in Brazilian domestic law and practice motivated
by the threat of U.S. trade sanctions. Id. at 52. The Brazilian practices that the United
States challenged under Section 301 were further constrained by the WTO TRIPs Agree-
ment and the Agreement on Import Licensing Procedures. Id. at 53. In turn, the new
WTO dispute settlement system somewhat constrained U.S. unilateral Section 301 mea-
sures against Brazil. Id. at 51.
100. Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, May 16, 2008, http://
www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/whatis-e/tif-e/org6_e.htm.
101. See U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Average Applied Import Tariff Rates on Non-
Agricultural and Non-Fuel Products, in UNCTAD HANDBOOK OF STATISTICS (2008). Since
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WTO has legally constrained the use of other barriers to trade. Centrally
important to our story, the WTO, in contrast with both the former GATT
regime in which a defendant could block the creation of a panel or the
adoption of its report and the International Court of Justice (ICJ), created a
judicialized dispute settlement system with compulsory jurisdiction and an
appellate process that can help to enforce these undertakings. 10 2 This
judicial regime has developed in a legalistic manner, often driven by law-
yers representing government and business clients, creating both opportu-
nities and challenges for countries with fewer political, financial, and legal
resources.
Although the WTO's more legalized and judicialized dispute settle-
ment system offers significant promise for developing countries, it comes
with costs. WTO legal procedures and substantive case law have become
increasingly complex and technically demanding. For example, the Con-
sultative Board to the WTO Director General reported in December 2004
that the first "81 cases for which reports are adopted, and reports whose
adoption is pending, amount to more than 27,000 pages of jurispru-
dence." 10 3 The 2006 WTO panel decision in the European Communities-
Biotech case alone was 1,087 pages in text, contained 2,187 footnotes, and
was over 2,400 pages including annexes.10 4 Most developing countries
have not participated at all in the WTO system. In fact, over the WTO's
first thirteen years, only twenty-five of the WTO's 120 non-OECD members
had filed a complaint before the WTO. By the end of 2007, sixty-two non-
OECD members had never even filed as a third party.10 5 We now examine
the 1980s, tariff rates have been significantly reduced around the world. Within Brazil,
average tariffs dropped from nearly 50% in 1989 to 12% in 1995, and to 10.4% by the
start of 2005. Id. In the two largest markets for Brazil's exports, the United States and
the European Union, average tariff rates declined from 8% in the EU and 6.5% in the
United States in 1990, to 6.1% in the EU and 5.8% in the United States in 1995, to 4.3%
in the EU and 4.2% in the United States in 2000, and to 4.2% in the EU and 3.8% in the
United States in 2005. Id. Tariff peaks, however, continue to affect products of export
interest. For example, Brazil maintained that "discriminatory [U.S.] measures have led
to the application of an average tariff of 45.6 percent on the fifteen top Brazilian exports
to the U.S. market. These fifteen products represent 36.4 percent of the Brazilian total
exports." HIRST, supra note 58, at 27.
102. See PHILLIPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BowETr's LAW OF INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS
357 (5th ed. 2001) (noting the requirement that countries consent to the International
Court of Justice's jurisdiction pursuant to a compromissory clause, and countries' use of
reservations even where they have accepted the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction pursuant
to Article 36(2), the "Optional Clause," of the ICJ's Statute). The WTO has no police
powers to "enforce" WTO rulings, but it does include mechanisms pursuant to which a
complainant may have a panel review whether the defendant has complied with the
WTO ruling and if not, for a panel to authorize the complainant to suspend trade con-
cessions vis-i-vis the defendant in an equivalent amount.
103. SUTHERLAND ET AL., supra note 68, at 51.
104. See Panel Report, European Communities- Measures Affecting the Approval and
Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Sept. 29,
2006).
105. These figures are as of Dec. 31, 2007. This represents a considerable improve-
ment of twenty additional non-OECD countries filing as third parties since June 2005.
Cf. Gregory Shaffer, 0 Sistema de Solu do de Controversias da OMC, Seus Pontos Fracos e
Propostas para Aperfeicoamento: Uma Visdo Econamica e de Mercado, in 10 ANos DE
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the general challenges that the WTO dispute settlement system poses
before examining Brazil's experience and what lies behind it.10 6
Developing countries vary significantly in terms of the size of their
economies and the role of law and legal institutions in their domestic sys-
tems, but they generally face four primary challenges if they are to partici-
pate effectively in the WTO dispute settlement system. These challenges
are: (1) lack of capacity to organize information concerning trade barriers
and opportunities to challenge them, as well as a relative lack of internal
legal expertise in WTO law, which has a lengthy and increasingly factually
contextualized jurisprudence, (2) constrained financial resources, includ-
ing those available to hire outside legal counsel to effectively use the WTO
legal system, (3) fear of political and economic pressure from the United
States, the European Union, and other WTO members with large markets,
resulting in reduced incentives to bring WTO claims against these WTO
members, and (4) their own internal governance systems. We can catego-
rize these challenges as constraints of legal knowledge, financial endow-
ment, political and market power, and internal governance or more simply,
as constraints of law, money, power, and governance.
For a WTO member to use the WTO system successfully, it must
develop cost-effective mechanisms to perceive injuries to its trading pros-
pects, identify who is responsible, and mobilize resources to bring a legal
claim or negotiate a favorable settlement. In the domestic socio-legal litera-
ture, these stages of dispute resolution are referred to as naming, blaming,
and claiming.' 0 7 In the WTO context, a member's participation in the sys-
tem is, in part, a function of its ability to process knowledge of trade inju-
ries, their causes, and their relation to WTO rights. Hiring lawyers to
defend WTO claims is of little help if countries lack cost-effective mecha-
nisms to identify and prioritize claims in the first place. 10 8 Even where
countries become aware of actionable injuries, this awareness will not be
transformed into legal claims if, based on experience, officials lack confi-
dence that a claim is worth pursuing in light of high litigation costs, rela-
OMC: UMA ANALISE DO SISTEMA DE SOLUCAO DE CCONTROVERSIAS E PERSPECTIVAS (Luiz
Glavo Baptista et al. eds., 2007).
106. This subsection draws from Gregory Shaffer, The Challenges of WTO Law: Strate-
gies for Developing Country Adaptation, 5 WORLD TRADE REV. 177 (2006).
107. See William Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Nam-
ing, Blaming and Claiming, 15 LAW & Soc'y REV. 631, 631 (1980).
108. For example, one developing country representative stated that it "would not
have thought of bringing the cotton and sugar cases against the U.S. and EU, as Brazil
did, not only because of the litigation costs," but also because it would have "lacked the
proper understanding that it had a claim." Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Repre-
sentative, mid-size developing country member of the WTO [name withheld], in Geneva,
Switz. (July 13, 2005) (on file with authors). As Hoekman and Kostecki write regarding
WTO dispute settlement, "The Advisory Centre on WTO Law focuses only on the
'downstream' dimension of enforcement, not on the 'upstream' collection of informa-
tion." BERNARD M. HOEKMAN & MICHEL M. KOSTECKI, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: THE WTO AND BEYOND 94-95 (2001) (also noting that "[olne
option to deal with the information problem is for the private sector to cooperate and to
create mechanisms through which data on trade . . . barriers are collected and
analyzed.").
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tively weak remedies, and political risks.10 9 Even where a country decides
to bring a case, it will need to comply with the WTO dispute settlement
system's demanding procedural requirements, including its tight deadlines
for legal submissions and responses to panel questions."l 0
Many developing country missions suffer from a lack of national legal
expertise in WTO matters, both within their government institutions and
their private bars. Diplomatic postings have generally been filled by non-
lawyers. Developing country members often have no lawyers or at most
have one or two to address WTO matters, whether in Geneva or in the
home capital."' Moreover, there are likely few, if any, private lawyers in
the country knowledgeable about WTO law. Although the situation is
changing in some countries, WTO law, as opposed to traditional "public
international law," generally has not been taught in developing countries.
As a result, many developing countries have become dependent on educa-
tion at law schools in the United States and Europe to develop local talent,
provided that their students have the funding to attend these schools and if
they do, that they return home. 1 1 2
109. Many developing countries have demanded stronger WTO remedies, especially
for developing countries, in new proposals in the current review of the WTO dispute
settlement understanding (DSU). For examples of more recent proposals for collective
retaliation, see Communication from Kenya, Text for the African Group Proposals on Dis-
pute Settlement Understanding Negotiations, TN/DS/W/42 (Jan. 24, 2003); Proposal by
the African Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/15
(Sept. 25, 2002); Proposal of the LDC Group, Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement
Understanding, TN/DS/W/17 (Oct. 9, 2005); Proposals on DSU by Cuba, Honduras,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Tanzania & Zimbabwe, Negotiations on
the Dispute Settlement- Special and Differential Treatment for Developing Countries, TN/
DS/W/19 (Oct. 9, 2002). As for proposals for money damages, see Contribution of Ecua-
dor to Improvement of the Dispute Settlement Understanding of the WTO, TN/DS/W/9
(July 8, 2002); Proposal by Ecuador, Negotiations on Improvements and Clarifications of
the Dispute Settlement Understanding, TN/DS/W/33 (Jan. 23, 2003). For a detailed anal-
ysis of such proposals regarding the perspective of developing countries, see A. AMARAL
ET AL., A REFORMA DO SISTEMA DE SOLUCAO DE CONTROVeRSIAS DA OMC E OS PASES EM
DESENVOLVIMENTO (2006).
110. This point has been repeatedly stressed by government representatives and pri-
vate practitioners that Gregory C. Shaffer interviewed.
111. See generally Busch et al., supra note 15. As a representative from a Southeast
Asian member stated, "I am the only lawyer here. I handle all DSU [WTO Dispute Settle-
ment Understanding] matters, as well as matters before other WTO committees." Inter-
view by Gregory C. Shaffer with government official, Southeast Asian member state
[name withheld], in Geneva, Switz. (Sept. 2002) (on file with authors). Of course, there
are situations where non-lawyers master WTO legal matters to lead an effective litigation
team, as was the case with the former head of Brazil's unit for WTO dispute settlement,
Roberto Carvalho de Azevedo. However, this situation is likely atypical.
112. See Interviews by Gregory C. Shaffer with developing country representatives
[names withheld], in Geneva, Switz. (Sept. 2002, Feb. 2003, June 2003, and July 2005)
(on file with authors); Interviews by Gregory C. Shaffer with developing country repre-
sentatives [names withheld], at regional African, Asian, and South American Dialogues
on WTO Dispute Settlement and Sustainable Development in Kenya, Indonesia, and Bra-
zil (2006) (on file with authors). To give just one example, a member of the Paraguayan
Ministry of Foreign Relations complained that as of June 2006, no course in interna-
tional trade law was offered in the country and that no professors were prepared to offer
such a course. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with official, Paraguay Ministry of For-
eign Relations [name withheld] (June 21, 2006) (on file with authors).
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In addition, English is a second or third language for most developing
country officials, and they have relatively little experience with the type of
factually-contextualized legal reasoning used in WTO jurisprudence." 13
Although English, French, and Spanish are the three official languages of
the WTO, English predominates so that even French and Spanish-speaking
delegates are at a linguistic disadvantage.11 4 Delegates speaking non-offi-
cial languages are even worse off. In addition, the legal culture of the WTO
dispute settlement system poses a greater challenge for lawyers and diplo-
mats raised in legal cultures where dispute settlement is less factually con-
textualized and legal submissions require less parsing of prior court
jurisprudence, such that adapting to the WTO's factually and legally com-
plex jurisprudence is more time consuming and costly for them.115 As one
Brazilian lawyer stated:
Lawyers in Brazil are not used to the fact-finding part of WTO cases. The
way attorneys write in Brazil is fashioned by Brazilian civil law traditions.
It's not a natural way for them, the way they are trained to write. Brazilians
can write in English, but they will think as Brazilian lawyers.'
16
A second major challenge that developing countries face is that they
have fewer resources to spend on legal assistance to defend their WTO
rights. WTO members face three primary types of costs in determining
whether to bring a case. The first is the direct out-of-pocket cost of hiring
outside legal counsel. The second is that of hiring and dedicating govern-
ment personnel with expertise to oversee and provide necessary support in
bringing a complaint. The third is the opportunity cost of expending
scarce government resources and personnel time for this particular use as
opposed to other social priorities, which in turn affects a member's percep-
tion of the cost. Because poorer countries have scarcer resources and more
113. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Esperanza Duran, Director, Agency for
International Trade Information and Cooperation, in Geneva, Switz. (June 20, 2002) (on
file with authors). The Agency for International Trade Information and Cooperation
works with the least developed organizations from Francophone Africa. Id.
114. See Diana Tussie & Valentina Delich, Dispute Settlement Between Developing
Countries: Argentina and Chilean Price Bands, in MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO
PARTICIPATION 23, 33 (Peter Gallagher et al. eds., 2005). As an Argentine representative
relates, "It is tiring and time consuming to wait for the translation in hearings. But more
relevantly, translation of documents may take ten days, so that panelists turn up without
time to read them. This is a disadvantage vis-A-vis documents submitted promptly in
English by the defendant. Panelists know where their arguments are headed while they
have no clue about ours, and this is a great handicap." Id. Tussie and Delich also note
the value of English at panel hearings: "[Slessions could technically be held in any offi-
cial language; but, after the initial presentations in Spanish led to a member of the panel
yawning and dozing off, a decision was taken to switch to English." Id.
115. Although some analysts may point to a divide between civil and common law, we
do not need to enter this debate to make our point. Cf. Florencio Lopez-de Silanes et al.,
Courts, 118 QJ. EcON. 453 (2003).
116. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian attorney, Sao Paulo law firm
[name withheld], in SAo Paulo, Braz. (Apr. 23, 2004) (on file with authors); Interview by
Gregory C. Shaffer with former interns working on dispute settlement issues, Brazil
WTO Mission [names withheld], in Geneva, Switz., in SAo Paulo, Braz. (Apr. 2004) (on
file with authors).
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immediate needs, they are particularly likely to perceive WTO legal costs
as significant, especially where future benefits are uncertain.
Compared to larger, wealthier members, developing countries face
much higher relative and absolute costs in WTO litigation to bring a case
of the same nature. The relative costs of litigation are much higher for
them in relation to the size of their economies and government budgets.
Investing in WTO legal expertise thus makes less sense for them, especially
in relation to other budgetary needs. In addition, developing countries can
face higher absolute costs to identify and litigate an individual case unless
their representation is partially subsidized, as through use of the Advisory
Centre on WTO Law. 1 7 The reason is that most developing countries par-
ticipate less frequently in WTO dispute settlement, and thus they do not
benefit from economies of scale. For example, the United States has partic-
ipated as a party or third party in approximately 99% of WTO cases that
resulted in an adopted decision, and the European Union has participated
in 85% of such cases."l 8 Because of their prior and ongoing litigation
experience, the United States and the European Union face fewer start-up
costs for an individual case. In other words, the United States and the
European Union can spread the fixed costs of developing internal legal
expertise over more cases than developing countries.
The third challenge that developing countries can face is extra-legal
pressure from more powerful countries, undermining the goal of objective
trade dispute resolution through law. 1 19 The powerful can exploit power
imbalances and rhetorically rationalize their actions in non-power-based
terms. There may be little that a small developing country can do to
counter threats to withdraw preferential tariff benefits or foreign aid-even
food aid-in response to the country's challenge of a trade measure. Such
tactics can undermine a developing country's faith in the efficacy of the
legal system.
The fourth challenge is maintaining good internal governance, which
affects a country's general stability and thus the role of law within it. Inter-
nal governance systems affect a country's ability to access knowledge and
expertise from its private sector, local lawyers, academics, and civil society
more generally. Although this particular challenge is largely external to the
operation of the WTO dispute settlement system, our study of Brazil points
117. See Shaffer, How to Make the WTO Dispute Settlement System Work, supra note 14,
at 18-23. For an estimation of the costs of WTO litigation, see Nordstr6m & Shaffer,
supra note 97.
118. This calculation is based on an update through December 31, 3007 of Tables 6.1
and 7.1 Of SHAFFER, DEFENDING INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 132, 157-58 (noting 97% and
81% participation rates as of January 17, 2003).
119. See generally Andrew Guzman & Beth Simmons, Power Plays and Capacity Con-
straints: The Selection of Defendants in WTO Disputes, 34 J. LEGAl STUD. 557 (2005).
Guzman and Simmons find that statistical evidence concerning the selection of defend-
ants suggests that developing country selection is more likely to be explained by capac-
ity rather than power because developing countries tend to bring complaints against
larger WTO members who represent their largest markets. See id. Nonetheless, Shaf-
fer's interviews confirmed that smaller developing countries frequently face political
constraints in initiating a WTO complaint.
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to the key role of national governance systems. A developing country with
corrupt, avaricious leaders or bureaucrats is much less likely to effectively
engage in international dispute settlement. The government does not
invest in building expertise, and it is unable to obtain necessary informa-
tion and collaboration from a private sector that has no confidence in it. 120
The concept of legal culture must be distinguished from a country's
internal governance system, but legal culture is a component of internal
governance and may help to explain some variation in WTO members' use
of the WTO dispute settlement system.1 2 1 Courts and litigation play a
more important role in Brazil than in many other developing countries,
such as those in East Asia. Hence, litigation at the international level does
not as dramatically diverge from Brazil's internal legal culture and struc-
ture. 122 The role of litigation in a country's legal system, however, does not
determine a country's ability to use the WTO dispute settlement system.
For example, Korea and Thailand, though not considered litigious societies,
have been relatively active users of WTO litigation compared to countries
such as Malaysia and Indonesia.12 3
120. For quantitative analysis that suggests that this latter factor is important, see
Christina Davis & Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, Who Files?: Developing Country Participa-
tion in WTO Adjudication 15 (Jan. 17, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.princeton.edu/-cldavis/files/who-files.pdf (noting "a high correlation
between democracy and patterns of participation in WTO adjudication .... Demo-
cratic states are likely to face pressures for accountability to interest groups that will lead
them to take strong trade enforcement measures, including WTO adjudication). Schnei-
der and Maxfield write more broadly that "in poor countries the lack of trust between
economic agents can inhibit all types of beneficial exchanges and retard overall develop-
ment .... Trust increases the voluntary exchange of information, makes reciprocity
more likely even without active monitoring and disciplining, and generally reduces
uncertainty and increases credibility on all sides." See Schneider & Maxfield, supra note
85, at 12, 14; see also EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY, supra note 86 (distinguishing preda-
tory, rent-seeking bureaucracies from "developmental" types); Charles F. Sabel, Learning
by Monitoring: The Institutions of Economic Development, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994).
121. See Davis & Bermeo, supra note 120, at 31 (stating that "the three developing
countries with the highest numbers of lawyers, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina are also
leading users of WTO adjudication"). On the concept of legal culture, see David Nelken,
Legal Culture, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND SOCIETY: AMERICAN AND GLOBAL PERSPEC-
TIvES 370, 370 (2007); see also Bradley Condon, NAFTA at Three-and-One-Half Years:
Where Do We Stand and Where Should We Be Headed? A Cross-Cultural Analysis of North
American Legal Integration, 23 CAN.-U.S. LJ. 347, 353 (1997) (defining legal culture as
an evolving set of shared beliefs, values, attitudes, and logical processes through which
lawyers, jurists, and others within a given society perceive and react to legal rules).
122. See Megan J. Ballard, The Clash Between Local Courts and Global Economics: The
Politics of Judicial Reform in Brazil, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 230, 239, 276 (1999) (noting
"an explosion of cases challenging the government's new economic and state reform
policies" and that, "in Brazil, broad access to unfettered courts has increased the use of
courts as political instruments"); Keith S. Rosenn, Judicial Reform in Brazil, 4 NAFTA: L.
& Bus. REV. OF THE AMERICAS 19, 24 (1998) (noting an "avalanche of cases").
123. There is a debate among culturalists and structuralists as to the explanation of
low litigation rates in Asian countries, with culturalists focusing on cultural norms, such
as Confucianism in Korea and Buddhism in Thailand, and structuralists focusing on the
legal systems' constriction of litigation opportunities, which we do not address in this
article. Regarding Korea's and Thailand's use of WTO dispute settlement, see William J.
Davey, The WTO Dispute Settlement System: How Have Developing Countries Fared?
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In light of the considerable challenges that most members face if they
are to use the WTO dispute settlement system and the actual variation in
members' successful use of it, understanding the steps that Brazil took are
not just of academic interest. As we will discuss, Brazil's government and
private sector have responded to the challenges of the WTO legal system
through a series of complementary initiatives that are of interest to other
WTO members. Before we turn to them, however, we provide a brief chron-
ological and statistical overview of Brazil's experience in trade litigation in
the WTO.
B. Brazil's Use of WTO Dispute Settlement: An Overview
Brazil has been the most successful developing-country user of the
WTO dispute settlement system in terms of both the quantity of cases
brought and the cases' systemic implications. Overall, Brazil has been the
fourth most frequent complainant in the WTO dispute settlement system
after the United States, the European Union, and Canada. It has partici-
pated in 86 of the 369 cases filed before the WTO through December 31,
2007 as complainant, respondent, or third party, constituting a 23% partic-
ipation rate.' 24 It has been a complainant in 11, a respondent in 3, and a
third party in 35 of the 136 cases that resulted in an adopted WTO report
during this period, constituting about a 36% participation rate. 1 25 Table 1
depicts Brazilian participation as a complainant and respondent on an
annual basis, based on the dates that complaints were filed. Annex II lists
all cases in which Brazil has participated in the WTO dispute settlement
16-18 (Illinois Public Law Research Paper No. 05-17, 2005) available at http://
www.luc.edu/law/activities/publications/ilrsymposium/2008sym/
davey.wto.dispute-paper.pdf. For assessments of dispute settlement within Korea, see
JUDICIAL SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION IN THE GLOBALIZING WORLD (Dai-Kwon Choi & Kahei
Rokumoto eds., 2007); RECENT TcRSFORMATIONS IN KOREAN LAW AND SOCIETY (Dae-Kyu
Yoon ed., 2000); Lisa Blomgren Bingham et al., Participatory Governance in South Korea:
Legal Infrastructure, Economic Development, and Dispute Resolution, 19 PAC. McGEORGE
GLOBAL Bus. & DEV. LJ. 375, 386 (2007); Nancy J. White & Jun Lee, Dispute Resolution
in the Korean and U.S. Markets: A Comparison, 19 Mi-AM. J. Bus. 23 (2004). For assess-
ments of dispute settlement within Thailand, see David Engel, Globalization and the
Decline of Legal Consciousness: Torts, Ghosts and Karma in Thailand, 30 L. Soc. INQUIRY
469, 469-514 (2005); Tim L. Estrange, Major Issues in Litigation in the Asia Pacific Rim,
INT'L COM. ARB., Apr. 1996, at 24 (discussing dispute resolution in Thailand and other
Asian countries).
124. Dispute Settlement Commentary, http://www.worldtradelaw.net (last visited
Mar. 20, 2008); Ministerio das Rela 6es Exteriores, Contenciosos do Brasil na OMC,
http://www.mre.gov.br/portugues/ministerio/sitios-secretaria/cgc/contenciosos.doc
(last visited Mar. 20, 2008); World Trade Org., Brazil and the WTO, http://www.wto.
org/english/thewto e/countries e/brazil-e.htm (last visited May 20, 2008). A large gap
separated Canada and Brazil from the two most active members, the United States and
the European Union. The United States has brought eighty-eight cases as a complainant,
and the EU has brought seventy-six cases as a complainant. See Dispute Settlement
Commentary, supra. In total, the United States has been a party or third party in 258
cases, and the EU a party or third party in 214 cases. See id.
125. Some of the cases in which Brazil is involved were still in consultations or before
a panel at the beginning of 2008. See infra Annex I1. For the adopted reports, see WTO
Panel/AB Reports, http://www.worldtradelaw.net (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). We do
not include Article 21.5 compliance decisions in our calculations.
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system, indicating the status of the case, the products covered, and the
industry affected. Annex II also lists the private law firms employed in
these cases as part of Brazil's public-private coordination strategy for WTO
dispute settlement. 1
2 6
Table 1: Brazil as a Complainant and Respondent in WTO Cases by Year
(1995-2007)127
7
6
5
4uRespondent
3- 0 Complainant
21
111E
-1 F 1
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2005 2006 2007
Although Brazil became one of the first users of the WTO dispute set-
tlement system both as a complainant and respondent, the initial cases did
not receive much media coverage in Brazil and can be viewed as transi-
tional cases from the GATT. 128 At the end of 1996, however, Brazil faced a
controversy that would receive widespread attention in Brazilian politics,
126. See infra Annex II.
127. See World Trade Org., supra note 124; see also infra Annex II. This chart is based
on the dates on which cases were filed and not the dates on which the WTO Dispute
Settlement Body adopted the rulings. The rulings typically occur about a year or year
and a half after filing, depending on the complexity of the case and whether the panel
decision was appealed.
128. InJanuary and April 1995, Venezuela and Brazil brought complaints against the
United States regarding its discriminatory requirements for domestic and foreign refor-
mulated and conventional gasoline, resulting in the adoption of a rather straight forward
thirty-page Appellate Body decision in May 1996. See Appellate Body Report, United
States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29,
1996); Panel Report, United States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gaso-
line, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996). The case involved a prototypical national treatment
complaint (GATT Article Il) and an Article XX defense on alleged environmental
grounds. See Appellate Body Report, United States- Standards for Reformulated and Con-
ventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); Panel Report, United States-Stan-
dards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R Uan. 29, 1996). The
Appellate Body upheld the result but reversed the panel in its reasoning. See Appellate
Body Report, United States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/
DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); Panel Report, United States- Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996). Brazil also became a respondent in
the WTO's first year in a Philippine complaint against Brazilian measures affecting the
import of desiccated coconut. The case again went through the appellate process and
Brazil again emerged victorious but on the technical grounds that the Brazilian measures
were not covered by the new WTO regime but rather by the former GATT. See Appellate
Body Report, Brazil- Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, 1I9 21-22, WT/DS22/AB/R
(Feb. 21, 1997); Panel Report, Brazil- Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/DS22/
R (Oct. 17, 1996).
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the private sector, and the media and would lead to a change in the govern-
ment's approach to WTO dispute settlement. The case, brought by Canada
on behalf of the Canadian aircraft manufacturer Bombardier, concerned
Brazil's subsidization of the Brazilian aircraft manufacturer Embraer. The
Brazilian government followed suit with its own case against Canada on
behalf of Embraer, resulting in a complex series of decisions in which the
WTO Appellate body found that both Brazil and Canada had violated pro-
visions of the WTO agreement on subsidies.1 29 As the Executive Director
of a major Brazilian consulting firm stated, "Embraer was a wake-up for
industry. ' 130  Brazilian media coverage of these parallel cases brought
WTO proceedings to the broader Brazilian public for the first time.
13 1
The challenge against Brazil's subsidization of Embraer was symboli-
cally important for Brazil's identity as an emerging economic power. Brazil
created Embraer as a government-owned enterprise in 1969 intending it to
become the domestic supplier to the Brazilian Air Force during Brazil's mil-
itary rule. The government privatized Embraer in December 1994 as part
of the liberalization of Brazil's economy after the country's return to demo-
cratic government. Embraer became one of the two leading sellers of small
and mid-size jet aircraft. 132 Embraer's economic success thus supported
129. The Canada-Brazil, Bombardier-Embraer cases were complex, involving the full
range of WTO procedures, including requests and authorizations for retaliation on
account of non-compliance with the ruling. The first complaint was filed in 1996 and
the most recent decision was issued in 2003, but the case could flare up again. The
main decisions ensuing from the initial complaints (WT/DS46 and WT/DS70) were:
Panel Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46 (Apr. 14,
1999); Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WT/
DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999); Panel Report, Brazil- Export Financing Programme for Air-
craft- Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW (May 9, 2000); Arbi-
trators Decision, Brazil- Export Financing Programme for Aircraft- Recourse to Arbitration
by Brazil Under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement, WT/DS46/
ARB (Aug. 28, 2000); Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Export Financing Programme for
Aircraft-Recourse by Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/AB/R (July 21, 2001);
Panel Report, Brazil- Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, Second Recourse by
Canada to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS46/RW/2 (July 26, 2001); Panel Report,
Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14, 1999);
Panel Report, Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft-Recourse by Bra-
zil to Article 21.5 of the DSU, WT/DS70/RW (May 9, 2000); Appellate Body Report,
Canada- Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft-Recourse by Brazil to Article
21.5 of the DSU-AB-2000-4 WT/DS70/AB/RW (July 21, 2000); Appellate Body Report,
Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft-AB-1999-2, WT/DS70/AB/R
(Aug. 2, 1999). The following decisions for complaint WT/DS222 are also related to
this dispute: Arbitrator Decision, Canada-Export Credits and Loan Guarantees for
Regional Aircraft-Recourse by Canada to Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 4.11 of the
SCM Agreement, WT/DS222/ARB (Feb. 2003); Panel Report, Canada- Export Credits and
Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/R (Jan. 22, 2002).
130. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Ricardo Camargo Mendes, Executive Direc-
tor, Prospectiva in Sdo Paulo, Braz. (Apr. 22, 2004) (on file with authors) [hereinafter
Mendes Interview]. For more on Prospectiva, see infra note 279.
131. See, e.g., Embraer Festeja Decisdo da OMC Contra Canadd, FOLHA ONLINE, Dec.
23, 2002, http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/dinheiro/ult91u61087.shtml.
132. Cf. Tyler Brilk, Rediscovering Brazils Secret Assets, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Jan. 26,
2008, at 6 (describing Embraer as the third-largest seller of small and mid-size jet air
craft); Embraer Reaffirms Plans to Deliver on Global Orders, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 14,
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Brazil's claim that it can compete in international markets in high tech and
high value-added sectors-in this case, jet aircraft for commercial, corpo-
rate, and military use.' 3 3 Embraer's success exemplifies, in the words of
Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Brazil's Minister of Long-Term Planning, a situ-
ation "in which a relatively more backward country may be able to enter...
into lines of business in which a relatively more advanced one special-
izes."'134 That is, Brazil, much less economically developed than Canada in
per capita terms, was not only "in striking distance," but actually was the
home of the world's third or fourth largest jet aircraft manufacturer after
Boeing and Airbus, competing with Canada's Bombardier.' 35
Canada exacerbated the dispute when it banned Brazilian beef imports
to press Brazil to remove its subsidies of Embraer and comply with the
Appellate Body ruling in the case. Canada did so on the grounds that there
had been an outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow dis-
ease) in Brazil, but it appears that there was no such outbreak. 136 This
drew a strong reaction from Brazilian agricultural groups, stoking Brazilian
popular reaction against Canada's unilateral action, which they maintained
was in bad faith. The Canadian action led to large protests, a huge barbe-
cue before the Canadian embassy, and "a consumer boycott" of Canadian
products, spurring more media coverage and public attention on the WTO
and its dispute settlement system. 137
The Embraer case was followed by an even more controversial one
brought against Brazil that rallied civil society organizations in Brazil and
around the world, generating significant Brazilian media coverage once
more. 138 In 2000, the United States challenged a Brazilian patent law pro-
2008, at B2 (describing it as the fourth-largest seller of small and mid-size jet air craft).
Embraer's shares were first listed in the Sao Paulo stock market in 2000 and are now
also quoted on the New York Stock Exchange. See Embraer, Company Profile (2006),
www.embraer.com.br/portugues/content/empresa/profile.asp (last visited May 20,
2008). Following its privatization, Embraer was Brazil's largest exporter in 1999 and
2001, the second largest in 2002 (after Petrobras), and the third largest in 2004 (after
Petrobras and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce). See Press Release, Minist~rio das Comuni-
canoes, Petrobras E a Maior Exportadora do Pals (Jan. 26, 2004), http://
www.idbrasil.gov.br/noticias/NewsItem.2004-01-27.3216; Embraer, supra. In the mar-
ket for 30 to 120 seat commercial jet aircraft, its share of the global market has risen.
Press Release, Forecast International, Demand Shifting Upward in Regional Jet Market
(Sept. 19, 2005), http://www.forecastinternational.com/press/release.cfm?article=78.
Transportation consultant Ray Jawarowski of Forecast International estimated that over
the next decade, Embraer will produce 1,426 regional jets, resulting in a 38.8% global
share of the regional jet market, while Bombardier will make 1,210 jets, constituting a
32.5% share. Id.
133. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED: THE WORLD DIVISION OF
LABOR AND THE METHOD OF EcONOMICS 114-15 (2007).
134. Id. Unger puts forward a theory of "relative advantage" in which he argues for
the need for a flexible trade regime that permits countries like Brazil to develop innova-
tive policies and practices and thus does not preclude protection for these purposes. Id.
135. See id.
136. Barral, The Brazilian Experience, supra note 69, at 14-15 (saying it was "inexis-
tent"); Mark MacKinnon, Beef Ban Could End As Brazil Talks Tough; 'No Evidence' Found of
Mad-Cow Disease, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 10, 2001, at Al.
137. See Barral, The Brazilian Experience, supra note 69, at 14-15.
138. See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, Look at Brazil, N.Y TIMES MAG., Jan. 28, 2001, at 6, 26.
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vision permitting compulsory licensing at a time when civil society organi-
zations were calling for lower cost drugs to respond to the HIV pandemic
and other public health concerns through, among other means, compul-
sory licensing. 139 Although the U.S. complaint did not target Brazil's AIDS
policies per se, Brazil was able to frame it in that way. The U.S. complaint
rallied domestic and international non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) behind the Brazilian government. 140
Canada's challenge to Brazilian industrial policy in the Embraer case
and the United States' challenge to Brazil's intellectual property policies in
the patent case helped spur the Brazilian government and private sectors to
devote greater resources to WTO dispute settlement. Until these cases, the
Brazilian government had been developing ad hoc, case-by-case strategies
to handle WTO cases, and Brazilian industry, academia, and civil society
had generally devoted less attention to the WTO system. In this sense,
being a respondent in WTO litigation can be positive for a country regard-
less of whether one adopts a trade-liberal perspective. 14 1 Being a respon-
dent can catalyze greater involvement in trade policy by the government as
a whole, as well as by the private sector and civil society generally. After
being placed on the defensive in these cases, Brazil developed new dispute
settlement strategies involving a reorganization of government bureaucracy
to create a specialized WTO dispute settlement unit and enhanced engage-
ment with the private business sector, private lawyers, academics, and civil
society organizations. This bolstering of Brazilian domestic WTO-related
legal capacity led to Brazil's most highly touted successes in WTO
litigation.
Following the Embraer and patent cases, Brazil filed a flurry of com-
plaints from 2000 to 2002 and was actually the most active WTO com-
plainant in 2001. Many of these cases were particularly complex, both
factually and legally, and strategically important, such as the United States-
Subsidies on Upland-Cotton and the EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar cases
examined in Part IV. 14 2 Although Table 1 indicates that Brazil was less
active between 2003 and 2007, it was in fact litigating and bargaining over
compliance in the cases that it had filed earlier, including the Cotton and
Sugar cases. In addition, Brazil increasingly became engaged in the Doha
139. Id.
140. See id. (noting the relatively successful Brazilian strategy to fight the AIDS epi-
demic, compared to what has transpired in other developing countries).
141. Chad P. Bown & Bernard Hoekman, Developing Countries and Enforcement of
Trade Agreements: Why Dispute Settlement Is Not Enough, 42 J. WORLD TRADE 177, 179
(2008) (noting that the lack of WTO complaints against most developing countries leads
to "welfare economic losses due to continued import protection within developing econ-
omies; diminished incentives for the country to take on additional WTO commitments
such as reducing tariff bindings to meaningful levels (i.e., at or close to applied rates); as
well as externality costs imposed on other developing countries"). Davis and Bermeo
show statistically that "previous experience with [WTO trade adjudication, either as a
complainant or defendant, is an important predictor of how often a developing country
initiates a dispute." Davis & Bermeo, supra note 120, at 33.
142. See Panel Report, EC-Export Subsidies on Sugar, WT/DS266/R (Oct. 15, 2004);
Panel Report, US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004).
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Round of negotiations, which appear to have caused a general decline in
WTO dispute settlement activity during these years, as countries focused
their attention and resources on the negotiations.
1 43
Brazil has largely prevailed in each of its complaints that resulted in an
adopted WTO report, many of which were among the WTO's most chal-
lenging cases and had significant policy implications. Of the twenty-three
complaints that Brazil filed, the parties settled nine during consulta-
tions, 144 and three after a panel was formed, while eleven resulted in panel
decisions, ten of which were appealed. 14 5 All eleven of the cases resulting
in an adopted ruling were, in significant part, in favor of Brazil. 14 6 Brazil
was also a respondent in fourteen cases,14 7 but only four of these resulted
143. From 2005 to 2007, Brazil was a party in three new WTO cases, two of them as a
respondent and one as a complainant against U.S. agricultural subsidies. See generally
Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/
DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007) (EC was the complainant); Request for Consultations by
Brazil, Brazil- Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Certain Resins from Argentina, WT/
DS355/1 (Jan. 7, 2007) (Argentina was the complainant); Request for Consultations by
Brazil, United States Domestic Support and Export Credit Guarantees for Agricultural Prod-
ucts, WT/DS365/1 (July 11, 2007); see also infra Annex II.
144. The nine cases are: US- Certain Measures Regarding Anti-Dumping Methodology,
WT/DS239; US- US Patents Code, WT/DS224; US- Countervailing Duties on Certain
Carbon Steel Products from Brazil, WT/DS218; Mexico- Provisional Anti-Dumping Mea-
sure on Electric Transformers, WT/DS216; EC-Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee, WT/
DS209; Turkey- Anti-Dumping Duty on Steel and Iron Pipe Fittings, WT/DS208; EC- Mea-
sures Affecting Differential and Favourable Treatment of Coffee, WT/DS154; Peru- Coun-
tervailing Duty Investigation Against Imports of Buses from Brazil, WT/DS112; Canada-
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS71. More details on these cases
are available infra in Annex 11.
145. The ten appealed cases were: Panel Report, EC- Customs Classification of Frozen
Boneless Chicken, WT/DS269/R (May 30, 2005); Panel Report, EC- Export Subsidies on
Sugar, WT/DS266/R (Oct. 15, 2004); Panel Report, US-Subsidies on Upland Cotton,
WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004); Panel Report, US-Definitive Safeguard Measures on
Imports of Certain Steel Products, WT/DS259/R (July 11, 2003); Panel Report, Argen-
tina-Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, WT/DS241/R (Apr. 22,
2003); Panel Report, EC-Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fit-
tings from Brazil, WT/DS219/R (Mar. 7, 2003); Panel Report, US-Continued Dumping &
Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217/R (Sept. 16, 2002); Panel Report, Canada- Export
Credits & Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/DS222/R (Jan. 28, 2002); Panel
Report, Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70/R (Apr. 14,
1999); Panel Report, EC-Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products,
WT/DS69/R (Mar. 12, 1998); Panel Report, US- Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996) (WT/DS4 consolidated in a single report
with WT/DS2). The only case that was not appealed was Argentina- Definitive Anti-
Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, WT/DS241.
146. The Brazilian Foreign Ministry provides details about these rulings in Ministerio
das Rela 6es Exteriores, supra note 124.
147. The fourteen cases are: Brazil-Anti-Dumping Measures on Imports of Certain
Resins from Argentina, WT/DS355; Brazil- Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332; Brazil-Anti-Dumping Duties on Jute Bags from India, WT/DS229; Brazil-
Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199; Brazil- Measures on Minimum Import
Prices, WT/DS197; Brazil- Measures on Import Licensing and Minimum Import Prices,
WT/DS183; Brazil-Measures Affecting Payment Terms for Imports, WT/DS116; Brazil-
Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, WT/DS81; Brazil- Cer-
tain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, WT/DS65; Brazil-
Certain Measures Affecting Trade and Investment in the Automotive Sector, WT/DS52; Bra-
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in the establishment of a panel, 148 of which Brazil lost two in part,14 9 won
one, 150 and settled another. 15 '
Brazil's use of the dispute settlement system roughly reflected its trade
flows and thus primarily involved cases against Brazil's most important
trading partners (and the WTO's most powerful members), the United
States and the European Union. Approximately 39% of Brazil's complaints
were against the United States and approximately 26% were against the
European Union, constituting a total of 65% of its complaints. Brazil's
complaints also targeted important sectors for its exports. Of Brazil's
twenty-three complaints, twenty-one involved specific sectors, the most
important being agricultural products (ten), steel or iron products (five),
and vehicles (four). 152 From 2003 to 2006, agricultural products consti-
zil-Certain Automotive Investment Measures, WT/DS51; Brazil-Export Financing Pro-
gramme for Aircraft, WT/DS46; Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut and
Coconut Milk Powder, WT/DS30; Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/
DS22.
148. These four cases are: Brazil- Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/
DS332; Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent Protection, WT/DS199; Brazil-Export Financ-
ing Programme for Aircraft, WT/DS46; Brazil- Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut,
WT/DS22. There is another case in which a panel was established but a few months
later it was suspended. Communication from the Chairman of the Panel, Brazil-Anti-
Dumping Measures on Imports of Certain Resins from Argentina, WT/DS355/5 (Feb. 6,
2008).
149. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007); Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Pro-
gramme for Aircraft, WT/DS46/AB/R (Aug. 2, 1999).
150. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, WT/
DS22/AB/R (Feb. 21, 1997).
151. See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent
Protection, WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 1991).
152. The complaints can be broken down sectorally as follows:
(1) Agricultural products: EC- Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken, WT/
DS269; United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267; EC- Export Subsidies on
Sugar, WT/DS266; United States- Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on Processed
Orange and Grapefruit Products, WT/DS250; Argentina- Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties
on Poultry from Brazil, WT/DS241; EC-Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee, WT/DS209;
EC- Measures Affecting Differential and Favorable Treatment of Coffee, WT/DS154; EC-
Measures Affecting Importation of Certain Poultry Products, WT/DS69.
(2) Steel products: United States- Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Certain
Steel Products, WT/DS259; EC-Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe
Fittings from Brazil, WT/DS219; United States- Countervailing Duties on Certain Carbon
Steel Products from Brazil, WT/DS218; Turkey-Anti-Dumping Duty on Steel and Iron Pipe
Fittings, WT/DS208.
(3) Vehicles: Canada-Export Credits & Loan Guarantees for Regional Aircraft, WT/
DS222; Peru- Countervailing Duty Investigation Against Imports of Buses from Brazil, WT/
DS112; Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS71; Canada-
Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft, WT/DS70.
(4) Cases Relating to Other Economic Sectors: Mexico- Provisional Anti-Dumping Mea-
sure on Electric Transformers, WT/DS216; Argentina-Transitional Safeguard Measures on
Certain Imports of Woven Fabrics of Cotton and Cotton Mixtures Originating in Brazil,
WT/DS190; United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/
DS4.
(5) Systemic Cases: United States- Certain Measures Regarding Anti-Dumping Methodol-
ogy, WT/DS239; United States- US Patents Code, WT/DS224 (a tit-for-tat maneuver in
response to a U.S. challenge to the compulsory licensing provisions in Brazil's pharma-
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tuted 37 to 39% of Brazil's total exports, while iron and steel and vehicles
each totaled 6 to 7.5% of total exports. 15 3 Table 2 contains a breakdown
by country of WTO cases where Brazil was a claimant or a respondent.
Annex III lists Brazil's five most important trading partners on a yearly
basis in terms of imports and exports.
Table 2: Brazil WTO Cases by Country (1995-2007) 15 4
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WTO members can also participate as a third party in WTO cases,
which they primarily do when they have only a systemic interest in a dis-
pute. Brazil has been the seventh most active participant as a third party in
WTO cases, filing forty-nine times, following Japan (eighty-eight), the Euro-
pean Union (seventy-nine), the United States (seventy-one), Canada (sixty-
four), China (sixty-one), and India (fifty) as of December 2007.155 Table 3
breaks down Brazil's filings as a third party on an annual basis. To provide
a complete picture, Annex IV lists the cases in which Brazil was a complain-
ant and participated as a third party in a parallel case. 15 6
ceutical patent law, in which both complaints were dropped as part of a settlement);
United States-Continued Dumping & Subsidy Offset Act of 2000, WT/DS217.
153. U.N. Commodity Trade Statistics Database, Yearbook 2006, http://com-
trade.un.org/pb/CountryPages.aspxy=2006 (follow "Brazil" hyperlink) (last visited May
20, 2008).
154. World Trade Org., supra note 124; see also infra Annex I1.
155. See World Trade Org., Members and Observers, http://www.wto.org/english/
thewtoe/whatise/tif__e/org6_e.htm (last visited May 20, 2007). These figures are as of
December 31, 2007. See id. China has been proportionally more active as a third party
since it joined in December 2001. Id.
156. In sixteen of the cases in which Brazil participated as a third party, it filed its
own parallel complaint. In addition, Brazil filed as a third party in eight separate paral-
lel cases. For example, Brazil is listed as a third party seven times in the 2002 parallel
complaints against U.S. safeguard measures on steel imports, inflating the number of
third party participants in cases involving the steel industry. If one does not count these
parallel cases multiple times, then Brazil acted solely as a third party in twenty-five dis-
tinct cases. A member normally participates as a third party in a case filed in parallel to
its own in order to obtain information from the other's case, including the legal and
factual arguments used. See infra Annex IV.
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Table 3: Brazil as Third Party in WTO Cases by Year (1995-2007)157
Complaints
WTO Member Brazilian Complaints Against Brazil
United States 9 4
European Union 6 4
Canada 3 1
Argentina 2 1
Mexico 1
Peru 1
Turkey 1
India 1
Japan 1
Phillipines 1
Sri Lanka 1
Brazil's use of WTO dispute settlement and particularly its successful
challenges against U.S. and EU agricultural subsidy policies have provided
a vehicle for Brazil to advance its stature and positions in the WTO trade
law system. The U.S.-Cotton and EC-Sugar complaints, in particular, con-
tributed to Brazil's status as a leader of the G-20 group of developing
nations' 58 and a member of a new "quad" for structural leadership within
the WTO. 15 9 The cases helped focus considerable international political
and media attention on the adverse impacts of U.S. and European agricul-
tural subsidy programs on agricultural production in developing coun-
tries. 160 The cases created leverage for Brazil in the Doha Round
157. World Trade Org., supra note 124; see also infra Annex I.C (Brazil as Third
Party). The cases are apportioned in the chart according to the year Brazil filed its
request to participate as a third party. The list of cases in Annex II and Table 3 reflects
information found in documents accessible to the public that we checked in interviews
with Brazilian Foreign Ministry representatives. The various reports contained
inconsistencies regarding the number of third party requests that Brazil made. For
example, the WTO web page for Brazil lists forty-eight cases in which Brazil requested
third party rights. World Trade Org., supra note 124. This calculation includes
participation in the United States-Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Color Television
Receivers from Korea, WT/DS89, but the authors found no evidence of Brazil's
participation in WT/DS89. The WTO web site also considers neither Brazil's
participation in EC- Regime for the Importation, Sale, and Distribution of Bananas, WT/
DS27/RW/ECU, nor the request for consultations in United States-Provisional Anti-
Dumping Measures on Shrimp from Thailand, WT/DS324, though documents of such
requests may be found on the WTO database. In contrast, the Brazilian Foreign
Ministry lists seventeen cases in which Brazil was a third party. See Minist&rio das
Rela 6es Exteriores, supra note 124. In this incomplete list, it adds Brazil's participation
as a third party in Argentina- Measures Affecting Imports of Footwear, Textiles, Apparel
and Other Items, WT/DS56. However, no evidence of such participation was found.
158. On the G-20, see supra note 17 and accompanying text.
159. See DEESE, supra note 18.
160. See, e.g., Elizabeth Becker & Todd Benson, Brazil's Road to Victory Over U.S.
Cotton, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2004, at W1; Hardev Kaur, Brazil's Sweet Victory Raises Poor
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negotiations and provided tools for opponents of the subsidies in U.S. and
EU internal political debates.' 6 1 At the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Hong
Kong in December 2005, for example, WTO members declared that, sub-
ject to a final Doha Round agreement, export subsidies would be elimi-
nated and domestic support would be reduced pursuant to a formula.'
62
As one Brazilian official stated, "The cotton case showed not only interna-
tionally but I think mostly domestically in the U.S .... how distorting and
unfair [U.S.] agricultural polices are. And that may be in [the] long run, a
very positive element."' 63 In this way, Brazil hoped that the cases could
help catalyze a possible elimination of agricultural export subsidies and a
significant reduction of European and U.S. agricultural subsidies overall.
In sum, Brazil's ambitious use of the dispute settlement system para-
doxically was catalyzed in part by early cases in which Brazil was a respon-
dent. Brazil has since been among the most active WTO members in terms
of both the quantity and quality of cases, resulting in strategically impor-
tant WTO judicial decisions. These decisions have provided Brazil with
leverage in trade negotiations, as well as tools for allies that Brazil has
within political systems abroad, such as those actors who wish to reduce
agricultural subsides in the United States and the European Union. For
Brazil, the international political payoffs of its investment in WTO dispute
settlement have been significant.
Nations' Hopes, NEw STRAITS TIMES (Malaysia), July 1, 2005, at 23 ("These victories, the
first to target developed countries' farm subsidies, have given hope to other developing
countries."); Carl Mortished, US and EU Farm Subsidies 'Face New Pressure,' TIMES
(London), June 21, 2004, at 19; Larry Rohter, Brazil Is Ready to Use Clout to Get a Fair
Deal, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Dec. 13, 2005.
161. There are divisions within countries regarding trade policies, such as import
protection and subsidization. For example, Brazil's challenges to U.S. and EU agricul-
tural subsidies provide tools to U.S. and EU domestic actors who wish to curtail these
subsidies for domestic policy reasons. See, e.g., Brazil Scores Big Win over U.S. in Cotton
Compliance Dispute, 24 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1120, 1120 ("The ruling could also have
a major impact on the current debate in the United States over U.S. farm spending plans
for the coming five years, where the Bush administration is pushing Congress to accept
deeper cuts in agricultural subsidies.").
162. See World Trade Organization, Doha Work Programme, Ministerial Declaration
of 18 December 2005, WT/MIN(05)/DEC ("We agree to ensure the parallel elimination
of all forms of export subsidies and disciplines on all export measures with equivalent
effect to be completed by the end of 2013.") "On domestic support, there will be three
bands for reductions in Final Bound Total AMS and in the overall cut in trade-distorting
domestic support, with higher linear cuts in higher bands." Id. q 5; see also Stephen
Powell & Andrew Schmitz, The Cotton and Sugar Subsidies Decisions: WTO's Dispute Set-
tlement System Rebalances the Agreement on Agriculture, 10 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 287, 330
(2005) ("These decisions pose serious threats to U.S. farm policy in its current form and
substantially change the balance of concessions and obligations as the Doha Round
renegotiation of the Agreement on Agriculture enters the critical stage of exchanging
offers.").
163. Joseph A. Conti, The Good Case: Decisions to Litigate at the World Trade Organiza-
tion, 42 LAw & Soc'y REv. 145, 172 (2008).
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III. What Lies Behind Brazil's Success: The Building of a Pluralist
Trade Law Community
Brazilian public and private sector investment in trade law and policy
expertise has helped the country assume a leading role in WTO govern-
ance, whether in negotiations, dispute settlement, or monitoring WTO
agreements' implementation. The WTO's judicialization of international
trade relations has helped catalyze these Brazilian investments. Brazilian
public officials' realization of their need for outside legal and technical eco-
nomic assistance has provided incentives for business, lawyers, and consul-
tants to organize to work with the Brazilian government in international
trade negotiations and dispute settlement, resulting in the building of a
pluralist trade law community in Brazil. 1 64
To respond to the challenges and opportunities of WTO dispute settle-
ment, Brazil has developed what officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
call a "three pillar" structure for WTO dispute settlement. 165 The structure
consists of a specialized WTO dispute settlement division located in the
capital, Brasilia (the "first pillar"), coordination between this unit and Bra-
zil's WTO mission in Geneva (the "second pillar"), and coordination
between both of these entities and Brazil's private sector, as well as law
firms and economic consultants funded by the private sector (the "third
pillar"). 166 As part of this "third pillar," the Geneva mission started an
internship program for trade specialists from government agencies and
young attorneys from Brazilian law firms and business associations.
The term "three-pillar structure," however, does not fully capture the
significant developments in Brazil that have facilitated its success. As one
Brazilian representative notes about the internship program, "We are trying
164. SCHNEIDER, BUSINESS POLITICS, supra note 74, at 15. Similarly, Schneider exam-
ines state-provided incentives for business to organize in Latin America, and Shaffer
examines state incentives in the United States and the European Union in the specific
context of WTO dispute settlement. Id. at 15 ("Core arguments are: (1) that state
actions best explain variation in business organization in Latin America; (2) that state
actors help organize business in order to reduce their own vulnerabilities and advance
their policy agendas; and (3) that the diverse kinds of selective incentives states provide
to business have significantly different effects on business organization"); see also SHAF-
FER, DEFENDING INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 144-55 (examining U.S. and EU mechanisms
for government-business relations in WTO dispute settlement in relation to the increas-
ing need of state actors for outside legal and technical assistance).
165. Interviews by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian officials and private sector repre-
sentatives [names withheld], in Sdo Paulo, Braz.; Brasilia, Braz.; Geneva, Switz. (Apr.
2004; June 2004) (on file with authors). Celso de Tarso Pereira, Brazil's representative
in Geneva for DSU matters, confirmed these observations at a seminar that the Interna-
tional Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) organized on WTO dis-
pute settlement. See Celso de Tarso Pereira, Mission of Brazil to the WTO, Reactions:
The Experience of Brazil and a Comment on Some Reform Proposals, Presentation at
International Trade and Sustainable Development Conference: Making the Dispute Set-
tlement System Work for Developing and Least Developed Countries (Feb. 7, 2003).
166. Where Brazil works with outside economic consultants as well as lawyers, some
Brazilian officials refer to a "squaring" of what they call Brazil's "three pillar model" for
WTO dispute settlement.
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to spread knowledge of the system in order to create a critical mass. ' 167
That comment encapsulates a central theme of this article. Through mech-
anisms of public-private coordination, the Brazilian government has
defended Brazil's immediate interests in individual WTO cases while facili-
tating the development of broader national capacity in WTO law, policy,
and dispute settlement, strengthening the state by diffusing expertise.
We first assess the organizational initiatives that the Brazilian govern-
ment and in particular, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs undertook to
increase governmental capacity in response to the challenges of, and
opportunities provided by, the legalized and judicialized WTO system for
trade relations. We next provide an overview of the process behind Brazil's
litigation of a WTO complaint. We then examine the initiatives that indi-
viduals, trade associations, think tanks, universities, and civil society orga-
nizations have taken to develop their own expertise and work with
industry and the government, which have resulted in the formation of a
Brazilian epistemic community for trade law policy that can be tapped for
WTO dispute settlement, WTO negotiations, and more generally, WTO
governance.
A. Reorganizing Government to Respond to WTO Challenges
We stress three points regarding the Brazilian government's organiza-
tion for international trade matters in relation to that of many other WTO
members. First, Brazil has a critical advantage over other countries in that
it has a professionalized, meritocratic, and adaptive Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, which prioritizes international trade matters. Second, Brazil has
instituted an inter-ministerial process for trade matters to facilitate a more
coherent, coordinated approach for trade policy and trade dispute settle-
ment, which has helped deepen trade-related expertise in multiple minis-
tries. Third, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has created a specialized unit
for dispute settlement in Brasilia so that legal and technical expertise is
developed and retained over time. This unit ensures support for affiliated
members posted at the Geneva mission dedicated primarily to dispute set-
tlement issues. It also provides a focal point for interaction with the private
sector and the private counsel hired by it. Each of these elements is critical
for sustained, successful use of the WTO judicial system, and each is lack-
ing in many developing countries.
First, many developing countries lack experienced trade policy and
dispute settlement professionals. 168 Brazil, in contrast, benefits from a
professionalized, merit-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs. To pursue a
career in trade policy within the ministry, a candidate must first pass diffi-
cult entry exams, then excel in the ministry's two-year training program
(the Instituto Rio Branco), and finally place and perform well in assigned
167. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian representative [name withheld],
in Geneva, Switz. (Feb. 1, 2005) (on file with authors).
168. See Busch et al., supra note 15, at 3.
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posts in the field. 169 As a result, Brazilian officials handling trade negotia-
tions and trade litigation typically come to the task with significant experi-
ence as part of an elite group.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which has long-standing responsibil-
ity for representing Brazil before international organizations and with for-
eign governments,' 70 has adapted its organizational structure in response
to international developments. In 2001, when WTO, regional, and bilat-
eral trade negotiations and dispute settlement intensified, the ministry
overhauled its departments for trade. Until 2001, only one department in
the ministry, the Investment Goods Department, handled trade-related
matters, including all WTO trade negotiations, the proposed Free Trade
Area of the Americas (FTAA), 17 1 the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement
(FTA), and the Latin American Integration Association (ALADI). 172 When
169. See Lei No 11.440, de 29 de dezembro de 2006, D.O.U. de 29.12.2006, art. 35
(Braz.) (Institui o Regime Juridico dos Servidores do Servi~o Exterior Brasileiro). These
diplomats have a strong reputation for competence among other diplomats and interna-
tional civil servants. Interviews by Gregory C. Shaffer with members of the WTO and
UNCTAD Secretariats and representatives of numerous missions [names withheld], in
Geneva, Switz. (2004-2007) (on file with authors).
170. The President of Brazil is responsible for formulating and implementing Brazil's
foreign policy under the Constitution. CONSTITUlcAo FEDERAL art. 84 § VIII (Braz.). The
Ministry of Foreign Affairs carries out this policy for external relations, which it has
done since its creation almost two centuries ago. Decreto No. 99.578, 10 de octubro de
1990, D.O.U. de 11.10.1990 (Braz.) (Consolida Normas sobre Organizado e Funciona-
mento do Ministerio das Rela.6es Exteriore e da Outras Providncias); Medida
Provis6ria No. 813, 1 de janiero de 1995, D.O.U. de 1.1.1995 (Braz.) (Disp6e sobre a
Organiza Ao da Presidncia da Republica e dos Ministerios, e da Outras Providencias).
The ministry, which has considerable authority in this area, is divided into secretariats
(sub-secretarias), which in turn are split into departments (departamentos) and units
(coordena 6es), together with separate coordinating, advisory, and support bodies, such
as that responsible for the selection and training of diplomats. See Ministrio das
Rela 6es Exteriores, Estructura, http://www.mre.gov.br/index.php?option=com-con-
tent&task=view&id=1339 (last visited May 20, 2008). The ministry includes those
departments operating within Brazil and outside of it, such as the Overseas Depart-
ments, which consist of the Multilateral and Bilateral Diplomatic Missions and the
Career Consular Departments. See id.
171. See Free Trade Areas of the Americas, The Prepatory Process, 1994-1998, http://
www.ftaa-alca.org/View-e.asp (last visited May 20, 2008). In 1994, the United States,
under President Clinton, advocated the creation and institutionalization of Summits of
America, bringing together the heads of state from the region to address a wide array of
issues, from democratization and human rights to trade and investment. See David E.
Sanger, Trade Agreements End Long Debate, but Not Conflicts, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 4, 1994, at
Al. The first Summit of the Americas was held in Miami in December 1994. Id. At the
summit, the United States promoted the creation of a Free Trade Area of the Americas.
Summit of the Americas Info. Network, First Summit of the Americas: Free Trade Area of
the Americas, http://www.summit-americas.org/Miami%20Summit/FTAA-English(rev).
htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2008). In 2002, Brazil became the co-chair with the United
States of the FTAA negotiations but negotiations broke down and the last summit was
held in 2005. Id.
172. Associaci6n de Latinoamerica de Integraci6n [ALADI], Overview, www.aladi.org
(last visited May 23, 2008). ALADI was created in 1980, replacing the Latin American
Free Trade Association, which was founded in 1960. Id. ALADI aims to foster economic
cooperation among its eleven members: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. It is less ambitious than
its predecessor which sought to create a common market. Id.
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Celso Lafer, a former Ambassador at the Brazilian mission in Geneva,
became Foreign Minister in 2001, the ministry created six specialized
departments to which it allocated increased human and budgetary
resources. 17 3 The ministry has since increased support for trade negotia-
tions, litigation, and what Marc Galanter has called "litigotiation"-strate-
gic litigation in the shadow of negotiation. 174
Brazil's role in the WTO also has benefited from the priority that the
ministry gives to international economic and trade matters. Brazil's last
three Foreign Ministers served previously as the country's ambassador to
either the GATT or the WTO. Luiz Felipe Lampreia served as Foreign Min-
ister from 1995 to 2001, Celso Lafer from 2001 to 2002, and Celso
Amorim from 2002 through today, in each case after previously serving as
Brazil's GATT or WTO ambassador. 17 5 As a result, Brazil's Foreign Minis-
ters have had in-depth experience with the WTO's organizational culture
and the substantive issues at stake, and Brazil's Geneva mission, accord-
ingly, has received strong political and logistical support from the capi-
tal. 176 Compared to other developing countries, Brazil has allocated
173. Following the reorganization, the General Under-Secretariat for Matters of Inte-
gration, Economics, and Foreign Trade was assigned responsibility for WTO matters, as
well as negotiations of an FTAA and trade agreements with the European Union, India,
South Africa, and other countries not in Latin America. See Ministerio das Relac6es
Exteriories, FTAA-Free Trade Area of the Americas, http://www.mre.gov.br/index.php?
option=comcontent&task-view&id=1476&Itemid=1348 (last visited May 23, 2008).
The Under-Secretariat for Latin America handles Latin American trade matters relating
to Mercosur, the Organization of American States (OAS), and ALADI. Ministerio das
Relac6es Exteriories, Mercosur-The Common Market of the South, http://www.mre.
gov.br/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1474&Itemid=1346 (last visited
May 23, 2008). In addition, after Celso Lafer became Brazil's Foreign Minister, the min-
istry sent approximately half of the forty Brazilian diplomats that graduated in 2001 to
the Brazilian Mission in Geneva for their three-month foreign internship. Telephone
Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with member of Brazilian Mission [name withheld],
(Oct. 2006) (on file with authors). However, in 2003, a new person took charge of the
Rio Branco Institute, which trains new diplomats, and once more, graduates were sent to
other Latin American countries, reflecting more of a South-South orientation in trade
policy. Id.
174. Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost Everything You May or May Not Want
to Know About Contract Litigation, 2001 Wis. L. REV. 577, 579 (2001). As Galanter states
regarding U.S. domestic litigation, "[T]he career of most cases does not lead to full-
blown trial and adjudication but consists of negotiation and maneuver in the strategic
pursuit of settlement through mobilization of the court process." Id.; see also Marc
Galanter, Worlds of Deals: Using Negotiation to Teach About Legal Process, 34 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 268, 268 (1984).
175. Ministfrio das Relac6es Exteriories, Galeria de Ministros, http://www.mre.gov.
br/index.php?option=comscontent&task-view&id=1390 (last visited May 20, 2008).
Moreover, Amorim was also Foreign Minister from 1993 to 1995, preceded by Fernando
Henrique Cardoso who served from 1992 to 1993 and became President in 1994, and
Celso Lafer who served in 1992. Id.
176. In August 2005, the Under-Secretary General for Matters of Integration, Eco-
nomics and Foreign Trade in Brazil, Clodoaldo Hugueney Filho, became Brazil's new
ambassador to the WTO, maintaining a high level foreign ministry presence in Geneva
to address trade issues. Scott Alwyn, Anti-WTO Activists Take Fight from Street to Halls of
Power Dispatch from WTO Reporting from Hong Kong, SEATrLE TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at
Al. He replaced Ambassador Luiz Felipe de Seixas Correa who became Brazil's Ambas-
sador to Germany. Id.
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significant resources to WTO-related issues, especially for dispute
settlement.
Second, a developing country is likely to face a severe challenge in
coordinating its government's approach to WTO dispute settlement. Brazil
has attempted to address this issue through an inter-ministerial body, the
Chamber of Foreign Trade (CAMEX). 177 In 1995, following the WTO's cre-
ation, the Brazilian government created CAMEX to formulate, adopt, coor-
dinate and implement foreign trade policy. Before 1995, no
institutionalized forum existed within the Brazilian government where min-
istries could reach consensus as to Brazil's positions on international trade
matters. As one Brazilian official now states, "CAMEX has had a crucial
role" in bringing trade issues to the attention of other ministries and clari-
fying issues for them, which has generated increased "expertise on trade
matters within these ministries."'178 CAMEX includes a formalized body
that also provides a focal point for the private sector, the Private Sector
Consultative Council (CONEX). Although this body generally focuses on
broader trade policy issues, it has brought potential trade disputes to the
attention of CAMEX and has generally facilitated important input to
CAMEX on trade-related issues. 1
79
CAMEX is part of the Government Council of the Presidency and con-
sists of six ministers, assisted by a secretariat. 1 0 Three of the ministries
have primary responsibility for implementing Brazil's trade policy under
guidelines that CAMEX set. Externally, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
plays the central role, both in trade negotiations and in trade dispute settle-
ment. Internally, the Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign
177. Veiga, however, finds that "the problem of institutional coordination remained."
Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 154; see also
Trade Policy Review- Brazil, supra note 45, at 20. Nonetheless, other countries have no
such coordinating body. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with South American WTO
representative [name withheld], in Geneva, Switz. (July 21, 2005).
178. E-mail from Welber Barral, Sec'y, Dep't of Foreign Trade, to Gregory C. Shaffer,
Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago Law School (March 31, 2008) (on file with
authors).
179. Id.; Telephone Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Welber Barral, Sec'y, Dep't
of Foreign Trade (Apr. 8, 2008) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Barral Interview].
Trade disputes are primarily of interest to CONEX where they raise broader systemic
concerns, such as Brazil's positions on agricultural subsidies (offensively) or industrial
policy tools (defensively). Trade Policy Review- Brazil, supra note 45, at 21. CONEX is
"comprised of up to 20 private sector representatives" and can "carry out public reviews
and assessments of the Government's trade policy." Id.
180. Trade Policy Review- Brazil, supra note 45, at 20. CAMEX "consists of: the Minis-
ter of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade, who presides over it; and the Ministers
of the Civil House; Foreign Affairs; Finance; Planning, Budget and Administration; and
Agriculture and Supply." See id.; see also Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with member
of the Dispute Settlement Unit, Brazil Foreign Ministry [name withheld] (Apr. 19, 2004)
(on file with authors) [hereinafter Apr. 2004 Dispute Settlement Unit Member Inter-
view]. The Minister of the Civil House (Ministro Chefe da Casa Civil) is the President's
Chief of Staff and acts as the intermediary between the executive and legislative
branches. Trade Policy Review- Brazil, supra note 45, at 20. CAMEX generally meets
every two months. Id. Veiga notes the erosion of "the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
monopoly in trade negotiations." Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relation-
ship, supra note 59, at 176.
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Commerce (Ministry of Development) and the Ministry of Finance divide
primary responsibility for implementing Brazil's trade policy for import
protection and export promotion. The Ministry of Development is respon-
sible for anti-dumping and countervailing duty investigations and general
export promotion, while the Ministry of Finance is responsible for customs
matters and subsidies through Brazil's export incentives program,
PROEX. 18 3 The Ministry of Agriculture is also an important player in
CAMEX because of the export orientation of Brazil's agricultural sector.
In order to engage more effectively regarding Brazil's positions on, and
application of, international trade policy, other Brazilian ministries have
invested in creating trade policy expertise. In 1998, the government cre-
ated career tracks for foreign trade analysts (analistas de comercio exte-
rior).18 2 To obtain such a position, a candidate must have a background in
international law, international economics, or international relations.
Candidates must pass an extremely competitive exam to enroll in the train-
ing program. After training, they work in the ministries associated with
CAMEX and in particular, the Department of Foreign Trade (Secretaria de
Comercio Exterior), which is within the Ministry of Development. In 2008,
in order to hire forty new foreign trade analysts, the government approved a
new call for applications, for which the government expected around ten
thousand applications.'
8 3
Third, most developing countries lack continuity of specialized per-
sonnel for trade dispute settlement. During the Embraer case, Brazil's
Ambassador to the WTO, Celso Lafer, realized the need for increased legal
and logistical support in Brasilia to respond to the legal and technical
demands of the rapidly developing WTO judicial system. In 2001, the min-
istry created a specialized General Dispute Settlement Unit (Coordenagdo
181. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 176.
Veiga declares, "[Flollowing the dismantling of the 'Cacex model' of management, the
institutional organization of the State in the trade policy field has been gradually
reshaped. Since then, trade policy is dealt with through many ministries-Finance for
tariffs and incentives; Development and Industry for public credits, anti-dumping and
export promotion; and Foreign Affairs for coordinating trade negotiations." Id. The
PROEX program was successfully challenged by Canada in the Embraer case, and then
modified. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2004 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE
REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS 22 (2004).
182. See Associa~do dos Analistas de Comercio Exterior, http://www.aace.org.br/
aace.asp (last visited May 20, 2008). The foreign trade analyst career track was created
during the Cardoso administration. Telephone Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with
Brazilian official, Ministry of Dev. [name withheld] (Apr. 8, 2008) [hereinafter Interview
with Ministry of Dev. Official]. President Cardoso had earlier been Foreign Affairs Min-
ister and wished to bring the professionalization of Itamaraty's selection process to
other ministries. Id. In light of the changes in Brazil's policy orientation toward trade in
the 1990s, the government created a special career track for foreign trade analysts. Id.
183. E-mail from Welber Barral, Sec'y, Dep't of Foreign Trade, to Gregory C. Shaffer,
Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago Law School (Apr. 2, 2008) (on file with
authors). Brazilian federal civil servants are relatively well paid, especially for young
professionals, which helps explain why there are so many applicants. A starting salary
for a member of the federal Brazilian civil service is approximately 8,000 Brazilian reales
(around $5,500 per month). Interview with Ministry of Dev. Official, supra note 182.
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Geral de Contenciosos), consisting of five or six professionals. 184 The Dis-
pute Settlement Unit is responsible for analyzing the legal and factual
grounds for a WTO complaint, defining strategies, preparing and oversee-
ing outside lawyers' legal submissions, and representing Brazil in hearings
before WTO panels, the Appellate Body, and in any settlement negotiations
conducted after legal procedures have begun. The unit also handles dis-
putes arising under Mercosur and oversees the negotiation of new dispute
settlement chapters in proposed trade agreements, such as the FTAA and
the EU-Mercosur FTA, as well as the amendment of existing dispute settle-
ment chapters, such as the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. In
this way, the ministry aims to respond more effectively to the growing
demands of international trade dispute settlement.
B. The Brazilian Process for Bringing a WTO Complaint: An Overview
Implementing a coordinated process for identifying, evaluating, and
eventually bringing a WTO complaint is a tremendous challenge for most
countries. Brazil has created a process that generally works as follows
(although we do not suggest that the Brazilian government is completely
organized or coherent in identifying and bringing WTO complaints). To
start, Brazilian government ministries provide some interactive databases
to help exporters identify trade barriers. For example, INMETRO, the Bra-
zilian agency responsible for addressing technical barriers to trade, makes
available an electronic system that lists technical barriers affecting Brazil-
ian exports.' 8 5 Through this system, the private sector and its consultants
can interact with government officials. The Ministry of Development has
made some effort to expand the database to cover all trade barriers in
major markets. 186 The Lula government also has launched a website
184. Ministrio das Relac6es Exteriories, Sitios na Secretaria de Estado-CGC-Coor-
denacfo-Geral de Contenciosos, http://www.mre.gov.br/index.php?optioncom-con-
tent&task=view&id=437&ltemid-351 (last visited May 23, 2008). The Dispute
Settlement Unit falls within the Under-Secretariat for Matters of Integration, Economics
and Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Id. It was created pursuant to
Decree N. 3.959, October 10, 2001, regulating the ministry's internal organization. Id.
This Decree and its successor have been replaced following subsequent organizational
reforms within the ministry. Id. Roberto Carvalho de Azevdo was the first to head the
Dispute Settlement Unit, moving to it from the mission in Geneva and holding this post
from 2001 to December 2005. Ministerio das Relac6es Exteriories, Ministro Roberto
Carvalho de Azev~do, http://www.mre.gov.br/index.php?optioncom-content&task=
view&id=61&ltemid=347 (last visited May 23, 2008). From 1999 until 2001, he was
responsible for Brazil's WTO cases at the Brazilian mission in Geneva, particularly the
Embraer case. Id. Flavio Marega replaced Mr. Azevedo. Id.
185. See Instituto Nacional de Metrologia, Normaliza Ao e Qualidade Industrial
[INMETRO], http://www.inmetro.gov.br/barreirastecnicas/pontofocal/login.asp?url=
clientes/index.asp (last visited May 20, 2008) (access to INMETRO's electronic system).
186. See Secreteria de Comrcio Exterior, Barreiras ao Com~rcio de Bens, http://
www2.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/secex/neglnternacionais/barExtInfComerciais/bar
ComBens.php (last visited May 20, 2008). It has gathered data and prepared reports on
non-tariff barriers for Brazil's most important trading partners with the list of barriers
divided by category. See id. For example, the Ministry of Development worked with the
privately funded Funda5o Centro de Estudos do Comercio Exterior (Foundation
Center for Studies in Foreign Trade) to prepare a general report on foreign trade barriers
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designed for exporters, Portal do Exportador, which includes information
on foreign regulations and trade practices. 187
In addition, the Dispute Settlement Unit provides a central contact
point for affected businesses, trade associations, and their lawyers regard-
ing foreign trade problems. Private parties may still go to sectoral minis-
tries or departments, such as the Ministry of Agriculture for agricultural
issues or the Ministry of Development for issues affecting industry, but
these ministries can now work with a specialized unit within the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs with WTO legal expertise. Once the Dispute Settlement
Unit identifies a potential case, it works with other units within the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs and other ministries with specialized knowledge of
the substantive issues raised. Together they gather and evaluate data and
other factual support in light of the legal issues.
If officials determine that a WTO complaint should be brought, a file
is submitted to CAMEX, which decides whether to authorize a request for
consultations before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (the first formal
step in a WTO dispute). 18 s This decision can generate considerable inter-
nal debate. 18 9 For example, there was considerable disagreement between
ministries as to whether Brazil should file the U.S.-Cotton and EC-Sugar
cases before CAMEX finally made affirmative decisions. 190 If Brazil wins a
WTO complaint and the other side does not comply with the ruling, then
CAMEX decides whether Brazil should seek retaliation in the form of a
withdrawal of an equivalent amount of trade concessions. Following both
the Canada-Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft case and the
U.S.-Cotton case, CAMEX authorized retaliation against Canada and the
United States respectively (although no retaliation has yet been imple-
mented). CAMEX likewise decides how Brazil will respond to a WTO com-
plaint against a Brazilian regulatory measure, such as whether the case
should be litigated or a settlement sought and if so, on what terms. The
only time that CAMEX authorization is not required is when Brazil files a
third party submission, in which case the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can
proceed on its own initiative.
to Brazilian exports in 1999. See SECRETARIA DE CoMERcio EXTERIOR, MINISTRIO DO
DESENVOLVIMENTO, INDUSTRIA E COMtRCIO EXTERIOR, BARREIRAS EXTERNAS AS EXPORTACOES
BRASILEIRAS (1999), available at http://desenvolvimento.gov.br/arquivos/dwnl_119677
2454.pdf. There have been other intitiatives, but to our knowledge, none have resulted
in a comprehensive report since 1999.
187. See Ministerio do Desenvolvimento, Ind6stria e Comfrcio Exterior, Portal do
Exportador, http://www.portaldoexportador.gov.br. (last visited May 26, 2008).
188. See Davey, supra note 16, at 40-42 (describing the Brazilian experience with the
dispute settlement system). Within CAMEX, a lower-level body named GESEX first
meets to see if there is a consensus among ministries. See Ray Goldberg et al., Brazil's
WTO Cotton Case: Negotiation Through Litigation, in 2 CASE STUDIES IN US TRADE NEGOTI-
ATION: RESOLVING DISPUTES 235 (Charan Devereaux et al. eds., 2006).
189. Barral Interview, supra note 179 (noting that vigorous debates occur within
CAMEX, whether over an internal anti-dumping decision or launching a WTO
complaint).
190. See Goldberg et al., supra note 188, at 245 (noting the ministerial differences).
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After CAMEX's authorization, the Dispute Settlement Unit takes
responsibility for the file. The unit typically works with specialized outside
counsel, especially where Brazil is a complainant. This counsel is hired by
the private sector or, as in two recent cases, by the ministry. The Dispute
Settlement Unit encourages companies to hire counsel and has condi-
tioned pursuit of a WTO complaint on it.191 Because of their broad experi-
ence in WTO litigation, U.S. law firms have been used most frequently.
Nevertheless, Brazilian private companies and trade associations have
retained some Brazilian law firms. Brazil was the first and, to our present
knowledge, remains the only developing country where a domestic law
firm has worked with the government in a fully litigated WTO case without
further assistance from U.S. or European legal counsel.
The Dispute Settlement Unit shares information and discusses strate-
gies with other ministries concerning Brazil's litigation and settlement
positions. For example, the unit worked with the Ministry of Agriculture
during the systemically important EC-Sugar and the ongoing U.S.-Cotton
cases. 192 When settling the U.S. challenge to Brazil's patent law
(DS199), 193 it discussed the terms with officials from the Ministry of
Development, the Ministry of Health, and the intellectual property unit of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, all of whose policy domains were impli-
cated. The Dispute Settlement Unit, however, is the node within the gov-
ernment for WTO dispute settlement and controls the file, subject to
CAMEX's directions.
The Dispute Settlement Unit works closely with personnel affiliated
with it who are assigned to the mission in Geneva, consisting of a team of
two or three people. They follow and report to the capital on WTO dispute
settlement developments, including the bi-monthly meetings of the Dispute
Settlement Body, meetings of other WTO bodies in which matters relating
to a dispute may be raised (such as the Committee on Agriculture for agri-
cultural disputes), and meetings on the review and proposed amendments
to the Dispute Settlement Understanding. 194 The team's point person sub-
mits all of Brazil's filings to the WTO Secretariat, whether as a complain-
ant, respondent, or third party. Where Brazil acts as a third party, the
point person is typically responsible for drafting the submission, subject to
assistance by outside counsel and personnel in Brasilia, and for represent-
ing Brazil in hearings before the panel and Appellate Body. The team mem-
191. Apr. 2004 Dispute Settlement Unit Member Interview, supra note 180. The offi-
cial stated that the ministry's budget for investigating cases and hiring outside counsel
is limited. Id. He pointed out that the European Commission had sent one of its lawyers
from Brussels to Brazil to investigate the facts behind the Brazil-Tyres case, something
that the Brazilian Foreign Affairs Ministry could not afford to do. Id. At one stage in the
U.S.-Cotton case, the cotton producers allegedly were concerned about the cost of the
case and asked the government to fund it, but the government refused, stating that it
lacked funds. Id.
192. See infra Part IV.A.
193. See infra Part IV.B.
194. The Geneva mission generally has seven people who dedicate at least half of
their time to WTO-related work.
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bers also work with interns in Brazil's internship program for young
attorneys from Brazilian law firms and personnel from other government
agencies. The point person can face particularly severe demands because
of the number of WTO cases in which Brazil participates.
The members of the Dispute Settlement Unit based in Brasilia and
Geneva are able to manage and effectively interact with outside legal coun-
sel in WTO cases because of the expertise that they have acquired. They
provide outside counsel with needed factual support and general guidance.
This role is important because there can be disagreements between the gov-
ernment and the company or trade association that funds the outside law-
yers. The government may have frank discussions with the private sector
on what Brazil's legal positions will be.195 The Dispute Settlement Unit is
able to play this role more effectively than officials in other developing
countries because Brazil's frequent participation in WTO dispute settle-
ment has permitted the unit to develop a reservoir of knowledge about
WTO judicial procedures and substantive law.
C. Private Sector Networks: Developments in Information, Academic,
Legal, Business, and Civil Society Networks
Complementing the government's internal reorganization for WTO
negotiations and dispute settlement, Brazil has developed what officials
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs call a "third pillar." This "third pil-
lar" consists of the private sector, which broadly includes business, law,
academia, and civil society. Since the WTO's creation in 1995, Brazilian
private sector initiatives have deepened knowledge about international
trade issues among a broader array of individuals and groups, who have
formed a Brazilian epistemic network, one that is linked transnationally
with individuals and groups abroad. Brazilian media, law firms, academia,
trade associations, think tanks, consultancies and non-governmental
groups have undertaken important initiatives regarding international trade
law and policy, which have complemented and built from each other.
1. A Diffusion of Knowledge: The Brazilian Media and Information
Networks
Until recent years, most knowledge of international trade law matters
in Brazil, from negotiations to dispute settlement, was limited to govern-
ment representatives. Few law firms or economic consultants dealt with
WTO-related issues, and even government ministries seemed largely oblivi-
ous to international trade law constraints. For example, Brazil had a grow-
ing number of internal anti-dumping or countervailing duty cases in the
early 1990s, but they were viewed largely similar to any other domestic
legal procedure. A division of the Brazilian Ministry of Development han-
dled the investigations, but it was not concerned with, or even aware of,
195. Apr. 2004 Dispute Settlement Unit Member Interview, supra note 180.
Vol. 41
2008 The Trials of Winning at the WTO
international legal constraints.196
The judicialization of international trade relations, and Brazil's active
participation in the new WTO system radically changed this situation.
Before the Embraer dispute, WTO matters were rarely covered in the Brazil-
ian press. Due to the importance of the Embraer case, two leading newspa-
pers in Brazil decided to base full-time journalists in Geneva to follow
WTO issues. 197 Today, major Brazilian newspapers report on interna-
tional trade matters on a regular basis. Even though many domestic
groups criticize Brazil's foreign trade policy, Brazilian commentators take
pride in Brazil's success in WTO dispute settlement and in particular, the
EC-Sugar and U.S.-Cotton cases brought against the United States and
Europe. By 2006, in the last presidential campaign, "the two main candi-
dates argued tirelessly about which party (the Workers' Party or Social
Democratic Party) won more claims at the WTO."'198 The Brazilian
media's coverage of these cases has played an important role in increasing
broader Brazilian public awareness of WTO rules and their impact on the
Brazilian economy and society.
Brazilian journalists sought training on WTO matters in light of the
growing public interest in trade disputes. An agribusiness-funded think
tank, the Institute of Studies on Trade and International Negotiations
(ICONE) and the Sdo Paulo American Chamber of Commerce organized a
"trade for journalists course," which trained around fifty journalists in Sdo
Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. 199 Journalists also took part in trade courses
organized by academic institutions, such as the Getilio Vargas Foundation
Law School (FGV Law School) in Sdo Paulo.
196. Washington Counsel Interview, supra note 95. One observer noted that in the
1992 GATT case against Brazil's countervailing duties on milk powder, the administra-
tion applied duties before sending out a required questionnaire to affected industries.
Id. When the internal ministry was advised to recommence the procedures in line with
GATT disciplines, it refused. Id. Officials in the Foreign Ministry knew that the case
"was a loser" but went ahead so that internal officials could learn how GATT works,
with the case viewed as a disciplining device. Id. Similarly, interviewees in Brazilian law
firms noted that Brazilian judges hearing appeals of anti-dumping decisions lacked
knowledge of trade law. Interviews by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian attorneys (Apr.
2004) (on file with authors); Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with ministry official
[name withheld] (Feb. 19, 2008) (on file with authors). Brazil first adopted an anti-
dumping law in 1986 and adopted its first anti-dumping measures in 1988. It revised its
legislation to implement the Uruguay Round Anti-Dumping Agreement in 1995. See
KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM, THE USE OF ANTI-DUMPING IN BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA AND SOUTH AFRICA:
RULES, TRENDS AND CAUSES 4 (2005), available at http://www.tralac.org/pdf/Anti-
dumpingin 4DevelopingCountries.pdf.
197. Interviews by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian Mission official & Geneva-based
journalist [names withheld] (Sept. 2006) (on file with authors). The newspapers were
Gazeta and 0 Estado de Sdo Paulo. Id.
198. Barral, The Brazilian Experience, supra note 69 (citing Carolina Glycerio, Politica
Externa Gera Embate Acalorado Entre Lula e Alckmin, BBCBRASIL.COM, Oct. 9, 2006,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/portuguese/reporterbbc/story/2006/10/061009 debatepolitica
externacg.shtml).
199. See INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS DO COMIERCIO E NEGOCIACOES, REPORT OF ACTIVIES:
MARCH 2003 THROUGH MARCH 2007, at 2 (2007), available at http://www.iconebrasil.
org.br/arquivos/projeto/20.pdf. ICONE is the Brazilian think tank funded by agribusi-
ness. Id.
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Extensive positive coverage followed Brazil's 2005 victories in the EC-
Sugar and U.S.-Cotton, as well as the EC-Poultry Customs Classification and
the EC-Regime for Importation Sale and Distribution of Bananas arbitration
cases.200 Welber Barral wrote that in August 2004, "the most commented
news item in Brasilia-and certainly by President Lula's Administration-
was the Brazilian victory in two international disputes before the World
Trade Organization," the U.S.-Cotton and EC-Sugar cases. 2 0 1 The Brazilian
media examined how these cases implicated the negotiations on agricul-
ture in the Doha Round, highlighting their systemic importance, as Brazil
pressed for a ban on all agricultural export subsidies and tighter con-
straints on domestic agricultural subsidies.
The government, private sector, and academia have complemented the
media's coverage with specialized newsletters on international trade mat-
ters, which are of great importance for developing a national trade law
knowledge network. These newsletters cover WTO negotiations and dis-
putes in particular. The Brazilian mission in Geneva publishes the Carta
de Genebra, which provides an update on WTO developments. 20 2 Since
July 2004, FGV Law School in Sao Paulo, in partnership with the Geneva-
based International Centre on Trade and Sustainable Development
(ICTSD), publishes Pontes-Entre Comtrcio e Desenvolvimento Sustentdvel
(Bridges Between Trade and Sustainable Development). This monthly
newsletter is a Portuguese version of ICTSD's Bridges that includes original
reporting and analysis by Brazilian academics, practitioners, and civil soci-
ety representatives on WTO-related developments. 20 3 Its articles provide
an outlet for their writings and a regular forum in which they can engage
with each other's ideas.
2. Investment in Trade Law by Brazilian Law Firms; Catalyzing Knowledge
Diffusion Through Internship Programs in the Brazilian Government
Brazil's largest law firms have invested in developing trade law exper-
tise in the hope of tapping a new market. Although the market remains
limited, knowledge of trade law within Brazilian law firms has grown to an
extent unknown in other developing countries, as represented by the work
200. See, e.g., Brasil t o Quarto Pais que Mais vai a OMC, FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, May 18,
2005, at 1; OMC Anuncia Decisdo Inapelavel Contra Subsidio Europeu ao A Ocar, REVISTA
EXAME, Apr. 28, 2005, at 1; OMC Autoriza Brasil e Outros Parses a Retaliarem Exportac6es
dos EUA, REviSTA EXAME, Aug. 31, 2004, at 1.
201. Welber Barral, Trade Disputes and the Brazilian Character, BRAZIL NEWS, Oct.
2004, at 1, available at http://www.brazilinfocenter.org/pdfs/october2004.pdf. Like-
wise, the lawyer Ana Caetano remarked in a 2004 interview that no one followed trade
issues three years ago but that today papers generally have two or three articles. Inter-
view by Gregory C. Shaffer with Ana Teresa de S. L. Caetano, Attorney, O'Melveny &
Meyers LLP, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 23, 2004) [hereinafter Caetano Interview].
202. An archive of the Carta de Genebra is accessible at Ministrio das Relag6es Exter-
iores, Carta de Genebra, http://www.mre.gov.br/index.php?option=com-content&task=
view&id=798 (last visited May 20, 2008).
203. The publication Pontes-Entre Comercio e Desenvolvimento Sustentdvel is available
at Int'l Ctr. for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Pontes Entre o Comercio e o Desenvolvimento
Sustentavel, http://www.ictsd.org/monthly/pontes.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
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of the Brazilian firm Veirano & Advogados in the EC-Poultry Customs Clas-
sification and Argentina-Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry cases. 20 4 The Bra-
zilian government has facilitated the building of trade law expertise
through a series of internship programs, starting at its mission in Geneva
and expanding to its Dispute Settlement Unit in Brasilia and its embassy in
Washington, D.C., which are, to our knowledge, unique in the realm of
trade diplomacy. As one interviewee stated, the internship program can
"train Brazilian lawyers to facilitate their contact with WTO rules and pro-
cedures so that in the future they can help Brazil's private sector." 20 5
Brazil's elite law firms are the largest in Latin America and they have
long worked on cross-border matters, specializing in inbound investment
and commercial transactions in light of Brazil's large internal market. 20 6
Brazil's elite law firms formed an association in 1983 named the Centro de
Estudos das Soceidades de Advogados (The Law Firm Study Center) based in
Sdo Paulo. In 2002, in the midst of the Embraer case and the year that the
U.S.-Cotton and EC-Sugar cases were initiated, the Law Firm Study Center
created a technical group on international trade that brought together
twenty-five practitioners from the law firms. This group has since pre-
pared studies on international trade law topics and has coordinated meet-
ings among lawyers and government representatives to discuss trade
issues, including the role of the private bar in representing Brazil's com-
mercial interests in international trade disputes. 20 7
The Law Firm Study Center played a central role in the creation of an
internship program for private lawyers in Brazil's mission to the WTO in
Geneva. In August 2002, the center organized a conference in Rio de
Janeiro on trade law issues, which was the first large-scale event in which
Brazilian public officials and private lawyers examined the possible syner-
gies of working together in WTO dispute settlement.2 0 8 Private lawyers
complained at the conference that only foreign law firms were being hired
to assist the Brazilian government in WTO disputes, as in the Embraer
case. Brazilian officials from the Foreign Affairs Ministry responded that
the government did not select the private firms, because the private parties
who paid the law firm's fees made that decision. They emphasized that the
204. Argentina-Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry, WT/DS241; EC-Poultry Customs
Classification, WT/DS269.
205. Apr. 2004 Dispute Settlement Unit Member Interview, supra note 180.
206. See Consultor Juridico, Ranking da Advocacia: Demarest e Tozzini Lideram Lista
na America Latina, http://conjur.estadao.com.br/static/text/26975,1 (last visited May
23, 2008). The three largest and seven of the ten largest law firms in Latin America are
from Brazil. See id. The three largest each employed over three hundred lawyers in
2007. See id. (noting that Demarest e Almeida, Tozzini Freire Teixara e Silva, and
Pinheiro Neto, the three largest law firms in Latin America, employed 365, 346, and
325 lawyers respectively, and that the fifth and sixth largest law firms, Machado Meyer
Sendacz e Opice and Veirano & Advogados, also from Brazil, employed 293 and 223
lawyers respectively).
207. See Centro de Estudos das Soceidades de Advogados, Relat6rio das Atividades
2004, Sho Paulo (2004), http://www.cesa.org.br/com-apoio-rel.asp.
208. The meeting was organized by the Study Center at the Brazilian Development
Bank, Rio de Janeiro, in August 2002. About 200 hundred people attended the event.
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government would welcome the development of capacity on WTO law with
the Brazilian bar.20 9
The Rio de Janeiro event was followed by others that brought together
government trade officials, as well as private Brazilian lawyers and busi-
ness representatives. In November 2002, the Brazilian Institute of Studies
on Competition and Consumer Affairs (IBRAC), "a non-governmental asso-
ciation of about five hundred corporations, law firms, and individuals,"
organized its first conference dedicated to international trade issues.2 10
IBRAC has since annually organized an international trade conference that
brings together lawyers, economists, academics, and Brazilian trade offi-
cials, which has attracted increasing private sector interest.2 1 I In 2003, the
institute changed its name to include "International Trade" in its tide,
reflecting the growing interest in international trade law and policy within
Brazil. Its new name is the Brazilian Institute of Studies on Competition,
Consumer Affairs and International Trade (Instituto Brasileiro de Estudos de
Concorrencia, Consumo e Conercio Internacional). The Ministry of Foreign
Affairs followed the IBRAC event with a meeting it organized in Brasilia in
March 2003 that once again brought together lawyers, economists, academ-
ics, and government trade officials, aiming to catalyze the spread of knowl-
edge and legal capacity about WTO dispute settlement in Brazil.2 12
In relation to these initiatives, in January 2003, the ministry created a
four-month internship program for private lawyers within Brazil's mission
in Geneva, which the Law Firm Study Center co-sponsors.2 13 The Study
Center and IBRAC receive the applications of candidates interested in par-
ticipating in the program and, together with Ms. Vera Thorstensen at the
Geneva mission, they choose young Brazilian professionals to be part of the
program, and to the extent possible, candidates who have pursued (or are
pursuing) advanced legal studies in WTO law. The interns are privately
funded, typically by the Brazilian law firm that employs them from which
209. Interview by Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg with Brazilian offi-
cials and law firm representatives [names withheld] (2005) (on file with authors).
210. IBRAC was founded in 1992. OFFICE OF EcON. COOPERATION & DEV., COMPETI-
TION LAW AND POLICY IN BRAZIL: A PEER REviEw 131 n.116 (2005); see generally Instituto
Brasileiro de Estudos de Concorrencia, Consumo e Comercio Internacional (IBRAC),
http://www.ibrac.org.br/ (last visited May 20, 2008).
211. In the first year of the conference, in 2002, there were about forty participants,
while in 2005 that number increased to almost ninety, a level that has since been
maintained.
212. Interviews by Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg with Brazilian offi-
cials and law firm representatives [names withheld], in Brasilia & Sao Paulo, Braz.
(Jan.-Sept. 2005) (on file with authors).
213. The program at the Geneva mission was established with the support of the
Ambassador in Geneva, Luiz Felipe de Seixas Corr~a, and was coordinated by Ms. Vera
Thorstensen. Thorstensen, an economist with a doctorate from Fundagao Getulio Var-
gas (FGV) who regularly lectures on trade matters (from Sciences Politiques in Paris to
conferences in Latin America), has been the contact point at the mission for the trainee-
ship program and played a key role in supporting and coordinating the program. She
has worked there since the 1990s to provide the mission with technical support on eco-
nomic issues. She is known for continuing to push the trainees to conduct research on
international trade law issues after they return to Brazil.
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they take a leave of absence. As a condition of the internship, the intern
and the law firm sign a confidentiality agreement with the government.
The Geneva mission's staff organizes a training program for the interns to
prepare them for the WTO disputes on which they will work and the meet-
ings that they will attend.2 14 During the program's first five years (2003-
2007), fifty-three young lawyers from thirty-eight Brazilian law firms had
participated in the internship program. 2 15 Interns come predominantly
from Brazil's largest law firms located in Sdo Paulo and in Rio de Janeiro,
but a few firms from other parts of the country also have participated. 2 16
Although the number of new legal interns has decreased as law firms saw a
limit to the market for WTO law expertise, a base of knowledge of WTO
law and the WTO as an institution has now been formed within the Brazil-
ian bar.
The Foreign Affairs Ministry expanded the internship program in
order to spread knowledge of WTO law more broadly within the govern-
ment and the private sector, enhancing departmental knowledge and
interministerial coordination. As such, eighteen interns have been
accepted from other government ministries since the program's incep-
tion. 217 Although the program initially was conceived to train lawyers,
individuals in the private sector with international policy backgrounds
expressed interest in participating. Starting in 2005, the program was
expanded to include interns from Brazil's largest industry associations,
such as FIESP and CNI, who sent five individuals with international trade
policy portfolios. 218
The Geneva program's success spurred the Dispute Settlement Unit
within the Foreign Affairs Ministry to create its own internship program in
Brasilia in 2004.219 These interns then formed a Brasilia-based, public-
private trade law study group to continue to assess developments in WTO
dispute settlement relevant to Brazil. The Brazilian Embassy in Washing-
ton, D.C. created an analogous program in 2003 to develop capacity in
international trade matters. 2 20 The embassy also sponsors the ABCI Insti-
214. The point person for dispute settlement at the mission has taught courses and
organized seminars on WTO issues for the interns to prepare them for WTO meetings
and inform them about current trade disputes.
215. VERA THORSTENSEN, 0 PROGRAMA DE FORMACAO DA M1SSAO DO BRASIL EM GENEBRA
(2008). A number of former interns to the Brazilian mission are contributors to this
volume. Id.
216. Three interns came from Brasilia, and two interns came from each of Recife,
Salvador, Curitiba, Florian6polis, and Belo Horizonte. Id.
217. They came from the Ministry of Development (including its trade remedies
department), the Ministry of Agriculture, the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES), and
the Solicitor General's Office (AGU). Id.
218. See infra Part III.C.4.
219. Some interns in Geneva also worked as interns in Brasilia for an additional four-
month period.
220. Statistical evidence reveals that lower-income developing countries fare far worse
in U.S. anti-dumping proceedings than do developed country defendants, probably
because they have less capacity to defend themselves in the U.S. proceedings and pose
less of a threat of a WTO legal challenge. Chad Bown et al., The Pattern of US Anti-
Dumping: The Path from Initial Filing to WTO Dispute, 2 WORLD TRADE REv. 349, 349-71
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tute, a program launched in 2004 that brings together academics and prac-
titioners in the U.S. capital to exchange ideas in seminars and symposia
"on international trade matters of interest to Brazil."2 2 1 By the end of
2007, the Brasilia program had hosted eight interns and the embassy in
Washington, D.C. had hosted twenty.
2 22
The WTO has resulted not only in the legalization of international
trade relations but also of domestic import protection mechanisms. The
Brazilian law firms that have invested in building internal capacity for
WTO issues are often those that wish to develop an anti-dumping business
within Brazil. Anti-dumping work is a way for lawyers to become known in
the business community for trade-related expertise, especially because Bra-
zil's use of anti-dumping measures has increased following the trade liber-
alization of the 1990s. 22 3 The development of Brazilian law firm capacity
in trade law can thus be used both to impede and gain access to Brazil's
internal market because lawyers can work both sides of an anti-dumping
case. 224 Brazilian law firms asked for an internship program to be created
within the Brazilian entity responsible for anti-dumping investigations, a
division within the Department of Foreign Trade in the Ministry of Devel-
opment.2 25 The law firms hoped to increase their knowledge in this area,
both to develop their domestic practice and potentially to work on these
cases if they are brought to the WTO. The government finally created an
internship program for undergraduate students, for which it planned to
select twenty-eight interns in 2008.226 Although the anti-dumping work of
(2003). Bown et al. find that these countries "are more likely to be targeted, less likely to
settle cases, more likely to confront high dumping duties and less likely to bring cases to
the WTO." Id. at Abstract; see also Busch et al., supra note 15 (finding that members
with more legal capacity are more likely to challenge anti-dumping suits brought against
them at the WTO and less likely to be named in anti-dumping petitions in the first
place).
221. See Analistas Brasileiros de Comercio Internacional (ABCI), http://www.abciin-
stitute.org/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2008); see also Barral, The Brazilian Experience, supra
note 69, at 16. Mr. Aluisio Campos, a Brazilian diplomat at the Washington, D.C.
Embassy who created the internship program, was also responsible for the creation of
Analistas Brasileiros de Comercio Internacional.
222. The latest intern left the Dispute Settlement Unit in Brasilia in 2006. Interview
by Barbara Rosenberg with official, Dispute Settlement Unit (Mar. 4, 2008) (on file with
authors). In contrast, the internship program expanded in Washington, D.C. likely
because of the interest of Brazilian graduate law students studying at the law schools at
Georgetown University, George Washington University, and American University in
developing practical knowledge of U.S. anti-dumping law and extending their stay in
Washington.
223. KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM, supra note 196, at 25.
224. Caetano Interview, supra note 201. Caetano notes that Brazilian law firms do
not specialize in work for complainants or respondents in anti-dumping cases, as in the
United States, but can be hired to work on either side. Id. She also notes how there is
much more internal anti-dumping work than on safeguards or countervailing duties in
Brazil. Id.
225. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Vera Sterman Kanas, Attorney, Tozzini
Freire, in Sjo Paulo, Braz. (Apr. 25, 2004) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Kanas
Interview].
226. E-mail from Welber Barral, Sec'y, Dep't of Foreign Trade, to Gregory C. Shaffer,
Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago Law School (Mar. 10, 2008) (on file with
Vol. 41
2008 The Trials of Winning at the WTO
Brazilian law firms has remained relatively limited, there is clearly more
work than under the non-legalized mechanisms for import relief of the for-
mer CACEX system discussed in Part 1.227
Some Brazilian attorneys, on their own initiative, have explored the
possibility of working with U.S. firms in the United States on trade-related
matters, including anti-dumping investigations involving Brazilian prod-
ucts. U.S. law firms can train Brazilian lawyers in these subject area, as
well as in U.S. approaches to trade law and litigation generally. Ana
Caetano's experience with O'Melveny & Myers is an example. She
returned to Brazil and started working on anti-dumping investigations.
She became acquainted with representatives of Brazilian companies and
trade associations, leading to her WTO work for the poultry trade associa-
tion (ABEF), the first case involving an Argentine anti-dumping
measure.
2 28
The internship programs generally have been a success for the Brazil-
ian government and the lawyers involved. Some interns continued to work
on WTO cases on a pro bono basis for the government after they returned
to Brazil. For example, former Geneva interns helped to research and dis-
cuss Brazil's strategy in response to the EU's request for WTO consulta-
tions in Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres. 22 9 Sometimes
the former interns even flew back from Brazil to Geneva to observe panel
and Appellate Body hearings on matters on which they continued to
work.230 Although Brazilian law firms funded the interns and the interns
may not have generated the amount of work that the law firms had hoped,
the firms and interns have taken a longer-term view, hoping that the expe-
rience will provide them with business in the future. Some Brazilian
interns have since been hired by the private sector to provide counsel on
WTO disputes, as in the EC-Banana arbitration procedure of 2005 and in
the Brazil-Tyres case.2 3 1 Brazilian law firms, including the former interns
authors). The government also created a summer internship program for graduate stu-
dents, granting internships to three individuals in 2007. Id.
227. Id.; Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Adriana Dantas, Attorney, Trench,
Rossi e Watanabe Advogados (Associate of Baker & McKenzie), in S~o Paulo, Braz. (Apr.
15, 2004) [hereinafter Dantas Interview] (on file with authors); Interview by Gregory C.
Shaffer with Jose Diaz, former Intern, Demarest & Almeida, in Sio Paulo, Braz. (Apr. 22,
2004) [hereinafter Diaz Interview] (on file with authors). Dantas "has represented cli-
ents in a number of trade remedies investigations before the Brazilian Trade Remedies
Department, as well as investigations opened against Brazilian exporters abroad, partic-
ularly India, European Union and Russia." Georgetown Inst. of Int'l Econ. Law,
2007-2008 IIELL Fellows, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/iiel/fellows/currentfel-
lows.html (last visited May 20, 2008). Former intern Jose Diaz of Demarest & Almeida
in Szao Paulo noted that after returning from his internship, he was working on an anti-
dumping case and hoped to have another one shortly. Diaz Interview, supra.
228. See infra Part IV.A.
229. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with diplomat, Dispute Settlement Unit, Brazil
Foreign Ministry [name withheld], in Sdo Paulo, Braz. (Feb. 2006) (on file with authors).
230. Kanas Interview, supra note 225 (noting that she returned for the second hear-
ing of the EC- Sugar case, providing free services for the government, and that a former
intern at Pinheiro Neto was also flying back for the EC- Sugar hearing).
231. In the EC- Bananas arbitration case, the law firm of Machado, Meyer, Sendacz e
Opice, worked for the Brazilian banana sector. One of the lawyers on the case, Andre
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at the Geneva mission, have provided counsel on many WTO-related
issues, not only in relation to litigated WTO disputes, but also as regards
the Doha Round negotiations, foreign market access issues that WTO law
implicated, and internal anti-dumping cases in Brazil. 23 2 The interns have
seen how the WTO operates, and they now are part of an international
trade law network that can provide them with long-term career benefits. 233
In sum, Brazilian public officials and private lawyers have overlapping,
albeit not identical, interests in WTO dispute settlement. The government
can benefit from the diffusion of WTO legal expertise in Brazil, as qualified
Brazilian lawyers are now locally available. Through the internship pro-
gram in Geneva, Brazilian practitioners have learned about WTO law and
dispute settlement in order to better market themselves to companies, trade
associations, and the government to act as consultants, whether for the
identification and analysis of potential claims, the litigation of actual
claims, or settlement negotiations. For Brazil, even if these lawyers do not
work on actual WTO cases, they retain knowledge about the system which
can be of use. They also can advise clients when they have a potential
WTO case and bring the case to the government's attention. 234 Moreover,
because most trade disputes are settled, other WTO members' perception
of greater Brazilian capacity in WTO law can be helpful in settlement nego-
tiations conducted in the. shadow of a potential WTO proceeding.
3. Developments in Legal Education and the Creation of Trade Law Study
Networks
The increased interest in international trade law and policy has gener-
ated a competition for expertise, which is reflected in increased offerings
of international trade law courses in universities, the formation of trade
policy institutes, and the creation of trade law study networks in which
Areno, was a former intern at the Geneva mission. Another of the lawyers, Pablo Bentes,
was an intern in the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, D.C. and in 2006, joined the
Legal Division of the WTO Secretariat. In the EC-Tyres case, a former intern at the
Geneva mission worked for the retreaded tire industry opposed to the Brazilian ban.
232. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Carolina Saldanha, Attorney, Felsberg,
Pedretti, Mannrich e Aidar Advogados, in Sao Paulo, Braz. (Apr. 23, 2004) (on file with
authors) (concerning work for the Brazilian shrimp industry regarding U.S. anti-dump-
ing duties on shrimp imports in which Brazil was a third party in complaints that Ecua-
dor and Thailand brought); see also Caetano Interview, supra note 201 (regarding advice
to clients on Doha Round negotiating positions and e-mails from U.S. law firms regard-
ing potential partnerships in challenging import relief decisions); Dantas Interview,
supra note 227; Diaz Interview, supra note 227 (noting research for one of Brazil's largest
exporters of cashews on market access issues).
233. One could view the interns as also investing in the professional status gained
from selection in the Geneva internship program, which they can add to their interna-
tionalist portfolios. They are now part of an elite network of participants in the Geneva
internship. On investing in the "international" as a means to build domestic social capi-
tal, see DEZALAY & GARTH, supra note 9.
234. A member of the Dispute Settlement Unit confirms that the Brazilian private
sector is now "engaged in bringing its proposals." Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with
member of Dispute Settlement Unit, Brazil Foreign Ministry [name withheld], in Sao
Paulo, Braz. (June 22, 2006) (on file with authors). He states that the private sector
"identifies claims and brings memos, including from law offices in Brazil." Id.
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academics engage with Brazilian trade officials, private lawyers (in particu-
lar those returned from the internship programs), and specialists that trade
associations hired. Together, they form part of a Brazilian epistemic trade
law community.
Brazilian university departments and course offerings have changed
significantly in the last decade in response to the phenomenon of globaliza-
tion, the opening of the Brazilian economy, and the increased focus of Bra-
zilian policy on trade-related matters. Specialized "international relations"
schools were not created until the late 1990S,235 and Brazilian universities
offered few international trade courses and typically no courses on inter-
national trade law. Until the mid-1990s, Brazilian law schools were not
required to offer an international law course. When law schools offered
courses in public and private international law, they were general introduc-
tory courses that covered little to no trade law. The situation reflected a
lack of public interest in the GATT/WTO system and career opportunities
for graduates. Businesses, law firms, and the Brazilian government had
little interest in hiring graduates specialized in this area so there was no
demand for schools to introduce classes. A few private practitioners han-
dled occasional customs matters and starting in the 1990s, anti-dumping
matters, but they did little else involving trade law. As a result, knowledge
of WTO matters was limited to a few officials in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs.
The situation has changed dramatically since 2000. As interest in the
impact of WTO rules on Brazil grew, spurred by the Embraer, U.S.-Cotton
and EC-Sugar cases, together with the intensification of the Doha Round
negotiations, the demand for courses in international trade law did as well.
The law school of the University of S~o Paulo, Brazil's flagship institution
for higher education, offered three optional, upper-level trade-related law
courses in 2000 for its five-year undergraduate program.2 36 By 2005, the
law school had doubled its offerings and made one of them mandatory,
providing six trade-related undergraduate courses, two of them focusing on
the WTO. 2 37 In addition, students increasingly pursued masters and doc-
torate theses focused on trade-related issues, and these graduate students
joined trade law study groups coordinated with representatives from the
government and the private sector.
235. Shiguenoli Miyamoto, 0 Estudo das Relai6es Internacionais no Brasil: o Estado da
Arte, 12 REVISTA DE SOCIOLOGIA E POLiTICA 83, 83-98 (1999). The University of Brasilia
offered the first course on international relations in Brazil in 1974, and it established a
masters program in international relations ten years later. Other Brazilian institutions
offered courses in international relations for the first time in the 1990s, and they were
mainly located in the South and Southeast regions.
236. Students take upper-level courses during the last two years of Brazil's five-year
undergraduate program. For more information on the University of Sao Paulo's Law
School, see Faculdade de Direito, Universidade de Sdo Paulo, http://www.direito.usp.br
(last visited May 20, 2008).
237. The list of courses at the University of S~o Paulo Law School can be viewed on
its website, http://www.direito.usp.br/ (follow "Departamentos," "Internacional," "Dis-
ciplinas" links).
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In 2002, the Funda~do Getulio Vargas (FGV) in Sao Paulo founded a
new private law school called FGV Law School (Direito GV) whose aim was
to respond to changes "in the international commerce and investment cir-
cuit," which "has led to the redefinition of the contents of the classic fields
of law, and to the conception of new fields and new types of law."23 8 The
law school launched a post-graduate WTO course in 2003 which, for the
first time, brought together trade law professors and practitioners in the
public and private sectors as teachers, many of whom had been instrumen-
tal in other Brazilian initiatives to build WTO-related capacity. They
included Celso Lafer, former Foreign Minister under whose auspices the
Dispute Settlement Unit was created; Roberto Carvalho de Azev~do, the
first head of the Dispute Settlement Unit who had litigated the Embraer
case while at the Geneva mission; Jose Roberto Mendon~a de Barros, econ-
omist and former Secretary General of CAMEX; Marcos Jank, agricultural
economist and President of ICONE; Christian Lohbauer, former head of
the department of foreign affairs at the Industry Federation of the State of
Sao Paulo, FIESP, and current President of ABEF; and private lawyers,
some of them former interns. A team of four young law professors who
had just returned from studying in the United States and Geneva coordi-
nated the course, focusing on WTO law and jurisprudence of specific rele-
vance for Brazil and its economic sectors. 239 The team of instructors
collectively covered the core aspects of the WTO, including the GATT, the
Agreement on Agriculture, the DSU, the General Agreement on Trade and
Services (GATS), and the TRIPs Agreement.
The FGV Law School initiated complementary projects in Sao Paulo to
further understanding of WTO law and dispute settlement. In 2003, FGV
professors coordinated a collaborative research project on textile trade cho-
sen because the sector was to be integrated into the GATT following the
termination of the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing on January 1, 2005.
The GATT's inclusion of textile trade could affect Brazilian producers
because of increased competition from Asia, in particular from China, in
key export markets, such as the United States. FGV professors helped
coordinate the project to examine these concerns and the research group
discussed the results with the Brazilian Textile Association (Associa¢do
Brasileira da Industria T~xtil e de ConfecAo). 240 In July 2004, the law
school also helped UNCTAD organize a workshop at FGV on WTO dispute
238. See Fundac~o Getulio Vargas (FGV) Direito GV (Escola de Direito de S~o Paulo),
Mission, http://www.direitogv.com.br/english (follow "Mission" link) (last visited May
20, 2008) (providing the FGV Law School statement).
239. Michelle Ratton Sanchez and Barbara Rosenberg were two of the four professors.
The other two were Rabih Ali Nasser and Maria Carolina Mendonga de Barros.
Mendonga de Barros had been an intern at the Geneva mission.
240. See Guido Soares Silva, The Impact of the WTO Agreement on Textiles & Clothing
on Brazilian Exports of Textiles and Clothing to the United States, CADERNos DIREITO GV,
Apr. 2005, at 1, available at http://www.direitogv.com.br/AppData/Publication/Impact_
20of_20the 20WTO_2OAgreement_20on_2OTextiles.pdf. Ratton Sanchez was one of
the co-authors.
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settlement with a focus on trade remedy laws. 24 1
Other universities in a number of different Brazilian cities also began
integrating trade-related courses into their curricula, including specific
courses on the WTO, trade and development, and international economic
relations.24 2 They organized conferences and public seminars on interna-
tional trade law as well. The primary locations of these seminars and con-
ferences were Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, and the major cities of
southern Brazil. Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina in Florian6polis,
for example, began an annual conference on Current Issues in Interna-
tional Trade (Temas de Comercio Internacional em Debate) in 2004 in a part-
nership with the Universidad de Buenos Aires in Argentina. 24 3
Professors also created research institutes and centers for interna-
tional trade law and policy, such as the Institute on International Trade
Law and Development (Instituto de Direito do Com~rcio Internacional e
Desenvolvimento, IDCID) and the Center for the Study of International
Negotiations (Centro de Estudos das Negocia Oes Internacionais, CAENI) at
the University of Sao Paulo. In 2003, professors and researchers at the law
school created the IDCID, aiming to build capacity to address trade law
issues from a development perspective. It has produced research papers
and organized conferences on trade dispute settlement, intellectual prop-
erty, and trade in services, focusing particularly on WTO law. In 2005,
working with the Brazilian member of the WTO Appellate Body, Luiz Olavo
Baptista, the institute hosted one of five official Appellate Body conferences
commemorating the Appellate Body's tenth anniversary. 2 44 CAENI is a
multidisciplinary research centre that is linked to the university's political
science department and which aims to bring researchers together with gov-
241. See Press Release, U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Workshop on WTO Dispute Set-
tlement: Commercial Defense Measures (June 21-23, 2004), available at http://
r0.unctad.org/disputesettlement/pdfs/saopauloO6O4.pdf. The Brazilian Institute of
Studies on Competition, Consumer Affairs and International Trade (IBRAC) was also a
co-sponsor of the workshop. Id. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment (UNCTAD) likely came to FGV Law School because of the school's reputation for
launching its own WTO dispute settlement course. UNCTAD has developed a general
course for developing countries on WTO dispute settlement and it looks for local part-
ners to help conduct workshops. For a description of UNCTAD's mission and goals, see
U.N. Conf. on Trade & Dev., Mission Statement on the Project of Dispute Settlement,
http://rO.unctad.org/disputesettlement/mission.htm (last visited May 23, 2008).
242. These universities included: Universidade Estadual de Sao Paulo, Universidade
de Brasilia, Universidade de Campinas, Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina in Flori-
an6polis, Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, and Universidade Federal de
Santa Maria. These universities are based in southern Brazil, the country's most devel-
oped economic region. The University of Brasilia created a "Trade Negotiations Course"
to which it invited experts from Sao Paulo as lecturers. The University of Campinas and
other universities in the federal state of Sao Paulo followed suit. Campinas is located
eighty miles northwest of Sao Paulo.
243. E-mail from Welber Barral, Sec'y, Dep't of Foreign Trade, to Gregory C. Shaffer,
Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago Law School (Mar. 6, 2008) (on file with
authors). Barral founded the program before he became head of the Foreign Trade
Department of the Ministry of Development. Id.
244. To view IDCID's webpage, see Instituto de Direito do Comrcio Internacional e
Desenvolvimento, http://www.idcid.org.br/ (last visited May 20, 2008).
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ernment and private sector representatives to advance study and assess
developments in international negotiations. 245 An important part of
CAENI's research focuses on South-South cooperation strategies. The
center is funded in part by the government's Institute of Applied Economic
Research and the Inter-American Development Bank's Institute for the Inte-
gration of Latin America and the Caribbean (INTAL), with the Ford Foun-
dation sponsoring specific projects. 2 46
In 2003, academics and professionals created a research group specifi-
cally to assess developments in international trade negotiations, the Grupo
de Negocia6es Comerciais (Trade Negotiations Group). Vera Thorstensen
from the Brazilian mission in Geneva helped to coordinate the group with
Marcos Jank from the agribusiness-funded think tank ICONE. The team
was composed of economic consultants, academics, trade specialists from
business associations, and legal practitioners, again including former
interns at Brazil's WTO mission in Geneva. The group analyzed specific
trade issues under negotiation in the Doha Round, including in agriculture,
services, anti-dumping, subsidy and safeguard rules, intellectual property,
trade and the environment, trade and competition policy, and the ongoing
review of the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding. The group met
once a month in 2003 and produced a book consisting of thirteen studies
in 2005.247
In 2004, some FGV professors worked with two Brazilians from the
Geneva mission, Vera Thorstensen and Victor do Prado, to help create a
separate study group in Sao Paulo on WTO dispute settlement named the
Nucleo de Estudos sobre Solu~do de Controversias (Dispute Settlement Study
Group). 248 The study group aimed to deepen, spread and deploy the
knowledge that the interns developed from their stay in Geneva after they
returned to Brazil, where they rejoined their law practice and worked to
complete their dissertations. A central task of the Sao Paulo study group
was to prepare teaching materials on WTO dispute settlement that could
be used in trade courses throughout the country. Former interns at the
245. CAENI works with Nucleo de Pesquisas em Relap6es Internacionais, a multi-disci-
plinary research centre which has been at the University of Sao Paulo since 1989 that
addresses a broad range of international issues from security to political economy. For
information on CAENI, see Centro de Estudos das Negociai6es Internacionais, http://
www.caeni.com.br (last visited May 20, 2008). For information on NUPRI, see Nucleo
de Pesquisa em Relacoes Internacionais, Universidade de Sdo Paulo, UPRI, http://
www.usp.br/cartainternacional/modx/ (last visited May 20, 2008).
246. See Inst. for the Integration of Latin America & the Caribbean (INTAL), Inter-
American Development Bank, http://www.iadb.org/intal/index.asp?idioma=eng (last
visited May 20, 2008).
247. VERA THORSTENSEN & MARCOS JANK, 0 BRASIL E Os GRANDES TEMAS DE COMERCIO
INTERNACIONAL (2005).
248. Victor do Prado is a member of the WTO Secretariat who previously worked in
the Brazilian Foreign Ministry where he was responsible for some dispute settlement
cases. At the WTO, do Prado was part of the Secretariat's Rules Division until he
became Deputy Chief of Cabinet of the Director General Pascal Lamy in 2005. See
World Trade Inst., Biography of Victor do Prado, http://www.wti.org/index.php?
option=com content&taskview&id=741&Itemid=390&PHPSESSID=ca338fa0e47900
c464b1128df27b0c78 (last visited May 20, 2008).
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Geneva mission organized parallel initiatives in Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, and
Belo Horizonte. Government officials were an integral part of the groups in
Rio de Janeiro and Brasilia since Brasilia is the capital and Rio hosts a
number of trade-related government agencies. 2 49 The government officials
in Brasilia, in particular, suggested topics for research that could help Bra-
zil in current and potential WTO cases.
These developments evidence a boom of academic-related activities in
Brazil from 2002-2004 concerning international trade law, spurred by the
high profile WTO dispute settlement cases involving Brazil and the launch-
ing of the Doha Round of negotiations. Trade-related courses grew with
perceptions of the implications of the WTO for Brazil and demands for
professional specialization. Academic and policy-oriented trade law study
groups, seminars, and colloquia proliferated. Since 2005, the study groups
have become less active and the development of international trade law
courses targeted at post-graduate professionals has been suspended. This
turn likely reflects the reduced ambitions of the Doha Round and the
FTAA where negotiations reached a standstill in 2004, the relative decline
in Brazil's dispute settlement activity, the fact that the Brazilian market can
only sustain so many trade specialists, and the Brazilian private sector and
government's predominant use of non-Brazilian law firms for WTO dispute
settlement. 2 50
Although the market in Brazil for WTO-related knowledge has its lim-
its, it has developed significantly over the last six years so that expertise on
trade law, policy, and dispute settlement is no longer limited to the diplo-
matic realm. 25 ' New course offerings and advanced degree programs have
generated knowledge of international trade law and the international trad-
ing system that can be used by the public and private sectors. Brazilian
academics continue to play an important role for the country in following
trade agendas, mobilizing responses to developments in trade fora, and
249. The study group in Brasilia included officials from the Dispute Settlement Unit
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Secretariat of Foreign Trade from the Ministry of
Development, the Secretariat for International Matters from the Ministry of Agriculture,
and the Secretariat of Economic Law from the Ministry of Justice, in addition to lawyers
and academics. The Brazilian diplomat Haroldo de Macedo Ribeiro, a member of the
Dispute Settlement Unit, played an important role in these meetings. The group in Rio
de Janeiro brought together interns, academics, trade specialists from industry (mainly
from the Confedera Ao Nacional da Indistria (CNI)), economic consultants, and offi-
cials from government agencies, such as the Brazilian Development Bank, the Institute of
Applied Economic Research (IPEA), and INMETRO. INMETRO is the National Institute
of Metrology, Standardization and Industrial Quality (Instituto Nacional de Metrologia,
Normaliza~do e Qualidade Industrial) and is within the Ministry of Development. IPEA
is the Instituto de Pesquisa Economica Aplicada and is part of the Ministry of Planning.
250. It appears that the awarding of the bid to an international law firm in 2005
decreased the incentives for private practitioners to provide their services to the govern-
ment on a pro bono basis in connection with the study groups on dispute settlement and
negotiations. As for specialized courses designed for professionals, they charge higher
fees and the market has not supported them.
251. Dezalay and Garth found that economics became the leading expertise in South
American states in the 1990s, replacing law to some extent, but they also noted the rise
of business law. DEZALAv & GARTH, supra note 9, at 30, 47-51. We likewise find a rise
of interest in business law but for the first time, in terms of international trade law.
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offering a contact point for professionals for the organization of courses,
meetings, and conferences. Today, universities in Brazil's most important
cities commonly accept that a graduating law student should have at least
a basic knowledge of public international law, including WTO law. While
there was almost no academic debate on international trade law in Brazil in
the 1990s, there is considerable debate today.
4. Initiatives of Business Trade Associations, Think Tanks, Consultancies,
and Civil Society Organizations Regarding Brazilian Trade Policy
Changes in Brazilian economic policies during the 1990s, the launch-
ing of the Doha Round, and high profile WTO trade disputes mobilized
Brazilian business trade associations and civil society organizations, creat-
ing new opportunities for those investing in trade-related expertise. Bra-
zil's major business associations reorganized to respond to the challenges
posed by the opening of Brazil's internal market and the new opportunities
offered in foreign markets, now backed by a judicialized international trad-
ing regime. Brazilian business associations began to coordinate to enhance
their ability to provide input to the government on trade matters. They
wished, in particular, to engage more effectively with government officials
over Brazil's negotiating positions in the WTO, the proposed Free Trade
Area of the Americas, and the EU-Mercosur Free Trade Agreement, hoping
to influence the government's offers to reduce Brazilian trade barriers in
exchange for the opening of foreign market opportunities. Industrial and
agricultural trade associations held different views, with industry being
much more protectionist, but they worked to strengthen their alliances in
order to coordinate their demands. Brazilian businesses' new orientation
diverged dramatically from its approach during the years of import substi-
tution industrialization under the CACEX system, in which Brazilian busi-
ness organized sectorally to obtain ad hoc government support and
protection.
The Summit of the Americas in Belo Horizonte, Brazil in 1997 was a
turning point for Brazilian business. The summit of governmental leaders
included a parallel meeting of an FTAA "Business Forum," which brought
together heads of state with business leaders who put forth the proposals
of the business sector. 25 2 The FTAA meetings helped to trigger the crea-
tion of an official partnership between Brazil's industrial and agricultural
sectors under a new all-encompassing Brazilian Business Coalition (Coal-
252. The Belo Horizonte Summit was the third trade ministerial meeting that the Sum-
mit of the Americas process launched in Miami in 1994. Paragraph 14 of the joint Dec-
laration of the meeting provides, "We received with interest the contributions for the
Third Business Forum of the Americas relating to the preparatory process for the FTAA
negotiations, which we consider may be relevant to our future deliberations. We
acknowledge and appreciate the importance of the private sector's role and its participa-
tion in the FTAA process." See Summit of the Americas: Third Trade Ministerial Meeting -
Joint Declaration ' 14 (May 16, 1997), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/ministeri-
als/Belo/Belo e.asp; see also HIRST, supra note 58, at 35 (noting that "the demands of
Brazilian business sectors and labor organizations became part of the FTAA negotiating
process").
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izdo Empresarial Brasileira). The Coalition was an "institutional novelty not
only because it puts together ... different sectors," breaking with Brazil's
sectoral traditions for interest articulation, but also because it "focused on
one issue: trade negotiations. '2 53 The Coalition brought together 166 Bra-
zilian business associations and enterprises under a single umbrella,
including the Brazilian National Confederation of Industries (Confedera~ao
Nacional da Industria), the Brazilian National Confederation of Agriculture
(Confederado Nacional da Agricultura), the Brazilian National Confedera-
tion of Commerce (Confedera~do Nacional do Comercio), federations of
industries of different Brazilian states such as the State of Sho Paulo Indus-
try Federation (Federado das Indtistrias do Estado de Sao Paulo), unions of
employers such as For~a Sindical, and sector-specific associations. 25 4 The
Confederation of Industries (CNI) assumed the leadership within the
Coalition. 25 5
Created at a time when the industrial sector was wary of the FTAA
negotiations and agribusiness wished to push for greater market access
abroad, the Coalition aimed to coordinate common positions regarding
trade negotiating positions and to establish communication channels with
the Brazilian government to advance these views. Toward that purpose, it
first had to promote the exchange of information and views among busi-
nesses and trade associations on trade matters, including through organiz-
ing formal and informal meetings among sectoral associations and
federations. 25 6 It organized working groups on trade topics and prepared
position papers regarding negotiations, aiming to build private sector
capacity on trade issues. It then attempted to follow trade negotiations "by
means of the 'room next door,' where interlocution with government agents
is processed before and after the negotiations. '25 7 As Veiga and Ventura-
Diaz write,
The establishment of the Brazilian Coalition was a landmark for two rea-
sons: first, because business associations accepted that access to important
markets (investment, services and government procurement) could result
from exchanging concessions among partners. Second, because the Coali-
tion was an autonomous expression of the business community with respect
to the Brazilian government. Therefore it helped to determine a trade agenda
253. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 158.
254. See Confedera~ao Nacional da Indfstria, A Alca na visao da Coalizdo
Empresarial Brasileira (Aug. 2003), http://www.fiec.org.br/palestras/negocios-interna-
cionais/alca190803/alcaCNI arquivos/frame.htm.
255. Id.
256. Veiga notes the tensions between the export-oriented agribusiness sectors and
the import-competing industrial sectors. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society
Relationship, supra note 59, at 160-61. He also declares that small-scale farmers took a
defensive position, as did Brazil's Landless Worker's Movement (Movimento dos
Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra), whose positions are better represented in the Brazilian
Ministry of Agrarian Development than in the Ministry of Agriculture, which is closer to
agribusiness. Id. at 171 (explaining small-scale farmers' positions).
257. Id. at 159.
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based on a different rationale. 2 58
Since the late 1990s, Brazil's largest industry and agricultural trade
associations and companies have created new international trade depart-
ments and personnel positions. The two largest industry associations in
the country, the Confederation of Industries and the State of Sao Paulo
Industry Federation (FIESP), have had departments on foreign trade policy
since the 1950s, but in the 1990s, they dealt primarily with tariff and other
customs matters, including internal anti-dumping matters. By the end of
the 1990s, the associations developed specialized branches that took a
more proactive approach to foreign trade issues, focused in particular on
trade negotiations. The State of Sao Paulo Industry Federation, whose
members represent around 80% of the country's industrial capacity, estab-
lished a department on international trade relations (Departamento de
Relap6es Internacionais e Comercio Exterior),259 while the Confederation of
Industries, the association that represents industries at the national level,
created a Unit for International Negotiations (Unidade de Negociac3es
Comerciais). These departments hired professionals with international pol-
icy backgrounds, primarily economists and those with a degree in interna-
tional relations, as well as some lawyers. Major companies in Brazil, such
as Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD) 260 and Embraer, likewise created
specialized international trade departments, hiring top trade specialists in
a new competition for expertise. By the time of the 2003 FTAA negotia-
tions in Miami, Brazilian business associations came with specific propos-
als that they distributed. Other Latin American business associations
noted their organization and preparation as "extraordinary."261
Many trade associations and companies hired former government offi-
cials for their knowledge and access to government trade policy net-
works. 262 For example, in 2005, Mario Marconini, who worked at the
258. See Pedro da Motta Veiga & Vivianne Ventura-Diaz, Brazil: The Fine-Tuning of
Trade Liberalization, in TRADE POLICY REFORMS IN LATIN AMERICA: MULTILATERAL RULES AND
DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS 98 (Miguel Lengyel & Vivianne Ventura-Diaz eds., 2004).
259. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Christian Lohbauer, former Director, Int'l
Relations Dep't, State of Sdo Paulo Indus. Fed'n, in Sho Paulo, Braz. (Apr. 23, 2004) (on
file with authors) [hereinafter Lohbauer Interview]. Lobhauer noted that until around
2002, the State of Sdo Paulo Industry Federation (FIESP) was purely defensive. Id. The
aim of creating the department was to permit industry to play a more proactive role in
trade negotiations. Id. Before 2002, he said that "there was no systematic following of
negotiations" within FIESP. Id.
260. Companhia Vale do Rio Doce is the second largest mining company in the world
and the world's largest exporter of iron ore. Nerves of Steel in Brazil, ECONOMIST, May 10,
1997, at 64. It was privatized in 1997. Id.
261. Lohbauer Interview, supra note 259.
262. These practices parallel what one sees in the United States. See SHAFFER,
DEFENDING INTERESTS, supra note 4, at 122-34 (concerning U.S. revolving door bureau-
cratic culture for trade policy). At the highest level in Brazil, for example, during the
first administration of President Lula, the Minister of Development was Luiz Fernando
Furlan, who had been President of Brazil's biggest meat exporter (Sadia S.A.), and the
Minister of Agriculture was Roberto Rodrigues, who had been President of the Brazilian
Association of Agribusiness. Furlan is currently the President of the Board of the Sus-
tainable Amazon Foundation (Fundac5o Amazonas Sustent~vel). See Funda 5o Amazo-
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GATT and the WTO from 1988 to 1996 and served as International Trade
Secretary in the Ministry of Development and Deputy Secretary for Interna-
tional Affairs in the Ministry of Finance in the late 1990s, became a con-
sultant for the State of Sdo Paulo Industry Federation (FIESP). In 2006, he
joined the Washington, D.C.-based consulting firm Manatt Jones Global
Strategies to lead its new Sdo Paulo office. 2 63 Marconini is one of the few
Brazilians who worked in both the GATT and WTO secretariats.
Agribusiness associations have been particularly active in engaging
former government officials in light of agribusinesses' increasing export
orientation. The Sdo Paulo Agribusiness Union on Sugar Cane (UNICA)
hired Elisabeth Serodio, who alternated between UNICA and appointments
in agriculture-related government agencies. Serodio had served as the
manager of a government export program for sugar and alcohol in 2000
within the Ministry of Development. 2 64 She joined UNICA as a consultant
in 2003, returned to the government in 2005 as the Secretary for Interna-
tional Relations in the Ministry of Agriculture and then rejoined UNICA in
2006. Former Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Agriculture Pedro de
Camargo Neto became a consultant for agricultural trade associations and
helped to promote and coordinate Brazil's successful WTO complaints in
the U.S.-Cotton and EC-Sugar cases, working with Serodio and UNICA in
the EC-Sugar case and the cotton trade association (ABRAPA) in the U.S.-
Cotton case. 265 These individuals' prior experience in government helped
them to coordinate the Brazilian public-private partnerships for these
WTO cases. Complementing these initiatives, the State of Sho Paulo Indus-
try Federation organized a business training program for new Brazilian
diplomats so that they would "be trained in the commercial area before
starting to work at Brazilian embassies" and, thus, better promote Brazilian
trade abroad.26 6
Paralleling these developments, entrepreneurs created think tanks and
consultancies to inform, advise, and assist the government and private sec-
tor on international trade issues. These entities, organized on a profit or
non-profit basis, generally maintain their offices in Sao Paulo or Rio de
Janeiro, the economic centers of Brazil. They aim to assist the Brazilian
nas Sustentavel, http://www.fas-amazonas.org/paginainterna.php?cod=4 (last visited
May 20, 2008). Rodrigues currently coordinates the Agribusiness Center at FGV, is the
President of the Superior Board of Agribusiness at FIESP, and together with the Inter-
american Bank of Development and the State of Florida, has launched the interamerican
Commission on Ethanol. See Funda~io Getulio Vargas, Centro de Estudos, http://
www.eesp.fgv.br/gvagro (last visited May 26, 2008).
263. See Manatt Jones Global Strategists, Biography of Mario Marconini, http://
www.manattjones.com/bios/marconini-mario.htm (last visited May 26, 2008); Press
Release, ManattJones Global Strategists, Mario Marconini to Lead New Sao Paolo Office
(June 8, 2006), http://www.manattjones.com/press/pr20060607e.htm.
264. E-mail from official [name withheld], to Gregory C. Shaffer, Professor of Law,
Loyola University Chicago Law School (Mar. 31, 2008) (on file with authors).
265. See infra notes 306-14 and accompanying text.
266. See Isaura Daniel, Brazilian Diplomats to Have Hands-On Training in Trade, BRAz-
ZIL MAG., Oct. 28, 2004, available at http://www.brazzilmag.com/content/view/560/41/
(involving an agreement between FIESP and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs).
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government and private sector in developing positions in international
trade negotiations and litigation. The Institute of Studies on Trade and
International Negotiations (Instituto de Estudos do Comercio e Negociacoes
Internacionais, ICONE), DATAGRO, and Prospectiva Consulting Firm on
International Affairs (Consultoria Brasileira de Assuntos Internacionais) are
leading examples of Brazilian consultancies for international trade.
ICONE was created as a research institute in 2003 with the financial
support of large agribusiness associations to provide technical support to
Brazil in international trade negotiations regarding agriculture.2 67 Profes-
sor Marcos Jank founded it after teaching and conducting research in the
United States at Georgetown University and the University of Missouri-
Columbia and working for a year at the Inter-American Development
Bank.2 68 The institute aimed "to offer technical support to policy makers,
negotiators and representatives of the private sector" and help "them to
build long-term strategies on trade liberalization and integration. '2 69 It,
more generally, aimed to "disseminate information and research on trade
policy and agricultural trade through seminars" organized for different
audiences, including to build "technical capacity for journalists."270 Jank
participated in numerous Brazilian public-private trade research networks
and helped catalyze the creation of the Trade Negotiations Study Group
examined above. 2 71 The institute became a major presence both in Brazil
and internationally for its work and was frequently cited in the Brazilian
and international media and invited to present at symposia around the
world.
2 7 2
ICONE, in particular, has provided crucial support for the government
in Doha Round negotiations as part of an internal Brazilian working group
in which Jank served as a special assistant to the Minister of Agriculture. It
267. See MARCOS SAWAYAJANK & ANDRE MELONi NASSAR, ICONE, REPORT OF ACTIVITIES:
MARCH 2003 THROUGH MARCH 2007, at 3 (2007), available at http://www.
iconebrasil.org.br/arquivos/projeto/20.pdf. ICONE also receives funding from foreign
development agencies and foundations for specific projects. See id.; see also Inst. for Int'l
Trade Relations, ICONE Sponsors, http://www.iconebrasil.org.br/en/?actA=3&arealD=
4&secaolD=12 (last visited May 26, 2008).
268. See Marcos Sawaya Jank, The FTAA and Agriculture in Brazil-U.S. Relations,
Address Before the Brazil and the FTAA Seminar (Oct. 23-24, 2001), available at http://
www.netamericas.net/Researchpapers/Documents/Jank/Jankl.pdf. In June 2007, Jank
left ICONE to become President and CEO of UNICA, the sugar cane trade association.
Monica Scaramuzzo, Uniao da Industria da Cana-de-Acucar Trabalha na Abertura de Mer-
cados, NOTICIAS FINANCIERAS, June 26, 2007, at 1.
269. See JANK & NASSAR, supra note 267, at 5.
270. Id.
271. See supra note 267 and accompanying text.
272. JANK & NASSAR, supra note 267. ICONE's report for its first four years of opera-
tion (2003-2007) states that during this period, "the Institute produced 65 specialized
publications (57 in Portuguese and 18 in English), 19 working papers and 78 articles
published in Brazilian and international press." Id. (translation by authors). It further
states that "ICONE was invited to give 286 presentations, 197 in Brazil and 89 abroad,"
and that it "prepared 62 confidential technical papers and simulations for the Brazilian
government." Id. (translation by authors). The report notes that "172 different national
and international media outlets published reports mentioning ICONE." Id. (translation
by authors).
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generated key econometric simulation analyses of the impact on Brazil of
different methodologies for tariff and subsidy reductions. These analyses
were instrumental in the development of Brazil's negotiating positions, and
they provided the analytic heft for the G-20 in the Doha Round agricultural
negotiations. Because of its negotiating leadership and the sophistication
of its analyses, Brazil became part of the "G-4" group of WTO members
together with the United States, the European Union, and India, which
played the key role in setting the framework for the Doha Round agricul-
tural negotiations.2
73
DATAGRO has focused most of its expertise on one key sector of Bra-
zilian agribusiness. It is the leading Brazilian consulting firm for market
analysis of the domestic and foreign sugar, ethanol, and biofuels sectors.
Founded in 1984 by the U.S.-trained economist Plinio Nastari, it consists
of a group of economists, statisticians, and consultants who provide global
market analysis and statistical studies for companies and government min-
istries in Brazil and abroad. 27 4 It has become particularly active in interna-
tional consulting for the global biofuels market, which represents
significant export potential for Brazilian sugar producers. 2 75 Like ICONE,
DATAGRO has provided analyses for the government and private sector for
the WTO Doha Round negotiations.2 76 Particularly noteworthy for this
study, DATAGRO produced the econometric analysis for Brazil and the
sugar sector in the EC-Sugar case and provided further technical support in
the EC-Bananas arbitration and the EC-Tyres cases. 27 7 It also has helped to
coordinate Brazilian ethanol companies' defenses in U.S. anti-dumping and
countervailing duty investigations. 27 3 As a result, DATAGRO has become
an important player in Brazilian public-private partnerships for trade nego-
tiations and trade litigation.
Prospectiva Consulting Firm, like ICONE, is a creation of the early
2000s, formed in 2001 to help Brazilian companies strategize in response
273. For example, Brazil was central to creating the "July Framework" for agricultural
trade negotiations in 2004. See Ernesto Zedillo, Summer of Setbacks, FORBES, Aug. 13,
2007, at 31; see also Wolfe, supra note 17, at 192; Robert Wolfe, New Groups in the WTO
Agricultural Trade Negotiations: Power, Learning and Institutional Design (Can. Agric.
Trade Pol'y Res. Network Paper No. CP 2006-2, May 2006), available at http://
www.uoguelph.ca/-catprn/PDF/commissioned-paper 2006-2.pdf (discussing the Doha
Round and the Five Interested Parties, which consisted of the G-4 plus Australia).
274. See Todd Benson, More Brazilian Drivers Turn to Ethanol, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2004, at W1; DATAGRO, http://www.datagro.com/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
Datagro's President Plinio Nastari received his Ph.D. in agricultural economics from
Iowa State in 1983. See infra note 313 and accompanying text.
275. See DATAGRO, supra note 274.
276. See Gordon Feller, Regions: Middle East and Africa- Thinking Beyond Oil, FOREIGN
DIRECT INVESTMENT, Feb. 1, 2008, at 1.
277. Interviews by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian officials, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs [names withheld] (Apr. 20, 2004) (on file with authors) (confirming that
DATAGRO provided key technical support in the EC-Sugar case); see also DATAGRO,
supra note 274.
278. See Interviews by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian officials, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs [names withheld] (Apr. 20, 2004) (on file with authors).
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to the globalized business environment.2 79 Prospectiva has since become
one of the leading Brazilian business consultants for trade and investment-
related matters, specializing in the services sectors. 280 It counsels Brazil-
ian companies regarding their international strategies and foreign compa-
nies regarding the Brazilian market. It has advised Brazilian companies
and the government in the development of trade negotiating positions, spe-
cializing in trade in services, a domain in which public-private coordina-
tion in trade policy has been underdeveloped. Prospectiva has also
prepared economic analysis for anti-dumping cases.
Brazilian think tanks are organized on a non-profit basis as well, many
of which we have covered earlier. Some are linked to universities, while
others are independent. The Brazilian Center of International Relations
(Centro Brasileiro de Relacoes Internacionais, CEBRI), founded in 1998 in
Rio de Janeiro by a group of intellectuals, business leaders, government
authorities, and academics, aims to be the most important Brazilian think
tank on international affairs, modeling itself in some ways on the U.S.
Council of Foreign Relations. 28 1 CEBRI sponsors research programs and
commissions studies on a broad range of international issues, including
trade issues involving the WTO, FTAA, and Mercosur. 28 2 In conjunction,
it organizes roundtables, symposia, and debates with partner institutions,
such as ICONE, regarding trade negotiations. 28 3 The center is sponsored
by the largest exporting companies in Brazil, such as Companhia Vale do
Rio Doce, Embraer, and Petrobras, as well as by international foundations,
such as the Ford Foundation, and private law firms, such as Veirano &
Advogados and Pinheiro Neto Advogados. Its leadership includes impor-
tant Brazilian public figures, such as its Honorary President, Fernando
Henrique Cardoso, former President of Brazil; its President, Jose Botafogo
Gon~alves, former Minister of Development and Ambassador to Mercosur;
and its founding Vice-President, Luiz Felipe Lampreia, former Minister of
Foreign Affairs and Ambassador to the WTO.2 8 4
279. See Prospectiva, Prospectiva-Consultoria Barsileira de Assuntos Internationais,
http://www.prospectiva.consultoria.com.br/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2008). Prospectiva
provides analysis of market access and market development strategies, advice about
trade negotiations and business strategies in response to their projected outcomes, coun-
sel on the development of international supply chains, evaluation of customs matters,
and economic advice in anti-dumping and safeguard cases. See Prospectiva, Prospec-
tiva-Services, http://www.prospectivaconsultoria.com.br/eng/quem.asp#nossa (last
visited Mar. 14, 2008).
280. Mendes Interview, supra note 130.
281. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with leading representative of the Brazilian pri-
vate sector [name withheld], in Sao Paulo, Braz. (Apr. 2004) (on file with authors). One
interviewee noted that CEBRI would like to see itself as a counterpart of the U.S. Council
of Foreign Relations, but that it had not attained such status within Brazil.
282. See Centro Brasileiro de Relacoes Internacionais (CEBRI), http://www.cebri.org.
br/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
283. See e.g., CENTRO BRASILEIRO DE RELACOES INTERNACIONAIS, 4 - CuRsO SOBRE COMIR-
CIO E NEGOCIACOES INTERNACIONAIS PARA JORNALISTAS (2007), available at http://
www.cebri.org.br/pdf/401PDF.pdf.
284. See CENTRO BRASILEIRO DE RELACOES INTERNACIONAIS, http://www.cebri.org.br/
(last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
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Trade concerns have also generated considerable civil society contes-
tation in Brazil, as represented by the Porto Alegre World Social Forum
movement and its opposition to neoliberalism. As Veiga writes, the FTAA
negotiations triggered "the mobilization of civil society ... [which] reached
new heights and imposed a set of new mechanisms for consultation and
dialogue between State and civil society, a process pioneered by the busi-
ness sector, followed by NGOs. ''285 The result was a relative increase in
government transparency and access for these groups involving a "consis-
tent trend towards the diversification and 'intensiveness' of the channels of
consultation and position-building between the State and different groups
of civil society in the area of trade negotiations. '28 6
Brazilian NGOs have organized and coordinated to enhance their abil-
ity to engage with the government over trade policy. In 2001, key Brazilian
NGOs created a new institutional body to coordinate positions over inter-
national trade matters. They formed the Brazilian Network for the Integra-
tion of Peoples (Rede Brasileira pela Integra~do dos Povos, REBRIP), a
coalition based in Rio de Janeiro of approximately thirty-five NGOs that
include major Brazilian trade unions and social movement organiza-
tions.28 7 REBRIP's goal is to coordinate civil society positions regarding
existing and proposed trade agreements, building on analyses of the social
impacts of trade agreements in Brazil, in particular in relation to labor,
agriculture, the environment, intellectual property, services, and invest-
ment. REBRIP gained greater access to government officials and interna-
tional fora under the Lula government. In November 2003, its
285. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 173.
The FTAA negotiations resulted in greater politicization of trade policy within Brazil.
See HIRST, supra note 58, at 30; Hurrell, supra note 58, at 103 (noting that "there has
been considerable grassroots opposition (including within and around the Workers
Party)" to the FTAA).
286. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 173.
The only formal institutionalization of consultation with civil society organizations
nonetheless is under Mercosur where the member governments created a Social-Eco-
nomic Consultative Forum (Foro Consultivo EconOmico e Social) to engage with civil soci-
ety. Id. at 172. In contrast, the FTAA created a Committee of Government
Representatives on the Participation of Civil Society, which encouraged "sectors of civil
societies to present their views on trade matters in a constructive manner." See Summit
of the Americas Information Network, Open Invitation to Civil Society in FTAA Partici-
pating Countries, http://www.summit-americas.org/civilsociety-invitation.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 20, 2008). The Brazilian government created a National Coordination Unit on
FTAA-Related Issues (Sedo Nacional da Alca) to organize numerous meetings and semi-
nars regarding the FTAA for civil society representatives. See Free Trade Area of the
Americas (FTAA), http://www.ftaa-alca.org/SPCOMM/SOC/cs24rl e.asp (last visited
Mar. 20, 2008).
287. REBRIP was formalized as an organization under Brazilian law in 2001, but the
NGOs first informally agreed to coordinate their positions through it in 1998. See Veiga,
Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 165; Rede
Brasileira pela lntegragdo dos Povos (REBRIP), Apresenta¢do, http://www.rebrip.org.br/
rebrip/pagina.php?id=616 (last visited Mar. 20, 2008). Veiga notes how Brazilian labor
follows trade negotiations largely through REBRIP. Id. at 164 (noting how the biggest
trade union confederation, Central Unica dos Trabalhadores, "accompanies the trade
negotiations, and especially the FTAA negotiations, through REBRIP, although it
manifests its specific positions publicly at critical moments of the negotiations").
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representatives were included in Brazil's delegation to the FTAA negotia-
tions in Miami. 2
88
Like the Brazilian Business Coalition, REBRIP represents an "institu-
tional novelty" in Brazil. Mobilized by the FTAA negotiations, Brazilian
civil society organizations for the first time created an institutional struc-
ture that has "focused essentially on trade negotiations. '289 Although
REBRIP's members generally have opposed trade liberalization initiatives,
there are divisions within REBRIP that the institution aims to resolve in
order to form coordinated, common positions so that civil society organiza-
tions can be proactive instead of purely defensive. 290 REBRIP is particu-
larly active in debates over the effects of international intellectual property
rights, such as under the TRIPs Agreement, on access to medicines in
developing countries. It has sought to mobilize civil society against the
further strengthening of intellectual property rights through new intellec-
tual property chapters in regional and bilateral trade agreements, such as
the FTAA and the EU-Mercosur FTA. Although REBRIP focuses greater
attention on trade negotiations than trade disputes, it also supports the
government when Brazil is a respondent in WTO cases that raise social
policy concerns. For instance, REBRIP strongly supported the govern-
ment's positions against the EU in the Brazil-Tyres case. 29 1
In the early 2000's, as WTO negotiations and litigation intensified and
knowledge of the WTO system spread in Brazil, a new niche opened for
academic study and private legal and consulting work, generating competi-
tion for new expertise. Private parties sought means to make use of this
new expertise, whether to obtain greater access to foreign markets or to
defend Brazilian internal policies. Today, these various groups can be
viewed as components of a small Brazilian epistemic community specializ-
ing in trade matters. Individuals are often members of more than one
group, and the groups coordinate with each other. A lawyer-doctoral stu-
dent that had an internship at the Brazilian mission in Geneva can partici-
pate in meetings of the Law Firm Study Center (CESA) as a representative
of a law firm, of symposia, and trade-related study groups to engage with
academics, as well as the Brazilian Business Coalition (CEB) in order to
engage with business representatives. Academics are active participants in
these groups, and elite law practitioners speak in courses and at academic
colloquia, especially those organized in Sjo Paulo.2 92 These groups, as a
result, often co-sponsor and attend each other's events, facilitating group
288. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 167.
289. Id. at 164-66, 172. The FTAA negotiations resulted in greater politicization of
trade policy within Brazil. See HIRST, supra note 58, at 30; Hurrell, supra note 58, at 103
(noting that "there has been considerable grassroots opposition (including within and
around the Workers Party)" to the FTAA).
290. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 167.
291. See, e.g., Rede Brasileira pela Integra~do dos Povos (REBRIP), Declaracao tribunal
sobre pneus reformados na OMC, http://www.rebrip.org.br/_rebrip/pagina.php?id=880
(last visited Mar. 20, 2008).
292. Initiatives outside of SAo Paulo are less developed, but dispute settlement study
groups were formed in Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, and Belo Horizonte.
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interaction. Over time, individuals develop careers in trade policy and
trade law as they move among firms and between the private and public
sectors. The trade law academic Welber Barral, for example, moved from
being a trade law professor at the Universidade Federal de Santa Catarina
in Florian6polis to become Secretary of the Department of Foreign Trade in
the Ministry of Development. Christian Lohbauer moved from head of the
department of foreign affairs at the Industry Federation of the State of Sao
Paulo, to lead the international department of the City of Sao Paulo, and
then become President of the Brazilian poultry trade association, ABEF.
Pablo Bentes, after working as a lawyer in Washington, D.C., became an
associate at the law firm of Machado, Meyer, Sendacz e Opice in Sao Paulo
and then in 2006, joined the Legal Affairs Division of the WTO secretariat,
where he joined another Brazilian, Lauro Locks.
These groups and individuals also form part of transnational episte-
mic trade policy networks and therefore are well-positioned to act as
intermediaries between the international and national levels. To give just a
few examples of a general pattern, the founders of the agribusiness think
tank ICONE, Marcos Jank, and of the Rio-based international relations
think tank CEBRI, Jose Botafogo Gon~alves, have close ties with interna-
tional trade policy leaders around the world. 293 Mario Marconini, the for-
mer International Trade Secretary in the Ministry of Development who had
worked at the GATT and WTO, now leads the Sao Paulo office of a Wash-
ington, D.C.-based consulting firm. Members of the Dispute Settlement
Study Group (NESC) have worked with the Geneva-based organizations
UNCTAD and the International Centre on Trade and Sustainable Develop-
ment (ICTSD) to coordinate conferences and publications concerning
WTO dispute settlement, competition policy, intellectual property, and
other trade-related matters. A large number of the former interns at the
Geneva mission have received advanced degrees or fellowships from lead-
ing universities in the United States and Europe, including the law schools
of Paris I, Cambridge, Georgetown, and New York University, and some of
them have worked in U.S. law firms.
REBRIP has worked closely with Doctors Without Borders and Oxfam
on intellectual property-related issues, as has the Institute on International
Trade Law and Development (IDCID) at the University of Sao Paulo. The
Ford Foundation has helped to fund the work of a large number of these
organizations, including the University of Sao Paulo think tanks IDCID and
CAENI, the Rio-based think tank CEBRI, and the NGO network REBRIP.
By linking with international networks, these individuals and groups are
empowered to act as intermediaries between the national and international
realms in the field of international trade law and policy. Through their
national and international network connections, they are better able to
inform themselves of developments at home and abroad, which in turn
293. As noted above, Jank has now become President of UNICA, the Brazilian sugar
trade association. See supra note 268. Gonalves was a "board founder" of CEBRI. See
text accompanying notes 280-83.
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facilitates their ability to provide input into Brazilian policy debates and
represent Brazilian perspectives in international fora.
Bruce Carruthers and Terry Halliday have typologized intermediaries
between the national and international levels in terms of their competen-
cies, power, and loyalty. 29 4 Intermediaries may, for example, have greater
competence in economic or legal expertise, have variable power to translate
international scripts into national contexts, and have variable loyalties to
actors at the national and international levels. Carruthers and Halliday's
study focuses primarily on the translation of global bankruptcy norms into
national environments. In contrast, this article has addressed the recipro-
cal interaction of law and politics at the national and international levels.
We, thus, have also examined how national actors use their expertise to
advance their national, corporate, or other interests at the international
level. In terms of loyalty, Brazilian individuals who develop the relevant
expertise can work for the Brazilian government, Brazilian industries, for-
eign governments, or foreign industries, whether in WTO cases where Bra-
zil is a claimant or respondent, or in Brazilian anti-dumping and other
import-relief cases. Overall, they have brought more of a Brazilian perspec-
tive to the international level, and more of a cosmopolitan one within
Brazil.
IV. The Brazilian Approach Applied: Mechanisms Used in Specific
WTO Cases
We now move from our broader assessment of what lies behind Bra-
zil's engagement and highly touted success in the WTO to take a closer
look at the public-private coordinating mechanisms that Brazil has applied
as a complainant, respondent, and third party in specific WTO cases. The
willingness of Brazil's private sector to organize, engage with the govern-
ment, and fund outside counsel has been critical to Brazil's successful use
of the dispute settlement system.2 95 Brazil's strategies have nonetheless
varied as a function of whether it is a complainant, respondent, or third
party and whether the private sector is able and willing to fund a foreign or
Brazilian law firm to assist the government in its preparation of Brazil's
positions and legal submissions. Over time, Brazil's relatively active use of
the WTO dispute settlement system has led to a gradual institutionalization
of its handling of cases.
294. See Carruthers & Halliday, supra note 8, 529-32.
295. For example, a representative to the WTO from Argentina echoed the views of
many other developing country representatives in stating that it "had been difficult to
convince constituents to pay for legal counsel." Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with
Argentine Representative to the WTO [name withheld], at Sdo Paulo, Braz. (July 22,
2005) (on file with authors). According to this official, the government has "ideas for
cases, but they can only be done if the private sector created the pressure on the govern-
ment. And the private sector is not aware of how to use the WTO dispute settlement
system ... of the tools offered by the dispute settlement system." Id.
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A. Brazil as Complainant
Following Brazil's complaints against the U.S. cotton and EU sugar
subsidy regimes in 2002, commentators have highlighted how a developing
country like Brazil can make effective use of the WTO legal system.29
6
Nevertheless, it took time for Brazil, one of the largest developing coun-
tries, to build the confidence and capacity to bring these cases. Brazil
approached its first cases before the more judicialized WTO dispute settle-
ment system much as it had approached its GATT cases, changing neither
the structure of its mission in Geneva nor that of its Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. It had no specialized bureaucratic unit to work on dispute settle-
ment issues and had developed no systematic reflex to seek complemen-
tary assistance from the private sector to fund private law firm support.
Brazil's first WTO case as a complainant, United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (WT/DS4), filed in 1995, involved
different U.S. regulatory requirements for foreign and domestic reformu-
lated gasoline. 297 The U.S. regulations affected one of Brazil's largest
exporters, the state-owned company Petrobras, and Venezuela had already
filed a WTO complaint against the U.S. regulations, spurred by its own
state-owned oil company. It was fairly clear that the U.S. regulations in
question were discriminatory, as demonstrated by U.S. Congressional
records that the resulting panel decision cited.298 Therefore, Brazil's WTO
filing was easy to justify. Petrobras hired a Washington, D.C.-based law
296. See, e.g., Davey, supra note 16.
297. See Appellate Body, United States- Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); Panel Report, United States-Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R Uan. 29, 1996).
298. Appellate Body, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gas-
oline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); Panel Report, United States-Standards for Refor-
mulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996). The complaints brought
by Brazil and Venezuela concerned a rule promulgated by the Environmental Protection
Agency ("the Gasoline Rule") pursuant to a 1990 amendment to the Clean Air Act
§ 211(k), 42 U.S.C. § 7545(k) (2006). The EPA was charged with determining the speci-
fications of gasoline with respect to individual refiners, blenders, and importers. Appel-
late Body, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/
DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996); Panel Report, United States- Standards for Reformulated and
Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996). The resulting Gasoline Rule allowed
certain entities, including domestic refiners, to establish individual baselines for per-
formance while others, including most importers, were automatically assigned a more
stringent statutory baseline. Panel Report, US-Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, 1[1 2.5-2.8, WT/DS2/R (Jan. 29, 1996). Venezuela and Brazil argued
that the rule discriminated against imported gasoline. The complainants cited public
statements of U.S. officials, which "showed that the Gasoline Rule discriminated both in
effect and in intent against foreign refiners." Id. at 3.13. Brazil, for example, pointed
to an official's testimony to a congressional subcommittee that "on its face, the [Gasoline
Rule] subjects imported gasoline to different rules than those applied [to] domestically
refined reformulated gasoline, and it does pose an unmistakable GATT question. This
issue was under discussion within the U.S. government for more than a year and recog-
nized as a serious potential issue." Second Written Submission of Brazil, US- Standards
for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2, WT/DS4 (Sept. 13, 1995) (quot-
ing Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. 66 (June 22, 1994) (statement of Ira S.
Shapiro, General Counsel, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep.).
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firm, Mudge Rose, to advise it on the U.S. regulations and WTO options
and to work with Brazilian diplomats in the preparation of written submis-
sions and communications to the WTO Panel and Appellate Body, includ-
ing statements for the oral hearings.2 99 Although Petrobras funded the
preparation of the case, the amount of preparation more closely resembled
that used in late GATT cases than what was to come. 30
0
The Canada-Aircraft and Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Air-
craft cases, involving Embraer and Bombardier, were landmark cases in
terms of the intensity with which Brazilian officials worked with law firms
that Embraer hired in a public-private partnership for WTO litigation.
The WTO legal culture had changed following the "scorched earth" litiga-
tion tactics that the United States used in the EC-Bananas and EC-Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products Meat (Hormones) cases, intensifying the
demands for and on lawyers. 3 0 1 In the words of one Washington counsel
handling WTO cases, the legal complexities involved in the aircraft cases
were "light years away" from the GATT. 30 2 The aircraft cases, as a result,
were the first in which outside U.S. lawyers attended the panel hearings as
part of the Brazilian delegation. There was no longer any pretense that this
was simply a state-to-state dispute to be resolved with the assistance of a
quasi-legal process where diplomats presented their positions to a panel of
other diplomats.
Embraer, with its large international market share for medium-size
civil aircraft, represented a crown jewel for Brazil's industrial policy. Thus,
the case was of critical importance for the government. Embraer's experi-
ence in international markets and its close ties with the government
favored the formation of a public-private partnership, both as respondent
and complainant in the WTO litigation.30 3 Embraer had the financial
capacity to hire U.S. legal counsel to respond to Canada's legal challenge
against Brazil. Embraer engaged David Palmeter and his team of lawyers,
which started at Graham & James and then switched to Powell Goldstein,
to help the government prepare the legal submissions. A key part of Bra-
zil's response was to commence a WTO complaint against Canada's subsi-
299. Interviews by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian diplomats, Brazil Mission to the
WTO [names withheld], in Geneva, Switz. (June 2006) (on file with authors); Interviews
by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian diplomats, in Brasilia, Braz. (Apr. 2006) (on file
with authors) [hereinafter Brazilian Diplomats Interview]. These Brazilian diplomats
worked in the Brazilian Embassy at the time of the case.
300. Washington Counsel Interview, supra note 95 (noting the statement of a former
USTR official who found, in terms of legal practice, that US- Reformulated Gasoline was
"the last GATT case").
301. The term "scorched earth" was used by a trade law attorney in a discussion with
Gregory C. Shaffer in February 2008.
302. Washington Counsel Interview, supra note 95. Similarly, Gary Horlick, who has
worked on GATT and WTO cases, first at O'Melveny & Myers and then at Wilmer Cutler
& Pickering, refers to WTO and GATT disputes as "two different worlds." Horlick Inter-
view, supra note 16.
303. Embraer, Annual Report 2001, http://www.embraer.com/relatoriosanuais/
relatorio-2001/eng/index.htm (last visited May 25, 2008). Embraer was a state-owned
company until 1994. Id. Former Brazilian Foreign Minister and WTO ambassador Lam-
preia became a member of its Board of Directors in 2001. Id.
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dization of Embraer's rival Bombardier, for which Embraer also hired
Canadian consultants. 30 4
On the Brazilian government's side, the Embraer cases were handled
almost completely out of its Geneva diplomatic office with no structure of
support from the Brazilian capital. The outside lawyers' work was overseen
by Roberto Carvalho de Azevdo, a diplomat, who in turn was supervised
by the Ambassador at the Geneva Mission, Celso Lafer. 30 5 Lafer had been
a professor of law at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil's flagship univer-
sity.30 6 This highly technical, time-demanding experience would spur gov-
ernment and private efforts toward more systematized public-private
coordination initiatives for trade dispute settlement and in particular, the
government's creation of a specialized Dispute Settlement Unit in Brasilia,
an internship program for private Brazilian attorneys organized at Brazil's
Geneva mission, and many of the dispute settlement research groups and
networks organized in major cities in Brazil that we examined in Part III.C.
By the time Brazil brought the U.S.-Cotton and EC-Sugar complaints in
September 2002 against the United States and the European Union respec-
tively, it had developed significant dispute settlement experience. These
two cases, however, were considerably more factually intensive than the
complaints Brazil had filed before. Without the private sector's initiative
and support, it is unlikely that Brazil would have brought them. The com-
plaints thus exemplify how a country can work with its private sector and
with lawyers hired by it to bring and win an extremely complex and strate-
gically important WTO case, with significant international political
implications.
The major challenge for Brazil in the U.S.-Cotton case was to gather the
required factual evidence and economic and legal expertise. 30 7 The gov-
ernment would not do so without private sector support, and the Brazilian
cotton sector consisted of many producers, of varying size, with limited
capacity to address international trade issues. Therefore, the producers
had to be convinced to coordinate and pool their resources through a trade
association in order to help pay for outside legal and economic consul-
tants. A former secretary of agricultural policy in the Brazilian Ministry of
Agriculture, Pedro de Camargo Neto, played an important catalyzing role
in the case, working as a consultant to the cotton sector, among others,
304. Washington Counsel Interview, supra note 95. The law firms assisted Brazil in
its complaint against Canada (WT/DS70) and in its defense in Canada's complaint
against Brazil (WT/DS46). Id. Palmeter and the international trade practice group in
Powell Goldstein joined Sidley Austin near the end of the cases, which had a conflict of
interest. Id. The last stage of the cases involved requests by both sides for authorization
to suspend WTO concessions because of non-compliance by the other with the WTO
ruling against it. Id. Embraer thus had to seek other outside counsel. Id.
305. Interviews by Michelle Ratton Sanchez & Barbara Rosenberg with Brazilian offi-
cials [names withheld], in Brasilia, Braz. (Jan. -Sept. 2005) (on file with authors); see also
William J. Davey, Introduction: Mini-Symposium on the Consultative Board's Report on the
Future of the WTO, 8 J. INT'L ECON. L. 591, 591 (2005) (noting Lafer's background).
306. Id.
307. For an excellent overview of the case, see Goldberg et al., supra note 188.
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after he left the government.30 8 Private attorneys assured the producers
and the government of the legal merits of the case, and together they col-
lected the financial resources required.30 9 With this funding, the produc-
ers hired the U.S. law firm Sidley Austin to provide support to the
government for the litigation.3 10 In particular, the law firm would help
prepare the legal submissions, attend the hearings, and help the govern-
ment respond to questions that the panel and the Appellate Body posed.
Daniel Sumner, a U.S. economist at the University of California at Davis
who had previously worked for the U.S. Department of Agriculture, worked
with Sidley Austin to provide the economic analysis and explanations of
the formula that the U.S. government used to subsidize its cotton farmers
and to assess the impact on global prices and trade that these practices
had. Mr. Sumner's study showed that U.S. subsidies significantly affected
international cotton trade, causing "serious prejudice" in the words of the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. 3 1 1 Although
the case was costly, the public-private coordination worked. The U.S. law
308. See id. Goldberg et al. note how de Camargo Neto went from being President of
the Brazilian Rural Society to Deputy Minister in the Ministry of Agriculture to a consult-
ant. Id. As Deputy Minister, he "had this idea to do dispute cases" and thought first of a
case against U.S. soybean subsidies before turning to a challenge of cotton subsidies
after prices in the world soy market rose so that U.S. soy farmers were no longer eligible
for large subsidies and "the soybean case disappeared." Id. at 240-41. Camargo Neto
was Secretary of Production and Trade in the Ministry of Agriculture of Brazil, where he
was responsible for agriculture negotiations at the WTO, the Free Trade Area of the
Americas, the MERCOSUR-EC Free Trade Agreement, and other bilateral agreements.
Camargo Neto served as president of the Sociedade Rural Brasileira from 1990 to 1993
and founded and was president of Fundo de Desenvolvimento da Pecuaria de Sio Paulo
(FUNDEPEC) from 1991 to 2000.
309. The actual amount of the costs may have exceeded $2 million. Interview by
Gregory C. Shaffer with private lawyer [name withheld] (July 20, 2005) (on file with
authors) (noting a figure of $2 million); see also Elizabeth Becker, Lawmakers Voice
Doom and Gloom on W.T.O. Ruling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28, 2004, at C1, C7 ("[T]he litiga-
tion has already cost $1 million."). A major Brazilian newspaper reported, at one point,
that funding of the law firm was collected from: (i) the cotton producers in the amount
of R$300 000 (U.S. $130,000), (ii) the Export Promotion Agency (Ag~ncia de Promocdo
de Exporta 6es) in the amount of R$200 000 (U.S. $ 86,000), and (iii) amounts col-
lected from a lottery sale in the amount of R$1.2 million (U.S. $520,000). Produtores de
algodao fazem rifa para bancar painel na OMC, ESTADO DE SAO PAULO, Sept. 18, 2003,
available at http://www.comexnet.com.br/noticom.asp?paNumero=4215.
310. Washington Counsel Interview, supra note 95. Sidley's team had come from
Powell Goldstein, which had helped to litigate the Embraer case. Id.
311. See generally Goldberg et al., supra note 188, at 7. Sumner's study showed that
without the subsidies, the United States "would have shipped about 41 percent less cot-
ton abroad; [which] would have raised the world price about 12.6 percent." See Paul
Blustein, In U.S.: Cotton Cries Betrayal, WASH. POST, May 12, 2004, at El. Sumner was
considered a traitor by U.S. cotton interests. Id. "[Sumner] joined forces with the enemy
to cut the heart out of our farm program," said Don Cameron, Vice Chairman of the
California Cotton Growers Association and chairman of the California Tomato Growers
Association, Inc. Id. Cameron said "such an act was 'unethical' because Sumner is an
employee of California's public university system." Id. Cameron continued, "[T]here are
research projects that he's been involved with in the past that we'll direct elsewhere." Id.
Earl P. Williams, President of the California Cotton Growers Association, asserted, "If
this was governmental or military related, it might be called treason and court martial
proceedings would be in order." Id.
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firm and Mr. Sumner did the majority of the work, this time overseen by
the Dispute Settlement Unit in Brasilia, given that Brazil now had a dedi-
cated group in its capital.3 12
In the EC-Sugar case, Sidley Austin again was hired by the private sec-
tor as the external law firm, but it worked this time with the Brazilian eco-
nomic consulting firm DATAGRO. DATAGRO, led by Plinio Natari, a U.S.-
trained economist, specializes in sugar and ethanol market analysis. 3 13 It
was the first time that a Brazilian consulting firm was used for a WTO
dispute. The law firm and economic consultants again worked with the
government but were funded by the private sector, this time by the Sao
Paulo-based sugar cane association UNICA. Former government officials,
including Elisabeth Serodio, who alternated working for UNICA and in
government agencies, assisted UNICA. The resulting public-private part-
nership was composed of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Dispute Settle-
ment Unit in Brasilia, the Brazilian mission in Geneva, the team of lawyers
from Sidley Austin, and DATAGRO's team of economic consultants. 3 14
DATAGRO would again provide technical analytic support in the EC-
Bananas arbitration regarding the EU's revised bananas import regime and
the Brazil-Tyres case.3 15
Brazil also became the first developing country and to our knowledge,
remains the only developing country in which a domestic law firm was
hired to work with the government in a litigated WTO dispute without the
additional participation of a U.S. or European law firm. 3 16 The Brazilian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs worked with a lawyer in a Sao Paulo-based law
firm, Veirano & Advogados, in two successful WTO cases involving Brazil-
ian exports of poultry, brought against Argentina (WT/DS241) and the EC
(WT/DS269). 3 17 In these cases, the Brazilian Poultry Association (Associa-
do Brasileira dos Produtores Exportadores de Frango) funded Veirano &
312. The work of the legal interns at the Brazilian mission in Geneva was reportedly
also helpful in providing backup support, as they helped to collect, process, and organ-
ize information in Geneva, including archival research in the WTO library on the negoti-
ating history of relevant texts. Brazilian Diplomats Interview, supra note 299.
313. Id. For more on DATAGRO, see supra Part III.C.4.
314. The Brazilian Geneva mission was also in contact with Brazil's mission in Brus-
sels, Belgium regarding the operation of the EU's sugar subsidy program.
315. See DATAGRO, supra note 274.
316. When China hires foreign law firms, it requires them to work with a Chinese law
firm so that the domestic law firms can build expertise. The Chinese law firm may, in
particular, provide and coordinate translation services. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer
with a U.S. attorney who has worked with China in this capacity [name withheld], in
Sao Paulo, Braz. (June 23, 2006) (on file with authors). China also solicits bids from
Chinese law firms in Beijing to provide assistance in the drafting of the legal brief in
cases in which it is a third party. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with member, Minis-
try of Foreign Trade and Econ. Cooperation [name withheld] (Feb. 2006) (on file with
authors). In addition, there appear to be recent developments in India in which Indian
lawyers work with the Indian government in some WTO cases, but the government has
consistently hired the Advisory Centre on WTO Law for WTO disputes. E-mail from
Indian attorney [name withheld], to Gregory C. Shaffer, Professor of Law, Loyola Uni-
versity Chicago Law School (Mar. 15, 2008) (on file with authors).
317. Argentina-Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil, WT/DS241;
EC- Customs Classification of Frozen Boneless Chicken, WT/DS269.
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Advogados in S~o Paulo to help the Ministry of Foreign Affairs defend its
and Brazil's interests.3 18 The WTO panel and Appellate Body ruled in Bra-
zil's favor in both poultry cases in 2003 and 2005.
The lead lawyer at Veirano & Advogados, Ana Caetano, had received
an LLM degree at Georgetown University Law Center and worked in Wash-
ington, D.C. for the law firm O'Melveny & Myers in which she gained
expertise in trade law matters. 3 19 Caetano also handled the EC-Soluble
Coffee complaint after she returned to Brazil from working with O'Melveny
& Myers, where she had worked on a related matter. 320 ABICS, Brazil's
soluble coffee industry association, funded the case on account of the
impact of the EU measures on its exports. Brazil successfully settled the
case for ABICS only days after filing its complaint in October 2000, and the
European Union granted Brazilian coffee a larger quota under the EU's
preferential import system.3 2 1 Similarly, the Brazilian law firm of
Machado, Meyer, Sendacz e Opice worked with the government in the EC-
Bananas arbitration, funded by Del Monte, the largest exporter of bananas
from Brazil.3 22 These examples show how Brazil has broadened its inter-
318. Caetano Interview, supra note 201. ABEF issued a call for bids from Brazilian
law firms and selected Veirano Advogados. Id.
319. Id. Ana Caetano had worked with Gary Horlick for almost four years at
O'Melveny and Myers. Id. She moved to Brazil at the end of 2000, shortly after the
settlement of the soluble coffee case. Id.
320. Id. The 2000 complaint followed an earlier one also brought by Brazil against
the European Union's system of preferences program. Id. Caetano had worked with the
lead lawyer at O'Melveny & Myers in this complaint, EC-Measures Affecting Differential
and Favourable Treatment of Coffee, WT/DS154, brought by Brazil against the European
Union. Id.
321. See Alter, supra note 96 (concerning the 2000 soluble coffee case); Caetano Inter-
view, supra note 201; infra Annex I. The case anticipated India's later challenge of the
EU's enhanced preferences program for selected countries engaged in combating drug
production. See Appellate Body Report, EC- Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Prefer-
ences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004). For an overview of the
case, see Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the GSP Case: Who
Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences: The Law and Politics of Rights, 39 J. WORLD
TRADE 977 (2005).
322. The EC- Bananas Arbitration is linked to EU compliance with the decision in the
original EC-Bananas case (WT/DS27). Brazil was among nine Latin American countries
to join WTO arbitration proceedings initiated on March 31, 2005 against the EU to
determine whether the EU's revised banana tariffs regime would maintain at least the
same market access for Brazil's bananas as under the original tariff regime. An arbitra-
tion panel ruled in favor of the complainants on August 1, 2005. The parties could not
agree on the revised tariff figure proposed by the EU in response to the August 1 arbitra-
tion ruling and on September 26, the EU asked the WTO to carry out a second arbitra-
tion review. On October 27, an arbitration panel again ruled in favor of the Latin
American exporters. Subsequent talks to resolve the issue were complicated by disagree-
ments among the Latin countries themselves. Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and Guate-
mala favored a single tariff system, albeit significantly lower than that proposed by the
EU. Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua preferred a solution within the EU's existing
quota system. See EU Asks for Second Arbitration Review by WTO on Revised Banana
Tariff Scheme, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), Sept. 29, 2005; EU, Latin American Exporters
Discuss New Banana Tariff; Latins Unimpressed, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), Dec. 22, 2005;
EU Loses Second Challenge at WTO on Banana Tariffs to Latin American Nations, INT'L
TRADE REP. (BNA), Nov. 3, 2005; WTO Arbitrators Side with Latin American Nations on
EU's Proposed Banana Import Regime, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA), Aug. 4, 2005; Three More
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nal expertise so that Brazilian private parties can obtain domestic WTO-
related legal assistance at a lower cost, whether for actual litigation or for
preparation of a complaint to facilitate a favorable settlement.3 23
Brazil, as many other WTO members, has also challenged U.S. and EU
countervailing duty and anti-dumping measures. In these cases, the gov-
ernment typically works with the law firm that assisted the industry or the
importer in the domestic proceeding. Thus, the government worked with
the Washington, D.C. law firm Wilkie Farr & Gallagher in Brazil's com-
plaints against both U.S. countervailing duties and safeguards on steel
products and the U.S. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000. As these cases all affected the steel sector, in each case, the Brazilian
Steel Institute, the trade association for Brazilian steel companies, funded
the outside law firm.3 24 Because a number of these cases involved multiple
complainants, the law firm had to coordinate positions with the representa-
tives of other WTO members. Similarly, Brazil worked with the Brussels
office of the law firm of Theodor Goddard in Brazil's complaints against
EU anti-dumping duties on malleable cast iron tube and pipe fittings. 3 25
Civil society organizations can also help a country as a complainant,
but countries have more frequently obtained their support when the coun-
try is a defendant. Non-governmental organizations, such as Oxfam, for
example, helped rally support against U.S. cotton subsidies at the time of
the U.S.-Cotton case, especially in terms of the subsidies' impact on West
African cotton farmers.3 2 6 Brazil attached a statement from Oxfam to its
legal submissions in the U.S.-Cotton case regarding the impact of the subsi-
dies on West African producers, which the panel referenced.3 27 Oxfam
also assisted Benin and Chad as third parties in the case, which referred to
Nations join WTO Case Against EU Tariff Regime on Bananas, INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA),
Apr. 7, 2005. The case then returned to litigation before a WTO panel, which expected
to issue its final report to the parties in March 2008. See Communication from Chair-
man of the Panel, EC Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/
DS27/86 (Feb. 22, 2008).
323. Although Brazilian law firms are relatively less experienced than U.S.-based
international ones in WTO disputes, the firm's fees are also lower. Interviews by Greg-
ory C. Shaffer with Brazilian lawyers [names withheld], in Sgo Paulo, Braz. (Apr. 2004)
(on file with authors).
324. Telephone Interview by Michelle Ratton Sanchez with officials, Dispute Settle-
ment Unit, Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs [names withheld], in Brasilia, Braz.
(Aug. 16, 2007) (on file with authors) [hereinafter Ratton Sanchez Ministry Interview].
On the Brazilian Steel Institute and the history of the Brazilian steel industry, see
Instituto Brasileiro de Siderurgia, http://www.ibs.org.br/ (last visited May 25, 2008).
325. Ratton Sanchez Ministry Interview, supra note 324.
326. See discussion in Goldberg et al., supra note 188, at 7.
327. See Panel Report, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/DS267/R, 1
7.54, n. 120 (Sept. 8, 2004) ("Brazil has explained the situation in Benin and/or Chad in
its further submission dated 9 September 2003 (executive summary included as Annex
E item 1) at paragraph 1; in its answers dated 27 October 2003 to questions from the
Panel at paragraphs 61, 121, 159 (see Annex I item 5); in Exhibit BRA-294, and in its
further rebuttal submission dated Nov. 18, 2003 (executive summary included as Annex
G item 1) at paragraph 87. Numerous exhibits also pertain to the cotton sectors in
Benin and/or Chad, in particular, Exhibit BRA-15, an OXFAM briefing paper, Exhibits
BRA-264 through BRA-268 and BRA-294.").
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OXFAM studies in their third party submissions that the panel cited in its
decision. 328
The private sector is not always willing to fund a case that the Foreign
Ministry believes Brazil should pursue or that it must defend as a respon-
dent, particularly cases of a systemic nature for which the Ministry believes
that it needs outside legal assistance. In 2005, the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs therefore called for bids from international law firms based in the
U.S. and in Brussels, Belgium to propose terms for assisting Brazil in these
cases. It chose Sidley Austin. The first case in which Brazil hired the firm
to assist it as a complainant without private sector funding was in Brazil's
2007 challenge to U.S. agricultural subsidies in the case United States-
Domestic Support and Export Credit Guarantees for Agricultural Products
(WT/DS365). 3 29 Brazil identified the case as one of systemic importance,
in particular, in light of developments in the Doha Round negotiations and
as a tool to exert pressure on U.S. domestic political consideration of farm
subsidies. It brought the case alongside Canada, which filed first.330
Finally, Brazil, like other countries, often successfully settles com-
plaints that it brings without litigation. Brazil's success with WTO litiga-
tion using a public-private partnership model coordinated by a specialized
dispute settlement unit has enhanced Brazil's credibility in WTO circles,
which, in turn, has arguably strengthened its hand in settlement negotia-
tions conducted in the shadow of potential litigation. Brazil settled ten of
its first twenty-three WTO complaints without litigation. The Foreign Min-
istry handled most of these cases without the assistance of an outside law
firm, but law firms advised the affected private sector and government in
some of them.33 1
328. See id. ' 7.1211, n.1330 ("According to Benin and Chad, the Oxfam
report-using data from the International Cotton Advisory Committee-estimates that in
2001 alone, sub-Saharan exporters lost $302 million as a direct consequence of United
States cotton subsidies. The Report further notes that Benin's actual cotton export earn-
ings in 2001/02 were $124 million. However, had United States subsidies been with-
drawn, Benin's export earnings are estimated to have been $157 million. Therefore, the
value lost to Benin as a result of United States subsidies was $33 million. Chad's cotton
export earnings in 2001/02 were $63 million, although in the absence of United States
subsidies, Chad would have earned $79 million, thus reflecting a loss of $16 million.
For the period from 1999/2000 to 2001/2002, Oxfam estimates a total cumulative loss
of export earnings of $61 million for Benin and $28 million for Chad. Benin and Chad
agrees with Oxfam when it emphasizes, 'the small size of several West African econo-
mies and their high levels of dependence on cotton inevitably magnify the adverse
effects of United States subsidies. For several countries, U.S. policy has generated what
can only be described as a major economic shock.'")
329. See Request for Consultations by Brazil, United States- Domestic Support and
Export Credit Guarantees for Agricultural Products, WT/DS365/1 (July 11, 2007).
330. See Brazil Prepares Canada-Like Challenge to U.S. Farm Subsidies in WTO, 25
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, July 20, 2007 ("A Brazilian official said the case is meant to exert
pressure on the U.S. at a time when the Congress is preparing a farm bill").
331. See Annex II concerning US-Equalizing Excise Tax Imposed by Florida on
Processed Orange and Grapefruit Products, WT/DS250; US-Anti-Dumping Duties on
Silicon Metal from Brazil, WT/DS239; US- US Patents Code, WT/DS224; US- Counter-
vailing Duties on Certain Carbon Steel Products from Brazil, WT/DS218; Mexico- Provi-
sional Anti-Dumping Measure on Electric Transformers, WT/DS216; EC-Measures
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B. Brazil as a Respondent
Two aspects stand out when Brazil is a respondent. First, if the com-
plaint raises social concerns, civil society activists may indirectly assist the
government in its response. Second, the private sector may be less willing
to fund a private lawyer to assist the government in a case against Brazil,
and the government has no choice but to defend it. In that case, the gov-
ernment may need to hire outside counsel on its own. As of December 31,
2007, WTO members have filed requests for consultations fourteen times
against Brazil, but only three of these complaints have been fully litigated:
Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut, the Embraer case, and the Bra-
zil-Tyres case. 332 The Brazilian government worked with private law firms
in each of the three cases in which a panel was formed, but it had to pay
the outside counsel fees in the Brazil Tyres case.
Civil society organizations can be helpful for Brazil as a respondent in
WTO cases that raise social implications. Brazil's response to the U.S.
challenge to its patent law in 2000 (WT/DS199) exemplifies both the role
that civil society organizations can play in WTO dispute settlement, as well
as the links between WTO dispute settlement, trade negotiations, and the
broader social, political, and institutional context.3 33 The United States
brought the complaint under the TRIPs Agreement against Article 68, para-
graph 1 of the Brazilian Intellectual Property Law, which requires the "local
working" of a patent-that is, the local production of a patented invention
as a condition for the recognition of an exclusive patent right.3 34 The Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs, maintaining that Brazil's intellectual property law
Affecting Soluble Coffee, WT/DS209; Turkey-Anti-Dumping Duty on Steel and Iron Pipe
Fittings, WT/DS208; Argentina- Transitional Safeguard Measures on Certain Imports of
Woven Fabric Products of Cotton and Cotton Mixtures Originating in Brazil, WT/DS190;
EC-Measures Affecting Differential and Favourable Treatment of Coffee, WT/DS154;
Peru-Countervailing Duty Investigation Against Imports of Buses from Brazil, WT/DS112.
For example, we learned that Wilkie Farr & Gallagher assisted Brazil in the Florida
excise tax case and the U.S. countervailing duty case on steel, and that O'Melveny &
Myers assisted with the first soluble coffee case. Ratton Sanchez Ministry Interview,
supra note 324.
332. Brazil won the desiccated coconut case on technical grounds, came to a draw in
the aircraft case (winning as a complainant, losing as a respondent, and then settling),
and formally lost the tires case, although the decision substantially favored Brazil as
discussed below. Embraer funded the outside lawyers in the Aircraft case and a trade
association funded them in the Desiccated Coconut case. Panel Report, Brazil- Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres, WT/DS332/R (June 12, 2007) [hereinafter Panel
Report, Brazil- Tyres]; Panel Report, Brazil- Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999); Panel Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Desiccated Coco-
nut, WT/DS22/R (Oct. 17, 1996).
333. See SUSAN ARIEL AARONSON &JAMIE M. ZIMMERMAN, TRADE IMBALANCE: THE STRUG-
GLE TO WEIGH HUMAN RIGHTS CONCERNS IN TRADE POLICYMAKING 107-10 (2008).
334. Interview by Gregory C. Shaffer with Brazilian official [name withheld], in
Geneva, Switz. (June 19, 2002). A Brazilian official alleged that the United States also
brought the case to pressure Brazil not to challenge U.S. subsidization of soybean pro-
ducers. Id. Brazil eventually did not bring the case because the world price for soybeans
increased, reducing the amount of U.S. subsidies. Id.; see Goldberg et al., supra note
188.
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was TRIPs-compliant, devised and implemented a strategic response. 3 35
NGO reactions to the case helped Brazil in its settlement negotiations with
the United States. Advocacy groups maintained that the U.S. government
had placed corporate interests above life-and-death medical concerns. 33 6
This NGO pressure was complemented by prodding from international
health and human rights organizations.3 3 7 In June 2001, the Bush admin-
istration withdrew the U.S. complaint. 33 8 The international response that
the case spurred helped shift the terms of debate over the protection of
pharmaceutical patents, strengthening Brazil's and other developing coun-
tries' negotiating position that intellectual property rules must be inter-
preted, applied, and where necessary, modified in order to grant
developing countries "flexibility" to address public health issues.33 9 These
debates ultimately gave rise to a modification of Article 31 of the TRIPs
agreement in August 2005, shortly before the WTO Ministerial Meeting in
Hong Kong.340
Brazil's response to the EU's 2005 complaint against a Brazilian ban
on the importation of retreaded tires in Brazil-Tyres provides another exam-
ple where NGOs supported Brazil in its defense, but this time the case was
fully litigated. 34 1 Brazil based its defense on the environmental and health
risks posed by the accumulation of waste tires. Brazil argued that they
increase the risk of transmission of mosquito-borne diseases, such as den-
gue fever and malaria, and of toxic emissions from tire fires. 34 2 The Brazil-
ian government indicated its interest in generating civil society support in
the case by taking "the unusual step of making all of its written submis-
sions and oral statements in the tyre dispute publicly available," both in
English and Portuguese,3 43 and by meeting with civil society organizations
335. The ministry worked without the assistance of an outside law firm, which was
not needed at least in part because the case was settled before litigation commenced.
Ratton Sanchez Ministry Interview, supra note 324.
336. The point is further developed in Shaffer, supra note 106.
337. For example, fifty-two countries of a fifty-three member United Nations Human
Rights Commission endorsed Brazil's AIDS policy and backed a resolution sponsored by
Brazil that called on all states to promote access to AIDS drugs. See UN Rights Body
Backs Brazil on AIDS Drugs, NEws24.coM, Apr. 24, 2001, http://www.news24.com/con-
tentDisplay/level4Article/0, 1113,2-1134_1014970.00.html.
338. See Notification of Mutually Agreed Solution, Brazil-Measures Affecting Patent
Protection, WT/DS199/4 (July 19, 2001); see also Shaffer, supra note 106 .
339. World Trade Org., Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2 (Dec. 20, 2001).
340. World Trade Org., General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/
641 (Dec. 8, 2005).
341. See Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Tyres, supra note 34; Panel Report, Brazil-
Tyres, supra note 332; Annex II.
342. See Panel Report, Brazil- Tyres, supra note 332, at '1 4.15-4.19.
343. See Brazil Tyres Update, BRIDGES MONTHLY REv., Sept.-Oct. 2006, at 8. This
reflects steps that the Foreign Ministry has taken to be more transparent regarding WTO
matters. A member of the Dispute Settlement Unit of Brazil's Foreign Ministry indicated
in 2004 that the Ministry was planning to make Brazil's future case submissions availa-
ble on the Ministry's website. Apr. 2004 Dispute Settlement Unit Member Interview,
supra note 180.
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concerning the case. 344 In response, NGOs came to the Brazilian govern-
ment's defense. For the first time, Brazilian NGOs filed an amicus curiae
brief before a WTO panel on behalf of Brazil, together with a U.S.-based
NGO.3 45 In support of the government's position, the NGOs helped to
spur media coverage of the case from an environmental and health perspec-
tive.3 46 Most developing countries have, in contrast, generally been wary
of enhancing transparency of the WTO "intergovernmental" dispute settle-
ment system.3
4 7
Although Brazil lost the decision, the WTO panel and Appellate Body
made a number of findings in support of Brazil's right to take the measures
in question. In particular, the Appellate Body recognized that the ban on
tires, if implemented on a non-discriminatory basis, would pass WTO scru-
tiny.3 48 The Appellate Body further indicated that WTO panels must con-
sider a developing country's regulatory capacity constraints in determining
344. See Civil Society Throws Weight Behind Brazil in Retreaded Tyres Dispute, BRIDGES
WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., July 12, 2006, at 6 (noting that "Brazilian Environment Minis-
ter Marina Silva met with civil society representatives in Geneva ... following the first
panel hearing"). The Brazilian Environment Ministry provided key support on the envi-
ronment-related issues in the case. Id.
345. The amicus curiae brief was filed by: Associa~jo de Combate aos Poluentes
(ACPO), Associa ao de Prote~ao ao Meio Ambiente de Cianorte (APROMAC), Center for
International Environmental Law (CIEL), Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente
(CEDHA), Conectas Direitos Humanos, Justi~a Global, Instituto 0 Direito por Um
Planeta Verde Planeta Verde. See Brief for Associa~do de Combate aos Poluentes (ACPO)
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Brazil- Tyres, 12 WT/DS332/AB/R (Dec.
3, 2007) [hereinafter ACPO Brief], available at http://www.ciel.org/Publications/Bra-
zilTires AmicuslI0ct07.pdf (focusing on how "tire waste and disposal is a worldwide
health and environmental problem" and discussing relevant international law on the
question, such as the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of Hazardous
Wastes and Their Disposal, the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants,
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). The Humane
Society of the United States filed a separate amicus brief that, like the ACPO Brief, sup-
ported Brazil's defense of environmental and health concerns. See Brief for Humane
Soc'y of the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Brazil- Tyres, WT/DS332/R
(June 12, 2007), available at www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/Brazil-Retreaded-Tyres-Sub-
mission-of-Non-Party-Humane-Society-International.pdf.
346. See, e.g., Juana Kweitel, 0 Caso dos Pn6us, FOLHA DE SAO PAULO, Aug. 7, 2006,
available at http://www.riosvivos.org.br/canal.php?canal=34&matid=9401; see also
Merluza Mattos, Ministerio do Meio Ambiente, ONGs pedem im do contencioso contra o
Brasil na OMC (Sept. 27, 2006), http://www.mma.gov.br/ascom/ultimas/index.cfm?id=
2830; Rede Brasileira de Justicia Ambiental, UE Quer Transformar o Brasil na OMC
(Sept. 27, 2006), http://www.justicaambiental.org.br/_justicaambiental/pagina.php?
id=858. For these and other documents regarding the case, see Trade&Environment.org,
Retreaded Tyres Case, http://www.trade-environment.org/page/theme/tewto/tyrescase.
htm (last visited June 1, 2008).
347. See Gregory C. Shaffer, The World Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democ-
racy and the Law and Politics of the WTO's Treatment of Trade and Environment Matters, 25
HARV. ENv. L. REv. 1, 67-70 (2001).
348. Appellate Body Report, Brazil- Tyres, supra note 34, at 'I 258(a)(i). The Appel-
late Body upheld the panel's finding "that the Import Ban can be considered 'necessary'
within the meaning of Article XX(b) and is, thus, provisionally justified." Id. The Appel-
late Body rejected the EU's claims that alternative waste management and disposal mea-
sures were available that would meet Brazil's environmental health policy objectives and
would have a less restrictive impact on trade. Id. at 1 211.
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whether its regulatory measure is justifiable. 349 Brazil lost the case only
because of lower court injunctions requiring Brazil to import used tires
and an exemption for Mercosur members, which respectively undermined
the government's stated environmental and health objectives. 3 50 The Bra-
zilian government responded that the Mercosur policy was being renegoti-
ated and that the "court orders were being challenged" and would "be
reviewed by Brazil's Supreme Court."35 1
The Brazil-Tyres case is also of interest because it was the first time that
the Brazilian government hired an outside law firm's assistance without
private sector funding. The government began to coordinate research on
Brazil's defense of a potential complaint when the EU initiated informal
consultations in 2003.352 It worked with interns from Brazilian law firms
in Brasilia and former interns who had returned to Brazilian law firm prac-
tice from its Geneva mission.3 53 Because the private sector did not hire a
law firm to assist the government to defend Brazil's position, the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs issued an international call for tender in December 2005,
hiring a major U.S. law firm on account of its considerable experience and
its offices in the United States and Europe.3 54 As determined by the gov-
ernment, the U.S. law firm could support the Foreign Affairs Ministry with
its defense in the case, as well as others in the future.
349. Id. at 171. The Appellate Body maintained, "[Tihe capacity of a country to
implement remedial measures that would be particularly costly, or would require
advanced technologies, may be relevant to the assessment of whether such measures or
practices are reasonably available alternatives to a preventive measure, such as the
Import Ban, which does not involve 'prohibitive costs or substantial technical difficul-
ties."' Id.
350. Id. at 11 258(b). The Appellate Body only held against Brazil because Brazil did
not apply the ban to all used and retreaded tires on account of court injunctions block-
ing application of the law in question and an exemption granted to imports of certain
retreaded tires from members of Mercosur. Id.
351. See Daniel Pruzin, EU Accuses Brazil of Contradictory Stance in WTO Dispute Over
Ban on Retreaded Tires, 24 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1465 (Oct. 18, 2007); see also Michael
Kepp, Brazil's Chief Justice Overturns Lower Court, Citing Health Risks from Imported
Tires, 24 INT'L TRADE REP. (BNA) 1554 (Nov. 1, 2007) (also noting the government's
attempt to pass parallel legislation "that would ban the import of all reusable, recyclable,
or recycled solid waste that poses a public health or environmental risk").
352. The European Union started informal consultations in 2003 in the context of its
own internal investigation of the legality of the Brazilian regulations. The investigation
was initiated under the EU's Trade Barriers Regulation following a complaint by the
Bureau International Permanent des Associations de Vendeurs et Rechapeurs de Pneu-
matiques (BIPAVER), dated November 5, 2003, on account of adverse trade effects suf-
fered by the European Union retreaded tire sector resulting from Brazil's import ban on
foreign retreaded tires.
353. For a discussion of the internship program, see supra Part III.C.2.
354. Ratton Sanchez Ministry Interview, supra note 324. The case affected two Brazil-
ian industries, one for the production of new tires and one for the sale and import of
used and retreaded tires. The ministry maintained that the case was of systemic impor-
tance, because it implicated environmental and health concerns and, thus, the defense
should not be based on the partial, commercial points of view of affected industries. Id.;
see also Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Tyres, supra note 34, at ' 57-58.
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C. Brazil as a Third Party
Brazil will choose to file as a third party rather than as a complainant
when the country has more of a systemic interest in a dispute than a direct
commercial one. In these cases, the government typically has less need of
assistance from outside law firms, and the dispute settlement personnel in
Brazil's Geneva mission may do most of the work on their own. The
Geneva mission will communicate with and obtain the approval of the Dis-
pute Settlement Unit in Brasilia before filing the third party submission,
but it can act with much more autonomy than when Brazil is a complainant
or respondent, largely because the stakes are much lower. Third party par-
ticipation is also not as costly to the government in terms of expertise,
because a third party is not required to file a formal submission and when
it does, the submission can be short and non-technical in nature. Brazil's
approach has changed somewhat since Brazil hired an outside law firm
pursuant to its 2005 call for tenders noted in Part IV.B, as shown in Annex11.355
The Brazilian mission in Geneva often has used its interns for research
support for its third party filings since the beginning of the internship pro-
gram in 2003. Because the cases last longer than the four-month intern-
ship, former interns often continued to assist the government with the
matter on a pro bono basis after they return to legal practice in Brazil.3 56
In this way, the interns can continue to gather experience in international
trade dispute settlement for use in the future, enhancing their credentials.
The interns reportedly have made important contributions to Brazil's par-
ticipation as a third party. To our knowledge, this program is unique
among WTO members.
Although the Brazilian government typically does not develop partner-
ships with the private sector when it participates as a third party in a WTO
case, there are exceptions. To start, when Brazil files a third party submis-
sion in parallel with a complaint of its own, which will occur until a WTO
panel consolidates the complaints, then an outside law firm will likely help
prepare both submissions.3 5 7 In addition, some WTO cases can have such
implications for the private sector that the private sector nonetheless
becomes involved. Embraer, for example, funded an outside law firm to
assist the government as a third party in the U.S.-EU dispute over the subsi-
355. The information in the Annex was confirmed in Ratton Sanchez Ministry Inter-
view, supra note 324.
356. See supra Part III.C.2.
357. For example, Brazil participated as a third party when it also was a complainant
in the steel safeguard cases and the U.S. Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act of
2000. See Annex II. In a slightly different situation, India's complaint on the EU general
preference system in the EC- Tariff Preferences case implicated Brazil's earlier settlement
in its soluble coffee complaint against these same EU preferences. Associa~jo Brasileira
das Induistrias de Cafe Soluvel (ABCIS), the private trade association representing the
coffee producers in Brazil's ealier EC-Soluble Coffee complaint, hired the Brazilian law
firm Veirano Advogados to assist with Brazil's third party submissions to the panel and
the Appellate Body in the EC- Tariff Preferences case. See infra Annexes II and IV; supra
note 318 and accompanying text.
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dization of Boeing and Airbus, for which complaints were initially filed in
2004. The law firm assisted Embraer and worked with the Brazilian gov-
ernment in Brazil's filings as a third party in which Brazil assumed an
engaged role.3 58 Similarly, in a case involving U.S. countervailing duty
methodologies for privatized companies, Brazil retained Wilkie Farr & Gal-
lagher, funded by the Brazilian Steel Institute, and filed a complaint but
remained a third party during the litigation, letting the European Union
take the lead.35 9 In sum, although Brazil has less need of sophisticated
legal assistance when it acts as a third party in a dispute, it has developed
mechanisms to assist it in these cases, including a specialized dispute set-
tlement unit, an internship program for private lawyers in its mission in
Geneva, and for some cases, the hiring of an outside law firm.
V. The Limits of the Brazilian Approach
We have examined the response of Brazil to the legalization and
judicialization of international trade relations, which has enabled it to play
an important role in WTO negotiations, litigation, and their strategic com-
bination. This response should not be seen in "top-down" terms pursuant
to which the Brazilian government created a "model," which some call the
"three pillar model," that can be exported to other countries. Rather, we
have seen domestic and international factors interact reciprocally and
dynamically, affecting the responses of an array of public and private
actors.
358. Ratton Sanchez Ministry Interview, supra note 324;ee also King & Spalding,
Latin American Practice: Recent Matters, http://www.kslaw.com/portal/server.pt?
space=KSPublicRedirect&control=KSPublicRedirect&Pageld=310 (last visited May 25,
2008) ("Provided strategic advice and assistance to Embraer Empresa Brasileira Aer-
onautica, S.A. in support of Embraer's Washington Affairs office involving Congress, the
Federal Aviation Administration, Department of Defense, and state and local govern-
ments where they have a presence; in various trade issues involving government subsi-
dies provided to its competitors; and in complying with U.S. export licensing laws for
civil and military products and assisting it in obtaining relevant licenses when neces-
sary."). See, e.g., Brazil Sides with EU in Arguments Before WTO Boeing Panel, INSIDE U.S.
TRADE, Feb. 1, 2008; see also Communication from the United States, Answers to Ques-
tions from Brazil, European Communities and Certain Member States- Measures Affectiv-
ing Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS316/8 (May 15, 2006); Constitution of the Panel
Established at the Request of the European Communities-Note by the Secretariat,
United States-Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, WT/DS317 (Oct. 25,
2005); Constitution of the Panel Established at the Request of the European Communi-
ties-Note by the Secretariat, European Communities - Measures Affecting Trade in Large
Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint), WT/DS347/5 (July 24, 2006); Constitution of the
Panel Established at the Request of the European Communities-Note by the Secretariat,
United States - Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft - (Second Complaint),
WT/DS353/3 (Dec. 4, 2006).
359. See Communication from the European Communities, EC- Cast Iron Tube, WT/
DS219/13 (Mar. 23, 2004); Request for Consultations by Brazil, European Communi-
ties-Anti-Dumping Duties on Malleable Cast Iron Tube or Pipe Fittings from Brazil, WT/
DS219/1 (Jan. 9, 2001). The United States modified its methodology following the first
WTO case, which the EU then challenged, again successfully. Brazil also acted as a third
party in a number of other steel-related cases for which Wilkie Farr & Gallagher pro-
vided representation. See infra Annex II.
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Brazil's successful use of the WTO dispute settlement system deserv-
edly has attracted attention and is of clear interest to other WTO members.
Nonetheless, in this section, we address the limits of Brazil's approach both
for Brazil and for other developing countries whose politics are less demo-
cratic and whose economies are smaller and less diversified. We first
examine the following challenges for Brazil: retaining continuity of govern-
ment personnel in a system based on diplomatic rotation within the Minis-
try of Foreign Affairs; the willingness and ability of private industry to fund
private lawyers, especially for complex cases such as those over agricul-
tural subsidies in the United States and the European Union; the handling
of cases of systemic importance that the private sector will not fund; the
management of private law firms funded by the private sector where public
and private interests do not fully coincide; and the reciprocal impact of
Brazil's successful use of WTO litigation in contributing to the growing
complexity of the system as part of a recursive process. We then explain
why the challenges are even starker for other developing countries.
A first challenge for Brazil's approach is to ensure that successful inno-
vations are not abandoned, such as the specialized Dispute Settlement Unit
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the career track for "foreign trade
analysts," the internship program in Brazilian missions, and the overlap-
ping public-private networks of practitioners, consultants, business repre-
sentatives, academics, NGOs, and government officials. The last three
governments in Brazil have invested significant resources on foreign trade
issues, including those for addressing trade disputes. Yet as Heredia and
Schneider note in their study of administrative reform in developing coun-
tries, "administrative reforms take a long time to become consolidated or
institutionalized" and are subject to change in light of "political fluidity
and turnover. '360 Veiga derives similar conclusions in his study of Brazil-
ian trade policy, finding that "despite the diversification of the channels of
dialogue and participation, the great majority of these are still not
institutionalized. ",361
As for most WTO members, a first challenge for Brazil is to ensure a
continuity of government personnel who have developed expertise for han-
dling WTO negotiations and dispute settlement. There is a growing ten-
sion between the increasingly technical demands of the WTO and its
dispute settlement system and the traditional model of diplomatic rotation
in ministries of foreign affairs. Both the traditions and the career incen-
tives within Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs are for diplomats to have
broad-based knowledge and to move to different posts every two to three
years. Therefore, there is a strong possibility that once diplomats are
360. Heredia & Schneider, supra note 85, at 20.
361. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 178
(further noting that "civil society is invited by the State, which defines the actors to be
invited, the occasions for these invitations, the convenience of circulating information
pertinent to the meetings, and so on."). Veiga declares that the Brazilian Business Coali-
tion has proposed procedures for business sector participation in trade policy-making,
but "these efforts have never led to any formal government commitment to the proposed
procedures." Id.
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trained in WTO dispute settlement, they can be replaced by personnel with
little to no knowledge of the procedural and substantive complexities of
WTO dispute settlement. Although Brazil's Ministry of Foreign Affairs pri-
oritizes international trade matters 36 2 and has attempted to keep diplo-
mats interested in trade policy by assigning them to trade-oriented
posts, 36 3 this practice is not institutionalized. Officials within Brazil's Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs are divided as to whether to prefer within the Minis-
try specialized career tracks, such as in trade, or broader-based experience
through diplomatic rotations. Gifted individuals who wish to rise within
the ministry still face career incentives not to specialize but to broaden
their experience. No matter how bright a new diplomat and how fast the
diplomat may learn, WTO dispute settlement dynamically changes and
involves considerable technical complexity so that countries that assign
WTO matters to a ministry with a system of diplomatic rotation can be
disadvantaged unless they develop techniques to foster specialization
within it.
There are a number of alternatives that a country may consider. One
alternative is for countries to create a separate ministry for international
trade relations, such as the Office of the United States Trade Representative
or the European Union Trade Directorate General. In Brazil's case, it seems
doubtful whether this would be a good idea given the existing power and
reputation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs within the government. 3 64 A
new trade ministry might have lesser authority. Alternatively, the ministry
could provide special training programs for diplomats that work on trade
negotiations and dispute settlement and create a distinct career track for
them. The ministry could also hire permanent staff, such as international
trade lawyers and economists, or network closely with specialized analysts
in other ministries to support the work of the diplomats who would con-
tinue their diplomatic rotations. 365
362. Brazil's prioritization of trade policy already creates more trade-oriented career
incentives within its foreign ministry than for diplomats in other countries' foreign
ministries.
363. For example, Celso Almeida Pereira, who was in charge of dispute settlement in
the Brazilian mission in Geneva for about four years, left the mission in Geneva to work
in Brazil's embassy in Ottawa, Canada and then moved back to Brasilia to work in the
cabinet of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs replaced him
with Nilo Ditz, an individual who had worked in the Dispute Settlement Unit in Brasilia
for four years. Continuity, therefore, was assured, although Nilo Ditz assumed new
responsibilities at the mission in 2007. Similarly, Roberto Carvalho de Azevdo, who
first led the Dispute Settlement Unit, was then appointed to be the Director of the Eco-
nomic Affairs Department (Departamento de Assuntos Econ6micos) in late 2005, and
then became the General Under-Secretary of Economic and Technological Affairs.
Fldvio Marega replaced him in the Dispute Settlement Unit, which is within the Under-
Secretary of Economic and Technological Affairs, so that Azevdo can still oversee the
work.
364. See also Hurrell, supra note 58, at 86 ("Itamaraty, despite many predictions, has
maintained its general position in foreign policy, including in relation to trade negotia-
tions."). Moreover, the ministry would not easily relinquish this important portfolio.
365. Brazil's approach, which is still being implemented, is for specialized "foreign
trade analysts" to be largely in other ministries, such as the Ministry of Development,
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The challenge of how to structure a country's response to the demands
of a legalized and judicialized international trade regime will be ongoing.
We have seen how Brazil has responded, more so than other developing
countries, by creating a specialized Dispute Settlement Unit in Brasilia and
Geneva so that expertise is developed and retained. There is currently no
reason to suspect that these innovations will be disbanded because the
unit's success has received high-level Brazilian political attention and the
government and the business community perceive trade to be an important
factor for Brazil's economic development. Nevertheless, the ministry's
organization has changed in the past, and there is no guarantee that these
changes will be retained.
A second constraint that Brazil faces is whether the affected private
sector can afford and is willing to pay for a law firm to assist the govern-
ment in a WTO case. Sectors composed of relatively small producers often
face collective action problems to coordinate and pool the necessary
resources. Even in the famous cotton case, it appears that the cotton trade
association, ABRAPA, had significant budgetary concerns when it became
evident that the U.S. law firm's legal fees would exceed $1 million.3 66 The
cotton producers had to question whether the costs were justified in light
of the uncertainty of the WTO legal outcome and if favorable, U.S. compli-
ance in a manner that would enhance market access. Countries thus face a
greater challenge if they wish to address foreign trade barriers adversely
affecting their less-organized business sectors.
A third related constraint is that a country may have potential com-
plaints that are of systemic importance for the economy, but businesses do
not fund outside legal assistance because the complaints are not targeted to
benefit their sector. The government may not have the funds to hire
outside counsel in these cases because of limited budgetary resources.
Nevertheless, systemic issues can have large impacts over time so that a
country will be prejudiced if it does not have resources available. Brazil's
creation of mechanisms to identify and evaluate potential claims, its reor-
ganization of its ministry to manage litigation, its internship program, and
its allocation of money to engage a top private law firm's assistance
through an international bid, all point to ways in which Brazil is attempting
to respond to this challenge. Finding the resources for specific cases, how-
ever, will remain a constraint.3 67
and to work through inter-ministerial networks on specific trade-related issues. Barral
Interview, supra note 179.
366. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
367. For example, although the Brazilian internship program in Geneva is admirable,
it is still questionable whether the cost for law firms to develop WTO-related expertise is
worth the investment. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and private sector have largely
hired foreign law firms to defend Brazil's interests before the WTO dispute settlement
system because of their experience and expertise. Although their selection is under-
standable because the private sector and government wish to do all they can to win a
case, this practice may also discourage Brazilian law firms from investing resources to
build domestic capacity.
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A fourth challenge is that even when the private sector provides finan-
cial support for the hiring of an outside law firm, the private sector's inter-
ests may not coincide with the government's perception of the public
interest. There may also be divisions within the private sector so that only
that portion of the private sector with the means to fund the outside law-
yers will be represented. If private lawyers take the lead in a case and the
government does not sufficiently monitor the positions taken, arguments
could be used against the country in a later case. Although it makes sense,
in our view, for a country like Brazil to hire outside legal counsel because
of the procedural and substantive demands of WTO dispute settlement, a
country needs to ensure that it has technically astute personnel who can
define dispute settlement positions and supervise the arguments that pri-
vate counsel use in legal submissions in light of broader political
perspectives.
Governments face a related risk that they could settle a case in the
interests of a specific commercial sector in a manner that constrains the
country's ability to defend the interests of other sectors and the broader
national interest in the future. For example, in the case involving soluble
coffee, Brazil initiated a complaint against the EU regarding the EU's provi-
sion of enhanced tariff preferences for exporters from thirteen developing
countries in order "to combat drug production and trafficking."36 8 In set-
ding the complaint, the EU agreed to increase the import quotas for the
Brazilian soluble coffee sector and Brazil agreed to refrain from further
challenging this aspect of the EU's GSP program. Such a settlement, how-
ever, could conceivably constrain Brazil in defending other sectors that
might be affected by the EU's preferences, and it may explain why Brazil
was only a third party in India's challenge to these preferences in
EC-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
which was of great systemic importance for Brazil and developing coun-
tries. 369 Although Brazil has created new institutions to help it to manage
and collaborate with outside legal counsel, which go beyond those devel-
oped by most other developing countries, the challenges remain.
None of the above tasks are easy for any government to manage. On
the one hand, a government should ensure ongoing collaboration with the
private sector to obtain information and to supplement the government's
constrained human and budgetary resources. On the other hand, a gov-
ernment must have sufficient autonomy and expertise to manage the pri-
vate sector input that it receives and to engage effectively at the
368. These preferences were above those granted pursuant to the EU's normal prefer-
ence system for developing countries permitted by the WTO, the "Generalized System of
Preferences" (GSP). See EC-Measures Affecting Soluble Coffee, WT/DS209 (Oct. 12,
2000); EC- Measures Affecting Differential and Favourable Treatment of Coffee, WT/
DS154 (Dec. 7, 1998); Council Regulation 2501/2001, Applying a Scheme of General-
ised Tariff Preferences for the Period from 1 January 2002 to 31 December 2004, 2001
O.J. (L 346).
369. See Appellate Body Report, EC- Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004); Panel Report, EC- Conditions for
the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/R (Dec. 1, 2003).
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international level where confidentiality is required. Brazilian academics
and private sector and civil society representatives have requested the gov-
ernment to facilitate their access to Brazil's positions before the WTO, such
as its written submissions before dispute settlement panels and its state-
ments made during oral hearings. 370 Although these groups may remain
unsatisfied regarding their access, the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
has organized more frequent meetings regarding WTO developments over
the last years and since 2005, it has made its legal submissions in WTO
cases available on its website, as in the Brazil-Tyres case. Although these
changes have not been institutionalized, they represent significant develop-
ments in Brazilian governmental practice, especially compared to Brazil's
authoritarian past involving two decades of military dictatorship from
1964 to 1984.
Developing countries with smaller, less diversified economies and less
democratic governments face even greater constraints than Brazil.
Although Brazil represents less than 1 percent of global trade, it has a
much larger and more diversified economy than most developing coun-
tries. 37 1 Because of the size of Brazil's economy, which represents over
half of the GDP of South America,3 72 its industries and elite companies are
larger and thus relatively better able to fund lawyers for WTO dispute set-
tlement. Behind Brazil's successful WTO complaints are huge companies,
such as Embraer and Petrobras, and well-funded agribusiness and indus-
trial trade associations, such as UNICA for sugar and the Brazilian Steel
Institute for iron and steel. In addition, Brazil's elite law firms are among
the largest in the developing world, reflecting both the size of the Brazilian
market for trade and investment and the role of lawyers and courts in Bra-
zil. These law firms are thus better able to invest in developing trade-
related expertise, including through funding young attorneys in intern-
ships in the Brazilian mission in Geneva, the Brazilian embassy in Wash-
ington, D.C., or the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Brasilia.
Smaller, poorer developing countries have fewer incentives to organize
for international trade dispute settlement, because they trade less in aggre-
370. Brazilian academics contend that the documents could be more broadly used as
teaching and training materials and that the private sector could then provide better
input to the government in the future.
371. Brazil's gross domestic product was nearly $1.1 trillion in 2006. In 2006, Brazil
had the tenth largest economy (in terms of gross domestic product), the fifth largest
territory, and the fifth largest population in the world. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVEL-
OPMENT INDIcATORS 2006 (2007). Brazil ranks as an upper-middle income country under
World Bank criteria (defined as gross national income per capita between $3,596 to
$11,115), having a per capita gross national income of $4,730 in 2006. Id. The coun-
try has, however, high levels of income disparity and poverty. According to the U.N.
Development Programme's Human Development Report, Brazil ranked seventieth
among countries in this respect. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2007/2008: FIGHTING CLIMATE CHANGE: HUMAN SOLIDARITY IN A
DIVIDED WORLD tbl. 3 (Human and Income Poverty: Developing Countries) (2008), avail-
able at http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/hdr_20072008-en-complete.pdf.
372. Total GDP for South America was just over $1.9 trillion in 2006, and Brazil alone
contributed $1.1 trillion. WORLD BANK, supra note 371.
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gate, they trade a narrower range of products, and their opportunity costs
are greater.3 73 They face not only more immediate demands for the fund-
ing of basic human needs, but they are also unable to spread the costs of
developing expertise over as large a number of cases. Preparing for any
single case thus requires higher start-up costs. These countries are thus
less likely to invest in capacity-building for WTO disputes by creating a
specialized unit for WTO dispute settlement, a coordinated governmental
structure and systems of public-private partnerships. The benefits from
such initiatives are simply less likely to outweigh the costs. Interestingly,
when members of the U.S. Congress expressed concern that the successful
Brazilian cotton complaint could lead other countries to challenge U.S.
agricultural subsidies, some analysts responded that there was little to fear.
They concluded that the required legal fees would constitute "a sum that is
prohibitive for the poor nations that suffer the most harm from cheap sub-
sidized imports. 3 74
Paradoxically, Brazil's successful use of the system through hiring tal-
ented U.S. litigators has contributed to the growing procedural, factual, and
legal demands of WTO litigation and has thus created a de facto require-
ment of further specialization. The case-by-case orientation of WTO juris-
prudence with its factual contextualization and use of elaborate precedent
poses significant challenges, especially to those who practice in legal sys-
tems without such traditions. This trend explains not only why Brazil has
had to adapt its approach to WTO dispute settlement, but also how Brazil's
sophisticated use of WTO litigation through working with outside attor-
neys and economic consultants has contributed to the development of
more demanding requirements. Striving to win each case recursively drives
the jurisprudence and thus the system's demands. Over the last years, par-
ties increasingly use econometric studies to support a WTO claim, hiring
economic consultants to work with outside lawyers. 375 The more that par-
ties use them, the more that this expertise will be required. Smaller, poorer
countries are thus more likely to find themselves outside of the legal pro-
cess and in a traditional bargaining relationship with their major trading
partners, a situation in which they are relatively disadvantaged. Alterna-
tively, their best hope is to become a member of the Advisory Centre on
WTO Law (ACWL), established in 2001, which provides developing coun-
tries with lower-cost legal support for WTO dispute settlement and legal
analysis.3 76 The ACWL alone, however, cannot resolve a country's capac-
373. See Nordstr6m & Shaffer, supra note 97.
374. See Becker, supra note 309, at C1.
375. See e.g., WORLD TRADE ORG., WORLD TRADE REPORT 2005: EXPLORING THE LINKS
BETWEEN TRADE, STANDARDS, AND THE WTO 171-211 (2005), available at http://
www.wto.org/english/rese/bookspe/anrepe/world tradereport05_e.pdf [hereinafter
WORLD TRADE REPORT 2005] (discussing the use of quantitative methods in WTO dis-
pute settlement).
376. See Shaffer, supra note 106. For information on the Advisory Centre on WTO
Law (ACWL) program, see its web site at: Advisory Ctr. on WTO Law, http://www.acwl.
ch/e/training/training-e.aspx (last visited May 25, 2008). Under the annexes to the
agreement establishing the centre, developing countries are divided into three catego-
ries, A, B, and C, with least developed countries as defined by UN rules constituting a
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ity challenges in WTO dispute settlement.37 7
Finally, Brazil has become a functioning democracy in which the pri-
vate sector and civil society press the government to be responsive to their
concerns. Statistical evidence suggests that countries without democracies
are less likely to use WTO dispute settlement. 3 78 The best explanation
appears to be that they are less likely to have a private sector that identifies
trade harms, presses the government to bring a WTO case, and funds the
required outside lawyers. Improving a country's internal governance gen-
erally should improve its ability to use the WTO system more effectively.
Here, we refer, in particular, to the use of a professional, meritocratic
bureaucracy that has dense ties with the private sector, as reflected in the
concept of "embedded autonomy" that Peter Evans used.3 79 This article
has documented a diffusion (or democratization) of Brazilian expertise for
trade law and policy, a central finding to which we return in our
conclusion.
Conclusion: Our Findings
There has been considerable analysis of the WTO dispute settlement
system within law, political science, and economics. Nevertheless, there
has been a dearth of empirical work that probes beneath the surface to
examine the impact of the WTO legal system within a state and the
processes through which that state engages the WTO legal system, in turn
affecting the system. Brazil has been touted for exemplifying that develop-
ing countries can successfully use the WTO legal system and is thus an
important site for inquiry. Until this article, however, there was little
knowledge of what Brazil actually did to enable it to use the system, reflect-
ing a general lack of empirical work in the field at the micro- and meso-
levels.
In this article's conclusion, we highlight seven findings from our
study. First, we argue that international trade law and judicialization have
mattered in Brazil, unleashing a competition for expertise and helping to
fourth category. Id. In 2006, hourly rates for the centre's members for WTO litigation
support were set at $200 for category A countries, $150 for category B countries, and
$100 for category C countries. Least developed countries hourly rates were $25 per
hour. Non-member developing country rates were set at $350 for category A countries,
$300 for category B countries, and $250 for category C countries. See ADVISORY CENTRE
ON WTO LAW, THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE ADVISORY CENTRE ON WTO LAw 13-14
(1999), http://www.acwl.ch/e/pdf/agreement-estab-e.pdf. Brazil has not joined the
ACWL, as it has been able to defend itself in large part because of the willingness of its
private sector to fund outside legal assistance. Brazil has nonetheless worked with the
ACWL in cases involving other developing country complainants, as when Thailand
used the ACWL in the EC-Sugar case. The ACWL would cost Brazil, as an "upper
middle income country," $100,000 to join. See id at 10. The ACWL has limited
resources, so that if Brazil were to join the ACWL and actively use it, there would likely
be fewer ACWL resources available for smaller developing countries.
377. See e.g., HOEKMAN & KoSTECKI, supra note 108, at 94-95; Nordstr6m & Shaffer,
supra note 97.
378. Busch et al., supra note 15; Davis & Bermeo, supra note 120.
379. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
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transform the government's relations with business and civil society
regarding trade policy. Second, and related to this point, we contend that
being a defendant in WTO cases can help catalyze these changes, giving
rise to mechanisms of public-private coordination to defend a country's
interests at the international level. Third, we find that these developments
have not represented a weakening of the state, but rather the strengthening
of the state's ability to engage at the international level through a diffusion
of international trade law and policy expertise. Fourth, we observe that
these processes reflect a growth of pluralism for trade policy making within
Brazil, as the government has been pressed to become more transparent
and open to dialogue. Fifth, we maintain that these processes are not auto-
matic but are a function of domestic as well as international factors. We
highlight the roles of Brazil's professional, merit-based Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, the development of Brazilian career paths in the international trade
field, Brazil's private sector that has been able to overcome collective action
problems to engage with the government, and a general shift in orientation
in Brazil's development strategies. Sixth, we find that although the exam-
ple of Brazil offers some hope to other developing countries, these coun-
tries generally face greater challenges and will need to develop their own
strategies in light of their own contexts. Seventh, we conclude by arguing
that it is necessary to take into account the reciprocal interaction of the
domestic and international spheres to understand national and interna-
tional developments.
(1) The Impact of WTO Judicialization in Brazil: Inciting a New
Competition for Expertise
The legalization and judicialization of international trade relations has
exercised considerable influence on government-business-civil society rela-
tions in Brazil over foreign trade law and policy, spurring government reor-
ganization and a new competition for expertise. The WTO legal and
judicial system has catalyzed more than competition in product markets. It
has spurred competition in professional markets to build careers that take
advantage of the new opportunities offered. The number of career oppor-
tunities is limited, but it is much broader than one might initially think,
involving academics, lawyers, government officials, companies, trade
associations, think tanks, and consultancies. These professionals work
with public and private actors to attempt to use and shape the WTO legal
and judicial regime.
At the governmental level, multiple Brazilian ministries have become
engaged with trade law and policy, creating new foreign trade career
tracks.3 80 Their involvement has reduced the Ministry of Foreign Affairs'
former monopoly position within the government over foreign trade pol-
icy.38 ' The Ministry of Foreign Affairs now receives instructions from
380. See supra Part III.A.
381. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 176.
Veiga notes the erosion of "the Ministry of Foreign Affairs monopoly in trade negotia-
tions" in Brazil as other ministries have become increasingly engaged, advancing the
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CAMEX, an inter-ministerial coordinating body for trade policy. The min-
istries that participate in CAMEX have hired professionals in a governmen-
tal career track for "foreign trade analysts" who specialize in the law,
economics, or politics of foreign trade, pass a highly competitive civil ser-
vice exam, and undergo further government training before assuming their
posts. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in turn, has created what its offi-
cials call a "three pillar model," which lies behind Brazil's successful use of
WTO dispute settlement. The minstry's approach includes a new Dispute
Settlement Unit in Brasilia (the "first pillar"), complemented by ministry
personnel in Geneva dedicated to dispute settlement (the "second pillar")
who together work directly with the private sector, as well as lawyers and
economic consultants hired by the private sector (the "third pillar").
Increased business and societal interest in trade law and policy has
spurred a competition for expertise within the private sector in Brazil. At
the university level, this competition for expertise is reflected in increased
university course offerings, graduate dissertations, and the formation of
trade policy institutes and centers. 3 82 In the private commercial sector, we
see the rise of new consultancies and think tanks that provide services to
the business sector and the government for WTO negotiations and WTO
litigation.38 3 These think tanks and consultancies seek to help their clients
obtain greater access to foreign markets, to defend Brazilian internal poli-
cies, or to open up the Brazilian market itself. They have produced statisti-
cal analysis critical for Brazil's negotiating positions in the Doha Round
and the success of its complaints in WTO disputes. Brazil's largest law
firms have co-sponsored, through the Law Firm Study Center, new intern-
ship initiatives within the government to gain expertise that they can mar-
ket.38 4 The Brazilian business community has responded by not only
funding, hiring, and participating in many of these initiatives but also by
creating a new encompassing business association specialized on trade
policy, the Brazilian Business Coalition; new international trade depart-
ments within existing associations, such as in the State of Sao Paulo Indus-
try Federation and the Brazilian Confederation of Industries; and new
company personnel positions focused on trade law and policy.385 Individ-
uals from these various groups have gathered in trade negotiation and dis-
pute settlement study groups, forming a trade policy epistemic community
within Brazil. These various networks link legal and economic knowledge,
which was well-developed in the United States and Europe, to Brazilian
trading interests, with Brazil's lawyers being trained and becoming entre-
preneurs in the process.
concerns of different constituencies. Id. The ministry nonetheless retains the leading
role in the formation and execution of Brazil's trade policy at the international level. See
Hurrell, supra note 58, at 86.
382. See supra Part IIl.C.3.
383. See supra Part III.C.4.
384. See supra Part III.C.2.
385. See supra Part 11I.C.4.
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The government's coordination with these groups for WTO trade
negotiations and litigation represents a dramatic change in practice of
what once was considered to be the most insular of Brazilian government
ministries. As Barral writes, "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Itamaraty)
itself is an example of how the evolution in trade relations promoted insti-
tutional openness. Traditionally the most hermetic bureaucratic organiza-
tion in the Brazilian government, Itamaraty was progressively opened to
inputs from civil society and the business community."38 6 Government
officials not only participated in a number of these initiatives, such as the
trade negotiations and dispute settlement study groups, they also invested
in facilitating the creation of this expertise through offering competitive
internship programs in the mission in Geneva, the embassy in Washington,
D.C., the Dispute Settlement Unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and
the Trade Department of the Ministry of Development in Brasilia.
In sum, we have shown how WTO legalization and judicialization
have catalyzed public and private investment in trade law expertise in Bra-
zil, constituting one type of "shadow effect" of the law. This investment, in
turn, has enabled Brazil to bargain more effectively with third countries,
constituting a reciprocal "shadow of the law" effect. 3 87
(2) The Catalyzing Effect of Being a Defendant
For most politicians, being a defendant in WTO litigation is bad and
being a complainant is good. Trade liberals, in. contrast, respond that
being a defendant is best for a country's general welfare because inefficient
trade barriers will be removed. We have taken a different track, showing
how being a defendant in high-stakes cases can catalyze greater public and
private sector engagement regarding international institutions, building
capacity for a country to become more engaged in international processes
and to make use of the opportunities that they provide. Canada's challenge
of Brazil's industrial policy in the Embraer case was a pivotal moment for
Brazil, which resulted in much greater media coverage of the WTO in the
country, helping to spur the creation of broader-based capacity on WTO-
related matters. 38 8 The Embraer case, together with the U.S. challenge
against Brazilian patent policy, made a broader Brazilian public aware of
international legal rules, spurring the government, private sector, and civil
society to coordinate and become more engaged.
(3) Strengthening the State Through Diffusing Expertise
Since Brazil increasingly has worked with the private sector, private
lawyers, private consultancies, and civil society groups on international
trade matters, some might contend that these developments represent a
weakening of the state in that expertise is no longer consolidated within
386. Barral, The Brazilian Experience, supra note 69, at 14.
387. This second "shadow of the law" effect has been addressed to a greater extent by
socio-legal scholars. See, e.g., Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L. J. 950 (1979).
388. See supra Parts I.B, I1I.C.1.
Vol. 41
2008 The Trials of Winning at the WTO
governmental departments but rather shared and developed through Bra-
zilian public-private policy networks. In contrast, we find that Brazil has
strengthened its ability to represent Brazilian interests through the diffu-
sion of WTO expertise in the private sector and civil society. Brazil would
not have won the strategically important U.S.-Cotton and EC-Sugar cases
without outside agribusiness and law firm support, and it would not have
had the statistical analysis which empowered it in its negotiations over new
agricultural rules as leader of the G-20 and a member of a new G-4, consist-
ing of the United States, the European Union, Brazil, and India, in the
Doha Round.3 89 Moreover, even when not working directly with the gov-
ernment, Brazilian academics and policy analysts help to ensure that Bra-
zilian ideas, perspectives, and priorities are more likely represented before
transnational policy communities. 3 90 Brazilian individuals and groups
certainly challenge the Brazilian government, but in doing so, they also
provide it with essential resources to enable it to better represent Brazilian
perspectives in the WTO legal system. From a simple cost-benefit analysis,
the political gains for Brazil from its investment in WTO-related expertise
and the broader diffusion of this expertise outside the government have
been considerable. Compared to investing in military means to gain inter-
national influence, Brazil's approach has been brilliantly inexpensive.
(4) Growth of Pluralism and Government Transparency
Whether one views the processes, mechanisms, and adaptations that
we describe positively or negatively depends, in part, on one's ideological
perspective. Brazil's engagement may be viewed as evidence of a deepening
of WTO norms both internally in Brazil (through Brazil's internal adapta-
tions and the diffusion of expertise and social learning) and externally
(through its challenging of other countries' policies). Some readers could
interpret these changes as evidence of the WTO's normative power, finding
that the WTO system provides tools for actors, especially elite actors,
within Brazil to advance neoliberal agendas within Brazilian politics and
389. See supra Part IV.A. The former "Quad" consisted of the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, Canada, and Japan. See DEESE, supra note 18; Wolfe, supra note 17.
390. Cf. Shaffer & Apea, supra note 321, at 977-1008. This earlier article points to
the need for greater engagement of developing countries' academics at the international
level and notes, regarding an important WTO case involving the EU's preferential tariff
system, that:
The discourse regarding the interpretation of the Enabling Clause in the GSP
case was dominated by an interpretive community of predominantly North
American and European scholars publishing in the major trade law journals that
are read by WTO judicial decision-makers. The discourse inevitably reflects
and privileges certain backgrounds and normative priorities. To give two exam-
ples from the GSP case, one leading North American scholar admirably pub-
lished three articles on the GSP case before the Appellate Body rendered its
decision and at least two additional contributions after the decision. Within a
few months of the decision's publication, the World Trade Review published a
special issue on the case in July 2004. All six of the commentators were either
from North America or the United Kingdom, and five of the six taught at U.S.
law schools.
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for the Brazilian economy. Certainly international institutions can, and in
the WTO's case do, create opportunities and provide tools. In this way,
they can affect national regulatory policy decisions.
Our empirical work, however, suggests that such conclusions would
miss crucial developments within Brazil toward a pluralist politics that
involves considerable contestation over policy choices, both within and
outside of government, and has led to greater government transparency.
There is contestation within and among Brazilian governmental minis-
tries, 391 as well as business and civil society groups. 3 92 For the first time,
the Brazilian legislature has begun to pay greater attention to the WTO
trade negotiation agenda. 393 As we have seen, the WTO has also helped to
open up Brazilian trade policy from a closed state bureaucracy from a time
when Brazil was under military rule to one in which both business and
other civil society organizations have much greater access to government
policy making, which has become much more transparent.
In his study of Brazilian trade policy, Veiga likewise finds an "impres-
sive growth in the number of actors involved in the policy process, both in
State and civil Society" and "a strong diversification of positions in respect
to the issues treated in trade negotiations" as opposed to domination by a
"traditional type of protectionist coalition putting together the State and
import-competing business sectors. '394 As he writes in referring to the
enhanced role of the Brazilian Network for the Integration of Peoples, the
network of unions and NGOs created to coordinate common trade policy
positions,395 Brazilian trade policy making "has become more transparent,
which reflects not only more access to formal and informal channels of
information and influence, but also convergence between the broad politi-
cal views and negotiating guidelines currently expressed through the
State's negotiating strategy and those sponsored by the entities that com-
prise the Network."'396 He finds that the Brazilian Business Coalition has
391. See Goldberg et al., supra note 188 (noting the ministerial differences within
CAMEX regarding the launching of the U.S. -Cotton case); Barral Interview, supra note
179. There are also differences within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example,
regarding whether to focus on Mercosur or trade agreements with the EU. Barral Inter-
view, supra note 179.
392. See supra note 256 and accompanying text (regarding differences between the
agricultural sectors and business sectors in the Brazilian Business Coalition); supra note
287 (regarding differences among civil society organizations within REBRIP).
393. The Brazilian legislature (the Congress) has the power to approve or reject, in
whole or part, the international commitments undertaken. CONSTITUICA o FEDERAL art.
49 § I (Braz.). In the case of WTO dispute settlement, the Congress plays no formal role.
Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 156. How-
ever, "as the trade negotiations agenda gained weight in the domestic policy debate in
the 2000s, it began to draw the attention of the legislature." Id.
394. Id. at 176-77; see also supra Part I.
395. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
396. Veiga, Changing Patterns in State-Civil Society Relationship, supra note 59, at 169
(an excellent work on civil society participation in the formation of Brazilian trade nego-
tiating positions over time). Veiga observes how, under the Lula government, Brazil has
moved away from a neo-corporatist institutional model to a more pluralist one. See id. at
174. However, Veiga also notes the possibility of the government being transparent
instrumentally when it is assured of a convergence of views with key stakeholders,
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lost some influence in the Lula administration to labor and civil society
organizations who have gained greater access to policy makers. 39 7 Veiga
concludes that the "recent history of trade policy making in Brazil reveals
the growing participation of civil society in this area of policy."398
In sum, we see a country that is moving toward a more pluralist model
of interest group representation in trade policy.39 9 In order to be success-
ful in the WTO regime, the Brazilian government has needed to coordinate
with the private sector to harness the private sector's resources and exper-
tise. The government has outsourced part of its traditional functions in
trade policy to the private sector through the mechanism of public-private
partnerships. This process, in turn, has generated more competition for
expertise within the private sector. This growth of pluralism could be
viewed, in part, as reflecting a U.S. export, but we remain agnostic on this
point. 40 0 Whatever its origins, this mode of pluralist governance has been
adapted to the Brazilian context.
(5) The Importance of Domestic Factors
The catalyzing impacts of international processes are not automatic.
One cannot understand Brazil's response and successful use of a legalized
and judicialized system of trade dispute settlement without also examining
domestic Brazilian factors. First, Brazil has a highly professionalized,
merit-based Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and has now developed foreign
trade analyst career tracks in other ministries. These officials can effec-
tively manage and use the information that the private sector provides.
Second, Brazil has large companies and well-organized trade associations
that help to overcome collective action problems. These companies and
trade associations have invested in international trade law, funding outside
law firms and economic consultants for trade litigation, and providing the
government with information and technical analyses for trade negotiations.
Third, Brazil's development policy has shifted toward greater reliance on
which then grant it legitimacy. Id. He writes, "Since there is acknowledged convergence
of viewpoints between the State and many of these sectors [business, trade unions and
NGOs] in the area of trade negotiations, the net result for the State of democratizing
access to the policy arena-without giving access to the instances where the strategy is
actually framed-is assured ex ante: options and strategies will be referended [sic] by
these sectors and gain legitimacy." Id. at 175.
397. Id. at 161.
398. Id. at 179.
399. For work regarding a general shift toward a pluralist approach of business-gov-
ernment relations in Brazil, see ELI DINIZ & RENATO BOscHl, EMPRESARIOS, INTERESSES E
MERCADO: DILEMAS Do DESENVOLVIMENTO NO BRASIL (2004).
400. Id. Paradoxically, the resulting Brazilian public-private partnerships have been
used by Brazil at the international level quite successfully, including through the hiring
of U.S. lawyers and U.S.-trained Brazilian lawyers to assist with claims against the
United States. Id. We note, in addition, the growth of "cause lawyering" and the
"judicialization of politics" in Brazil. See generally Fabiano Engelman, Tradition and
Diversification in the Uses and Definitions of the Law: A Proposed Analysis, 1 BRAZ. POL.
Sci. REV. 53 (2007). These developments in cause lawyering and judicial politics also
could be viewed in terms of a diffusion of U.S. legal practices translated into the Brazil-
ian context, but we again remain agnostic for purposes of this article.
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global markets and the private exporting sector to increase economic
growth. Just as Brazil's economic development policy has moved "in the
direction of greater support for (and increased reliance on) the private sec-
tor,"40 1 we have seen a delegation of traditional government functions in
international trade law and policy to collaborative networks of state offi-
cials, trade associations, companies, think tanks, consultancies, and law
firms. Combining these domestic factors, Brazil has become a major player
in the WTO system, using litigation and negotiation strategies to push for
systemic changes in international rules and foreign domestic practices and
in the process, affect the interpretation of WTO law.40 2 Brazil has devel-
oped and deployed its domestic factors to attempt to shape the interna-
tional field.
(6) Lessons for Other Developing Countries
This article should be of great interest to developing countries gener-
ally, as our findings provide both hope and caution. Brazil's pub-
lic-private network approach for WTO dispute settlement exemplifies what
a country can do to adapt to the challenges that the WTO system poses.
Nevertheless, we have also addressed the limits of the Brazilian approach
for Brazil and even more so, for smaller developing countries. The market
for expertise that WTO legalization and judicialization spurred has had
little resonance in smaller developing countries. Both for the government
and the private sector in these countries, investing in WTO-related exper-
tise is less beneficial at the margins because of their smaller size and the
relatively smaller aggregate gains at stake for them. 40 3 By documenting the
extent of Brazilian public and private investment in trade law and policy,
this article may be disconcerting for some developing country analysts.
Nonetheless, all countries and constituencies can benefit through eval-
uating the experiences of others. Ultimately, because developing countries
face different contexts, there is no single strategy that fits all of them.
Exporting legal strategies across cultures regardless of context has never
worked.40 4 Each country can attempt to determine how best to adapt strat-
egies in light of its particular circumstances. As Roberto Mangabeira
Unger writes, the goal "can be reached only by obeying Piaget's maxim that
'to imitate is to invent.' The new will have to be combined with the old, the
401. Thomas Biersteker, The 'Triumph' of Liberal Economic Ideas in the Developing
World, in GLOBAL ECONOMIC CHANGE, REGIONAL RESPONSE: THE NEW INTERNATIONAL CON-
TEXT OF DEVELOPMENT 178 (Barbara Stallings ed., 1995). For a discussion of general
shifts in Latin America, see Varas, supra note 46, at 284, see also Juan de Onis, Brazil's
New Capitalism, 79 FOREIGN AFF. 107 (2000) (noting "the 'new model' reforms created
by President Fernando Henrique Cardoso feature a political economy in which private
enterprise, including foreign investment, is assigned and expanded responsibility for
economic development").
402. See supra Part IV.
403. See supra Part II.A.
404. See, e.g., David Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some
Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L.
REV. 1062, 1068-69, 1080-85 (1974).
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foreign with the local."'40 5 This article has investigated developments in
Brazil in response to the challenges of WTO dispute settlement, noting the
state and private sector transformations that have occurred. In this way,
we hope to provoke reflection over, as well as debate and experimentation
with, strategies that countries at varying levels of development and their
constituencies may adopt to better defend themselves in the international
trading system.
(7) What Lies Behind Brazil's Success
To conclude, we maintain that the best interpretation of what lies
behind the trials of Brazil's success is the rise of pluralist interaction
between the private sector, civil society, and the government on trade mat-
ters. The institutionalization of a legalized and judicialized system of inter-
national trade relations, combined with Brazilian democratization and a
shift in Brazilian development policy, has catalyzed the formation of new
public-private trade policy networks. We find that a combination of these
international and domestic factors, involving intermeshed processes work-
ing from above and from below, best explains Brazil's successful capacity-
building initiatives for international trade negotiations and dispute settle-
ment. More broadly, our study suggests that one cannot fully understand
international legal developments without examining dynamics within key
countries and that one cannot understand these dynamics without examin-
ing how they respond to international processes, in our case of WTO legali-
zation and judicialization. The two recursively and dynamically interact.
We look forward to future research that addresses how these processes
interact in other countries.
Annex
1. Brazil in the GATT Dispute Settlement System
During the GATT's first three decades, Brazil was an infrequent par-
ticipant in dispute settlement. 40 6 Although it was a respondent in one of
the first GATT cases, Brazilian Internal Taxes, which was brought by France
in 1949,407 it was not until 1962 that Brazil brought its first complaint, one
against the United Kingdom (UK) in response to a proposed tariff that
would have increased the margin of preferences that the UK provided to
Commonwealth countries for bananas. 40 8 Brazil did not participate in the
GATT again for another fifteen years, when it brought a complaint against
EC sugar export subsidies in 1978, which resulted in a panel decision
405. UNGER, supra note 133, at 111.
406. All cases involving Brazil during the GATT period are listed in Annex I.
407. Third Session of the Contracting Parties, Summary Record of the Ninth Meeting 9
(Apr. 25, 1949), GATT/CP.3/SR.9 (1950). The working party recommended that Brazil
liberalize its discriminatory internal taxes. Id. Brazil reportedly liberalized its internal
taxes ten years later in 1958.
408. Report of the Panel, UK-Increase in Margin of Preferences on Bananas, GATT
Doc. SR.19/12 (Dec. 9, 1961). The UK abandoned its proposed tariff increase a few
months after the panel's report.
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against the EC in 1980 but no significant change in EC policy. 40 9 These
earlier GATT cases prefigured cases that were to come before the more
judicialized WTO system decades later.
Brazil significantly increased its use of GATT dispute settlement after
the reforms to the GATT dispute settlement system as part of the Tokyo
Round of Trade Negotiations. As a result of these reforms, the GATT estab-
lished a specialized legal division in 1981 within its secretariat to assist the
three-member panels that heard GATT complaints. 410 Because the GATT
panelists were largely diplomats designated on an ad hoc basis, the GATT
secretariat's legal division became a font of knowledge of GATT precedent,
working to create a jurisprudence that was more legally rigorous and less
diplomatically oriented. In this way, the post-1979 reforms served as a
foretaste of the more intensive judicialization that would come with the
establishment of the WTO and its Appellate Body. Under the revised
GATT system, Brazil initiated seven complaints in the 1980s, four of them
between November 1987 and August 1988. In 1980, Brazil brought a case
against Spain concerning its tariff treatment of unroasted coffee, with the
panel finding that Spain's measures were not in conformity with GATT
Article I, the most-favored-nation clause.4 1 1 In 1982, Brazil joined eight
other sugar-producing countries in a second complaint against EC sugar
subsidies, with the United States filing separately. This complaint again
resulted in no change in EC policy. 4 12 In 1986, Brazil brought a complaint
against the United States in response to a tariff increase and production
subsidies for non-beverage ethyl alcohol but did not pursue the complaint,
allegedly because of the limited amount of relevant Brazilian exports.
4 13
Two of Brazil's complaints during the 1980s were in response to U.S.
unilateral trade measures under Section 301 of the U.S. 1974 Trade Act,
but these complaints also served to little avail. In 1987, Brazil initiated a
GATT complaint in response to U.S. threats "to impose retaliatory tariff
increases on $700 million of Brazilian exports" because of Brazilian restric-
tions affecting the informatics sector.4 14 The case was settled after Brazil
409. Brazilian Communication, European Communities- Refunds on Exports of Sugar,
GATT Doc. L/4722 (Nov. 14, 1978).
410. See HUDEC,.supra note 5, at 42, 55-56, 137-38 (noting the Agreed Description of
Customary Practice and the Understanding on Dispute Settlement, which respectively
"certified that objective third-party adjudication was established GATT practice" and
committed to make this practice "more effective in the future," including through "a
definition of procedures for creating panels, and some rule-of-thumb time limits for the
various phases of the overall procedure").
411. Brazilian Permanent Delegation, Spain-Tariff Treatment of Unroasted Coffee,
GATT Doc. L/4948 (Feb. 29, 1980). Spain then equalized the tariff rates for all coffee.
See HUDEC, supra note 5, at 484.
412. Permanent Mission of Colombia, EC-Sugar Regime, GATT Doc. L/5309 (Apr. 8,
1982).
413. Permanent Mission of Brazil, Brazilian Exports of Non-Beverage Ethyl Alcohol into
the United States, GATT Doc. L/5993 (May 13, 1986); see HUDEC, supra note 5, at
529-30.
414. Permanent Representative of Brazil, United States- Tariff Increase and Import Pro-
hibition on Brazilian Products, GATT Doc. L/6274 (Nov. 27, 1987); see also HUDEC, supra
note 5, at 552-53.
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agreed to some legislative and administrative changes. 4 15 In 1988, Brazil
filed a complaint in response to U.S. retaliatory tariffs of $39 million in a
Section 301 case concerning pharmaceutical patent protection.4 16 It too
was settled, this time in the context of Brazil's acceptance of the TRIPs
agreement as part of the new WTO. 4 1 7
Brazil also brought unsuccessful complaints against the United States
for violation of most-favored-nation treatment in U.S. countervailing duty
proceedings involving rubber footwear, which it followed with a similar
complaint in 1992,418 and for an export subsidy program benefiting soy-
bean oil. 4 19 The panel decided against Brazil in one case, and Brazil did
not request the formation of a panel in the other. The United States, in
turn, brought two complaints against Brazil during the decade, one in
1983 against Brazilian export subsidies on poultry,420 and the other in
1989 against the Brazilian import licensing regime following the Super 301
listing, 42 1 both of which were settled.4 22
In the first half of the 1990s (just before the WTO's creation), Brazil
brought seven more cases and was a respondent in one, four of which
resulted in a panel report.42 3 These cases, however, largely involved
import relief measures and had a low political profile. Five of Brazil's seven
complaints were again against the United States and the European Commu-
nity, while two were against Mexico. They were:
415. HUDEC, supra note 5, at 552-53.
416. Permanent Mission of Brazil, United States- Request for Consultations Under Arti-
cle 12:1 of the Agreement, GATT Doc. SCM/89 (Aug. 31, 1988) [hereinafter Pharmaceuti-
cals Retaliation].
417. Id.
418. See Comm. on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures, United States- Collection of
Countervailing Duty on Non-Rubber Footwear, 19[1 87-93, GATT Doc. SCM/M/38 (May
31, 1988). The panel found against Brazil, but Brazil blocked adoption of the report. Id.
A separate GATT panel in a subsequent 1992 Brazilian case against the same counter-
vailing duty order found against the United States. See id. No settlement, however,
appears to have been reached to Brazil's satisfaction. See HUDEC, supra note 5, at 566.
419. See Pharmacueticals Retaliations, supra note 416, at 1. Brazil, however, never
requested formation of a panel.
420. Comm. on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures, Brazil- Subsidies on the Export
and Production of Poultry, GATT Doc. SCM/Spec/19 (Sept. 27, 1983). The U.S. com-
plaint followed a similar complaint against the EC. See HUDEC, supra note 5, at 514. The
complaints allegedly were settled after the "major exporters reached an understanding
about mutual restraint on export subsidies." Id.
421. Request for Consultations by Brazil, Brazil-Restrictions on Imports of Certain
Agricultural and Manufactured Products, GATT Doc. DS8/1 (Oct. 11, 1990). It was set-
tled when the Collor government significantly liberalized Brazil's import policies. See
Communication Request by United States, United States- Restrictions on Imports of Cer-
tain Agricultural and Manufactured Products, GATT Doc. DS8/2 (Jan. 12, 1990).
422. See Communication Request by United States, United States- Restrictions on
Imports of Certain Agricultural and Manufactured Products, GATT Doc. DS8/2 (Jan. 12,
1990); HUDEC, supra note 5, at 514.
423. The only complaint brought against Brazil during the 1990s, listed in Annex I,
was the EC complaint brought in 1992 under the Subsidies Code in response to Brazil-
ian countervailing duties on milk powder. See Brazil-Imposition of Provisional and Def in-
itive Countervailing Duties on Milk Powder and Certain Types of Milk from the European
Economic Community, GATT Doc. SCM179, BISD 31S/467 (Jan. 27, 1994).
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(1) complaint against EC anti-dumping measures involving cotton
yarn,42 4
(2) complaint concerning U.S. quantitative restrictions on wool
suits, 4
2 5
(3) complaint against anti-dumping measures imposed by the United
States on steel products,
(4) complaint against the European Community in respect of the con-
cession compensation provided to the United States following the U.S.
GATT complaint against EC protection of oilseed producers,
(5) complaint brought with ten other countries against U.S. internal
measures favoring U.S. tobacco, 426 and
(6) two complaints against Mexico concerning anti-dumping measures
on textiles and electric power transformers respectively, neither of which
resulted in the formation of a panel.42 7
This spurt of Brazilian complaints under the GATT was a response to
the opportunities that the judicialization of GATT dispute settlement
offered, as well as a reflection of internal and external pressures for change
in Brazil's trade and development policies. This early use of GATT dispute
settlement would anticipate Brazil's active engagement under the WTO
system.
424. EC- Imposition of Anti-Dumping Duties on Imports of Cotton Yarn from Brazil,
GATT Doc. ADP/121 (Apr. 8, 1995).
425. US-Restrictions on Imports of Wool Suits from Brazil, GATT Doc. DS37/1 Uan.
28, 1992).
426. United States-Measures Affecting the Importation, Internal Sale and Use of
Tobacco, GATT Doc. DS44/9Rev.1 (Feb. 28, 1994). The U.S. measures were challenged
as a violation of GATT Article III. Id. at '1 1.
427. Brazil brought two complaints against Mexico concerning anti-dumping mea-
sures on textiles and electric power transformers, but neither of them resulted in the
formation of a panel.
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(22 cases: 16 as complainant and 6 as respondent)
Complainant Respondent File Date Duration Case title Consultations Panel
France Brazil 4/25/1949 1949-1957 Internal Taxes x x
UK Brazil 9/15/1953 1953-1954 Compensatory Concessions x
USA Brazil 9/15/1953 1953-1954 Compensatory Concessions x
Brazil UK 12/9/1961 1961-1962 Preferences on Bananas x x
Brazil EEC 11/14/1978 1978-1981 Refunds on Exports of x x
Sugar
Brazil Spain 2/29/1980 1980-1982 Unroasted Coffee x x
Brazil EEC 4/8/1982 1982-1983 Sugar Regime x
USA Brazil 9/27/1983 1983-1984 Subsidies on Poultry x
Brazil USA 5/13/1986 1986-1987 Non-Beverage Ethyl Alcohol x
Brazil USA 11/27/1987 1987-1988 Informatics Retaliation x
Brazil USA 5/31/1988 1988-1992 CVD on Non-Rubber x x
Footwear
Brazil USA 8/24/1988 1988-1990 Pharmaceuticals Retaliation x x
Brazil USA 8/31/1988 1988-1990 EEP Subsidy x
USA Brazil 10/11/1989 1989-1990 QRs on Certain Agriculture x
& Manufactured Products
Brazil Mexico 1/1/1992 1992-1992 AD Proceeding on Brazilian x
Textiles
Brazil Mexico 9/1/1991 1991- AD Actions on Electric x
Power Transformer
Brazil EEC 3/1/1992 1992-1995 AD Duties on Cotton Yarn x x
Brazil USA 4/1/1992 1992-1993 QR on Wool Suits x x
Brazil USA 6/1/1992 1992- AD Actions on Steel x
Products
EEC Brazil 7/1/1992 1992-1994 CVD on Milk Powder x x
Brazil EEC 5/1/1993 1993- Oilseed Concession x
Compensation
Brazil USA 7/23/1993 1993-1994 US Tobacco Restrictions x x
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II. Brazil in the WTO Dispute Settlement System (1995-2007)
A. Brazil as Complainant
Industry/
WT/DS Respondent - File Date and Stages of Products Company Private Consultant
Case Title Proceeding Covered Funding Hired
365 07/11/2007 Systemic for Sidley, Austin,
United States - Domestic Agricultural Brown & Wood
Support and Export Credit Consultations LLM
Guarantees for Agricultural X
Products
269 10/11/2002 Frozen Veirano
European Communities - Poultry; Meat Advogados
Customs Classification of Consultations/ Panel (Poultry);
Frozen Boneless Chicken report/ Appellate Body Meats
report adopted/ Article (processed);
21.3 (c) Arbitration report Salt
adopted
ABEF
267 09/27/2002 Cotton Sidley, Austin,
United States - Subsidies Brown & Wood
on Upland Cotton Consultations/ Panel ABRAPA LLM
report/ Appellate Body
report adopted
266 09/27/2002 Sugar Sidley, Austin,
European Communities - Brown & Wood
Export Subsidies on Sugar Consultations/ Panel report UNICA LLM / Datagro
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted/ Article
21.3 (c) Arbitration report
adopted
259 05/21/2002 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Definitive Gallagher LLM
Safeguard Measures on Consultations/ Panel report IBS
Imports of Certain Steel adopted/ Appellate Body
Products report adopted
250 03/20/2002 Citrus ABECITRUS Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Equalizing Products; Gallagher LLM
Excise Tax Imposed by Consultations/ Panel Fruit Juices
Florida on Processed Formed; Mutually Agreed (Citrus)
Orange and Grapefruit Solution
Products
241 11/07/2001 Meat Veirano
Argentina - Definitive (Poultry) Advogados
Anti-Dumping Duties on Consultations/ Panel report
Poultry from Brazil adopted ABEF
239 09/18/2001 Systemic X
United States - Certain
Measures Regarding Anti- Consultations X
Dumping Methodology
224 01/31/2001 Systemic X
United States - US Patents
Code Consultations X
222 01/22/2001 Aircraft Sidley, Austin,
Canada - Export Credits Brown & Wood
& Loan Guarantees for Consultations/ Panel report Embraer LLM
Regional Aircraft adopted/Article 22.6
Arbitration report adopted
219 12/21/2000 Cast Iron; Theodor Goddard
European Communities - Tube Oil Pipe
Anti-Dumping Duties on Consultations/ Panel Fittings
Malleable Cast Iron Tube or report/ Appellate Body
Pipe Fittings from Brazil report adopted Tupy
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Industry/
WT/DS Respondent - File Date and Stages of Products Company Private Consultant
Case Title Proceeding Covered Funding Hired
218 12/21/2000 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Gallagher LLM
Countervailing Duties on Consultations IBS
Certain Carbon Steel
Products from Brazil
217 12/21/2000 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Continued Gallagher LLM
Dumping & Subsidy Offset Consultations/ Panel report IBS
Act of 2000 adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted/ Article
21.3 (c) Arbitration report
adopted/ Recourse to
Article 22.6 Arbitration
report adopted
216 12/20/2000 Transformers X
Mexico - Provisional Anti- (Electrical)
Dumping Measure on Consultations
Electric Transformers X
209 10/12/2000 Coffee Veirano
European Communities - Advogados
Measures Affecting Soluble Consultations/ Mutual ABICS
Coffee Agreed Solution
208 10/09/2000 Steel and Iron X
Turkey - Anti-Dumping Pipe Fittings
Duty on Steel and Iron Pipe Consultations
Fittings X
190 02/11/2000 Clothing; X
Argentina - Transitional Textiles;
Safeguard Measures on Consultation/Panel- Woven
Certain Imports of Woven Mutually Agreed Solution Fabrics
Fabrics of Cotton and
Cotton Mixtures X
Originating in Brazil
154 12/07/1998 Coffee O'Melveney &
European Communities - Myers
Measures Affecting Consultations ABICS
Differential and Favourable
Treatment of Coffee
112 12/23/1997 Buses and X
Peru - Countervailing Coaches
Duty Investigation Against Consultations
Imports of Buses from X
Brazil
71 03/10/1997 Civil Aircraft Graham & James
Canada - Measures LLP/ Gowling,
Affecting the Export of Consultations Embraer Strathy &
Civilian Aircraft Henderson, Shaw,
Pittman, Potts &
Trowbridge/
Powell, Goldstein,
Frazer & Murphy
LLP
70 03/10/1997 Civil aircraft Graham &James
Canada - Measures LLP / Gowling,
Affecting the Export of Consultations/ Panel report Embraer Strathy &
Civilian Aircraft adopted/ Appellate Body Henderson, Shaw,
report adopted/ Panel Pittman, Potts &
Article 21.5 report Trowbridge/
adopted/ Appellate Body Powell, Goldstein,
Article 21.5 report adopted Frazer & Murphy
LLP
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Industry/
WT/DS Respondent - File Date and Stages of Products Company Private Consultant
Case Title Proceeding Covered Funding Hired
69 02/24/1997 Poultry Bernand O'Connor
European Communities -
Measures Affecting Consultations/ Panel ABEF
Importation of Certain report/ Appellate Body
Poultry Products report adopted/ Mutually
agreed solution
4 04/10/1995 Gasoline Mudge, Rose,
United States - Standards Guthrie, Alexander
for Reformulated and Consultations/ Panel Petrobras & Ferdon LLP
Conventional Gasoline report/ Appellate Body
report adopted
B. Brazil as Respondent
File Date; Products Covered;
WT/DS Complainant Industry/ Company Private
Respondent - Case Stages of Proceeding Funding Consultants Hired
355 12/26/2006 Pet Resin To be determined
Brazil - Anti-Dumping
Measures on Imports of Argentina M&G
Certain Resins from
Argentina Consultations / Panel
(ongoing)
332 06/20/2005 Retreaded Tires Sidley, Austin, Brown
Brazil - Measures & Wood LLM/ Datagro
Affecting Imports of European Systemic
Retreaded Tires Communities
Consultations/
Panel report/ Appellate
Body (ongoing)
(reports not yet
adopted)
229 04/09/2001 Bags; Jute Carvalho de Freitas e
Brazil - Anti-Dumping Ferreira Advogados
Duties on Jute Bags India Associados
from India
Consultations
199 05/30/2000 Systemic X
Brazil - Measures
Affecting Patent United States X
Protection Consultations/ Panel
Mutually Agreed
Solution
197 05/30/2000 Clothing, Textiles X
Brazil - Measures on
Minimum Import United States X
Prices
Consultations
183 10/14/1999 Agricultural Products; X
Brazil - Measures on Textiles
Import Licensing and European
Minimum Import Communities X
Prices
Consultations
116 01/08/1998 Systemic X
Brazil - Measures
Affecting Payment European X
Terms for Imports (EC) Communities
Consultations
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File Date; Products Covered;
WT/DS Complainant Industry/ Company Private
Respondent - Case Stages of Proceeding Funding Consultants Hired
81 05/07/1997 Automobiles X
Brazil - Measures
Affecting Trade and European X
Investment in the Communities
Automotive Sector (EC)
Consultations
65 01/10/1997 Automobiles X
Brazil - Certain
Measures Affecting United States X
Trade and Investment
in the Automotive Consultations
Sector
52 08/09/1996 Automotive Parts; X
Brazil - Certain Motor Vehicles; Parts
Measures Affecting United States
Trade and Investment X
in the Automotive Consultations
Sector
51 07/30/1996 Motor Vehicles; Parts X
Brazil - Certain
Automotive Investment Japan X
Measures
Consultations
46 06/19/1996 Aircraft Graham & James LLP/
Brazil - Export Gowling, Strathy &
Financing Programme Canada Embraer Henderson, Shaw,
for Aircraft Pittman, Potts &
Consultations/ Panel Trowbridge/ Powell,
report adopted/ Goldstein, Frazer &
Appellate Body report Murphy LLP
adopted/ Article 21.5
Panel report adopted/
Article 21.5 Appellate
Body report adopted/
Recourse to Article
22.6 Arbitration report
adopted/ Second
Recourse to Article
21.5 Panel report
adopted
30 02/23/1996 Coconut; Coconut Milk X
Brazil - Measures Powder
Affecting Desiccated Sri Lanka
Coconut and Coconut Trade Association
Milk Powder Consultations
22 11/30/1995 Coconut O'Melveny & Myers
Brazil - Measures
Affecting Desiccated Philippines Trade Association
Coconut
Consultations/ Panel
report adopted/
Appellate Body report
1 adopted
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C. Brazil as Third Party
File Date; Products Covered; Private
WT/DS; Complainant; Industry/ Consultants
Respondent/Title Stages of Proceeding Company Funding Hired
353 06/27/2005 Civil Aircraft King & Spalding
United States - Measures LLP
Affecting Trade in Large European Communities Embraer
Civil Aircraft - Second
Complaint Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
350 10/02/2006 Systemic Sidley, Austin,
United States - Continued Brown & Wood
Existence and Application of European Communities X LLM
Zeroing Methodology
Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
347 01/31/2006 Civil Aircraft King & Spalding
European Communities - LLP
Measures Affecting Trade in United States Embraer
Large Civil Aircraft (Second
Complaint) Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
345 06/06/2006 Systemic Sidley, Austin,
United States - Customs Brown & Wood
Bond Directive for India X LLM
Merchandise Subject to Anti-
Dumping/Countervailing Consultations/Panel
Duties (ongoing)
343 04/24/2006 Systemic Sidley, Austin,
United States - Measures Brown & Wood
Relating to Shrimp from Thailand X LLM
Thailand
Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
342 04/13/2006 Systemic Sidley, Austin,
China - Measures Affecting Brown & Wood
Imports of Automobile Parts Canada X LLM
Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
340 03/30/2006 Systemic Sidley, Austin,
China - Measures Affecting Brown & Wood
Imports of Automobile Parts United States X LLM
Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
339 03/30/2006 Systemic Sidley, Austin,
China - Measures Affecting Brown & Wood
Imports of Automobile Parts European Communities X LLM
Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
335 11/17/2005 Systemic Sidley, Austin,
United States - Anti- Brown & Wood
Dumping Measure on Ecuador X LLM
Shrimp from Ecuador
Consultations/Panel Report
adopted
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File Date; Products Covered; Private
WT/DS; Complainant; Industry/ Consultants
Respondent/Title Stages of Proceeding Company Funding Hired
324 12/09/2004 Shrimps; X
United States - Provisional Processed shrimps
Anti-Dumping Measures on Thailand
Shrimp from Thailand X
Consultations (no panel
established nor settlement
notified)
321 11/08/2004 Hormones X
Canada - Continued
Suspension of Obligations in European Communities X
the EC - Hormones Dispute
Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
320 11/08/2004 Hormones X
United States - Continued
Suspension of Obligations in European Communities X
the EC - Hormones Dispute
Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
317 10/06/2004 Civil Aircraft Sidley, Austin,
United States - Large Civil Brown & Wood
Aircraft European Communities Embraer LLM
Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
316 10/06/2004 Civil Aircraft Sidley, Austin,
European Communities and Brown & Wood
Certain Member States - United States Embraer LLM
Large Civil Aircraft
Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
315 09/21/2004 Systemic X
European Communities -
Selected Customs Matters United States X
Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
294 06/12/2003 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Laws, Gallagher LLM
Regulation and Methodology European Communities IBS
for Calculating Dumping
Margins ("Zeroing") Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
293 05/14/2003 Biotech X
European Communities -
Measures Affecting the Argentina X
Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products (United Consultations/Panel
States) (ongoing)
292 05/13/2003 Biotech x
European Communities -
Measures Affecting the Canada X
Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
291 05/13/2003 Biotech X
European Communities -
Measures Affecting the United States X
Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products (Argentina) Consultations/Panel
(ongoing)
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File Date; Products Covered; Private
WT/DS; Complainant; Industry/ Consultants
Respondent/Tide Stages of Proceeding Company Funding Hired
290 04/17/2003 Agricultural X
European Communities - Products and
Protection of Trademarks & Australia Foodstuffs
Geographical Indications for
Agricultural Products and Consultations/Panel report X
Foodstuffs (Australia) adopted
286 03/25/2003 Frozen Boneless Veirano
European Communities - Chicken Advogados
Customs Clarification of Thailand
Frozen Boneless Chicken ABEF
Cuts (Thailand) Consultations/Panel report
adopted/Appellate Body
report adopted/ Article
21.3(b) Arbitration report
adopted
283 03/14/2003 Sugar Sidley, Austin,
European Communities - Brown & Wood
Export Subsidies on Sugar Thailand UNICA LLM
(Thailand)
Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted/ Article
21.3(b) Arbitration report
adopted
265 09/17/2002 Sugar Sidley, Austin,
European Communities - Brown & Wood
Export Subsidies on Sugar Australia UNICA LLM / Datagro
(Australia)
Consultations/Panel report
adopted/Appellate Body
report adopted/ Article 21.3
(b) Arbitration report
adopted
258 05/14/2002 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Definitive Gallagher LLM
Safeguard Measures on New Zealand IBS
Imports of Certain Steel
Products Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
254 04/04/2002 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Definitive Gallagher LLM
Safeguard Measures on Norway IBS
Imports of Certain Steel
Products Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
253 04/03/2002 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Definitive Gallagher LLM
Safeguard Measures on Switzerland IBS
Imports of Certain Steel
Products Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
252 03/26/2002 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Definitive Gallagher LLM
Safeguard Measures on China IBS
Imports of Certain Steel
Products Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
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File Date; Products Covered; Private
WT/DS; Complainant; Industry/ Consultants
Respondent/Title Stages of Proceeding Company Funding Hired
251 03/20/2002 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Definitive Gallagher LLM
Safeguard Measures on Korea IBS
Imports of Certain Steel
Products Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
249 03/20/2002 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Definitive Gallagher LLM
Safeguard Measures on Japan IBS
Imports of Certain Steel
Products Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
248 03/07/2002 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Definitive Gallagher LLM
Safeguard Measures on European Communities IBS
Imports of Certain Steel
Products Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
246 03/05/2002 Coffee Veirano
European Communities - Advogados
Conditions for the Granting India ABICS
of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted/ Article
21.3(c) Arbitration report
adopted
245 03/01/2002 Apples X
Japan - Measures Affecting
the Importation of Apples United States X
Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted/ Article 21.5
Panel report adopted/
Mutually Agreed Solution
244 01/30/2002 Steel (Carbon) X
United States - Sunset
Review of Anti-Dumping Japan X
Duties on Corrosion-
Resistant Carbon Steel Flat Consultations/Panel report
Products from Japan adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
234 05/21/2001 Steel Products Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Continued Gallagher LLM
Dumping and Subsidy Offset Canada IBS
Act of 2000
Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted/Article 21.3
(c) arbitration a report
adopted/ Recourse to Article
22.6 Arbitration report
adopted
Cornell International Law Journal
File Date; Products Covered; Private
WT/DS; Complainant; Industry/ Consultants
Respondent/Title Stages of Proceeding Company Funding Hired
212 11/10/2000 Pasta; Stainless Wilkie, Farr &
United States - Steel Plate; Steel Gallagher LLM
Countervailing Measures European Communities (Carbon); Steel
Concerning Certain Products
Products from the European Consultations/Panel report
Communities adopted/ Appellate Body IBS
report adopted/ Article 21.5
Panel report adopted
207 10/05/2000 Agricultural X
Chile - Price Band System Products
and Safeguard Measures Argentina
Relating to Certain X
Agricultural Products Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted/Article 21.3
(c) Arbitration report
adopted/ Article 21.5 Panel
report adopted/ Article 21.5
Appelate Body report
adopted
204 08/17/2000 Systemic X
Mexico - Measures
Affecting United States X
Telecommunications Services
Consultations/Panel report
adopted
184 11/18/1999 Steel Products X
United States - Anti-
Dumping Measures on Japan X
Certain Hot-Rolled Steel
Products from Japan Consultations/Panel report
adopted/Appellate Body
report adopted/Recourse to
Article 21.3 (c) arbitration
report adopted
174 06/01/1999 Agricultural X
European Communities - Products
Protection of Trademarks United States
and Geographical X
Indications for Agricultural Consultation/Panel report
Products and Foodstuffs adopted
160 01/26/1999 Systemic X
United States - Section
110(5) of the U.S. Copyright European Communities X
Act
Consultation/Panel report
adopted/Article 21.3 (c)
Arbitration report adopted/
Recourse to Article 22.6
Arbitration report adopted
152 11/25/1998 Systemic X
United States - Section 301-
310 of the Trade Act of 1974 European Communities X
Consultations/ Panel report
adopted
138 06/12/1998 Steel (Carbon) Wilkie, Farr &
Unites States - Imposition European Communities Gallagher LLM
of Countervailing Duties on IBS
Certain Hot-Rolled Lead and Consultations/Panel report
Bismuth Carbon Steel adopted/ Appellate Body
Products Originating in the report adopted
United Kingdom
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File Date; Products Covered; Private
WT/DS; Complainant; Industry/ Consultants
Respondent/Title Stages of Proceeding Company Funding Hired
135 05/28/1998 Asbestos X
European Communities -
Measures Affecting Asbestos Canada X
and Asbestos-Containing Consultations/Panel report
Products adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
121 04/06/1998 Foot-wear X
Argentina - Safeguard
Measures on Imports of European Communities X
Footwear
Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
114 12/19/1997 Pharmaceutical X
Canada - Patent Protection Products
of Pharmaceutical Products European Communities
x
Consultation/Panel report
adopted/ Arbitration under
Article 21.3 (c)
108 11/18/1997 Systemic X
United States - Tax
Treatment for "Foreign Sales European Communities X
Corporations"
Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted/ Article 21.5
Panel report adopted/ Article
21.5 Appellate Body report
adopted/ Recourse to Article
22.6 Arbitration report
adopted/ Second Recourse to
Article 21.5 Panel Report
adopted/ Second Recourse to
Article 21.5 Appellate Body
Report adopted
89 07/10/1997 Colour Television X
United States - Imposition Receivers
of Anti-Dumping Duties on Korea
Imports of Colour Television X
Receivers from Korea Consultation/Panel
(withdrawn)
76 04/07/1997 Agricultural X
Japan - Measures Affecting Products
Agricultural Products United States
x
Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted
27 02/05/1996 Bananas X
Article 21.5 European
Communities - Regime for Ecuador; Guatemala; X
Importation, Sale and Honduras; Mexico; United
Distribution of Bananas States
Consultations/Panel report
adopted/ Appellate Body
report adopted/ Article 21.3
(c) Arbitration report
adopted/ Article 21.5 Panel
report adopted/ Recourse to
Article 22.6 Arbitration
report adopted/ Mutually
Agreed Solution
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III. Brazilian Exports and Imports 1995-2006428
Brazil Exports (in USD million)
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
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Brazil Imports (in USD million)
428. United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, available at http://
comtrade.un.org/.
File Date; Products Covered; Private
WT/DS; Complainant; Industry/ Consultants
Respondent/Title Stages of Proceeding Company Funding Hired
56 10/04/1996 Footwear, Textiles, X
Argentina - Measures Apparel, and
Affecting Imports of United States Other Items
Footwear, Textiles, Apparel
and Other Items Consultations/ Panel report X
adopted/ Appellate Body
_ report adopted
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1MEuropean Union JUnited States 0 China Ojapan ElArgentina
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IV. List of Connected Cases in Which Brazil Was a
Third Party (1995-2007)429
Complainant and
Brazil as a Single, Consolidated
Product Complainant or Brazil as a Panel or AB
Sector/Issue Respondent Third Party Report Adopted
Boneless DS269 (Brazil/EC) DS286 (Thailand/EC) Yes
Chicken
Sugar DS266 (Brazil/EC) DS283 (Thailand/EC) Yes
DS265 (Australia/EC)
Steel DS259 (Brazil/US) DS258 (New Zealand/US) Yes
DS254 (Norway/US)
DS253 (Switzerland/US)
DS252 (China/US)
DS251 (Korea/US)
DS249 (Japan/US)
DS248 (EC/US)
AD DS239 (Brazil/US) DS244 (Japan/US) No*
Methodology
CVD DS218 (Brazil/US) DS212 (EC/US) No*
DS138 (EC/US)
Byrd DS217 (Brazil/US) DS234 (Canada/US) Yes
Amendment
Coffee DS154 (Brazil/EC) DS209 (Brazil/EC) No*
DS246 (India/EC)t
Brazil as a Single, Consolidated
Brazil as a Third Third Party in a Panel or AB Report
Issue Party Parallel Case Adopted
Footwear DS121 (EC/Argentina) DS56 (US/Argentina) No*
Trademarks DS174 (US/EC) DS290 (Australia/EC) Separate**
Biotech DS291 (US/EC) DS292 (Canada/EC) Yes
DS293 (Argentina/EC)
Aircraft DS316 (US/EC) DS317 (EC/US) In process
EC/Hormones DS320 (EC/US) DS321 (EC/Canada) Yes
Automobiles DS339 (EC/China) DS340 (US/China) In process
DS342 (Canada/China)
f The cases were only indirectly related because both involved tariff preferences, which is why
the Brazilian coffee trade association hired the same counsel to follow the case.
* "No" means that neither of the cases resulted in an adopted panel report.
** The cases were litigated before a single panel but, pursuant to a request by the EC, the Panel
submitted separate reports. See Panel Report, EC- Protection of Trademarks and Geographical
Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs, '19 2.13-2.15, WT/DS174/R (Mar. 15, 2005).
429. Documents Online, http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited May 25, 2008). Cases
are as of December 31, 2007.

